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ABSTRACT 
"The Appellate Question: A Comparative Analysis 
of Supreme Courts of Appeal 
in Virginia and Louisiana, 1776-1840 11 
This dissertation examines the processes that created 
supreme courts of appeal in Virginia and Louisiana and 
challenges the traditional view of Louisiana as an anomaly 
in the American judicial system. Comparison of the 
development of the Supreme Court of Louisiana to that of 
Virginia reveals important similarities in judicial 
practices and procedures, legal theory, and the role the 
courts played in the early political development of each 
state. In every area, the two states shared important 
intellectual and historical experiences. 
In order to investigate the creation of these 
jurisdictions, this dissertation examines the political 
climate cf both 3tates; the background, education, and 
politics of the judges; the rules of court which they 
developed; and the jurisprudence that defined the structure 
and operation of the courts. Accordingly, the judicial 
history of both states reflects the political changes which 
governed the era. The study of the development of the 
jurisdictions, moreover, chronicles the structural changes 
that influenced a pronounced shift from "moral" or 
"republican" principles of law to a more pragmatic and 
activist approach to justice in nineteenth-century America. 
Finally, the profound influence of the common law and Anglo-
American patterns of judicature on Louisiana's legal 
institutions sugges·ts a reconsideration of the state's place 
in the mainstream of American legal history. 
Mark Frederick Fernandez 
Department of History 
College of William and Mary in Virginia 
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Chapter One 
Introduction: 
Judicial History and the Early Republic 
Law and society bond in an intricate dance. Law courts 
provide the stage while litigants, lawyers, judges, and 
politicians perform, each to his or her own capabilities, a 
dazzling array of gestures and poses. Sometimes the 
performance is graceful and consistent, at other times, 
abstract and avant garde. The result, no matter how 
brilliant or amateurish, mirrors the essence of society 
because the manner in which individuals and corporations 
resolve their disputes speaks to the very nature of 
civilization. 
Every known human community has either written its 
own laws or relied on the collective memory of its 
inhabitants to define the limits and regulations of its 
society. But laws alone do not illustrate much about a 
particular culture. statutes remain on the books long after 
their particular usefulness has disappeared, customary 
conventions influence legal commentary merely because they 
concerned a previous generation of thinkers, and legal 
principles by themselves are stationary without devices to 
prime their evolution. Courts and jurisprudence provide the 
instruments needed to interpret the workaday problems and 
solutions which underscore the rhythms of the dance between 
law and society. 
2 
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Scholars have applied numerous devices to interpret the 
dance. Investigation of jurisprudence and judicial 
institutions, however, has not been one that they have 
pursued vigorously. Although many outstanding studies of 
the Supreme Court of the United States and federal courts 
are available, little is known of the origins and 
development of early state tribunals. Indeed, scholars have 
paid ~cant attention to the development of state governments 
in the early national period. 
One promising approach to the study of early state 
government is to incorporate law and legal culture into the 
general scheme of state politics. The role of the judiciary 
comprises a major segment of the study of the origin and 
development of state government. Courts not only represent 
a central feature of the American political system, the men 
and women who sit on those courts and argue before them also 
often use their legal background as a point of entry onto 
the avenues of power. Moreover, courts represent the arena 
where ordinary individuals realize their most important 
contacts with the state. An examination of the role and 
development of state courts, accordingly, provides something 
much more important than a mere history of the law. Through 
the study of courts and their accompanying culture, the 
subtle contest between competing and complementary elites 
may be approached at the most elementary level. Creation of 
courts within states, subsequent practice and procedure, and 
the role of the bench in defining a given state's legal 
3 
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culture offer a rich fund of sources for interpretation. If 
two or more states are considered in a controlled 
comparison, a sweeping analysis of law, society, culture, 
politics, conflict, and consensus becomes possible. 
Choosing elements of comparison, however, presents an 
important problem. Analysis of all the courts of early 
American states poses insurmountable difficulties because of 
the sheer volume of documentation and the lack of a 
sufficient support network of secondary literature.l 
Regional development looms as the most promising venue. Yet 
even a regional focus represents a tedious and unmanageable 
4 
research problem. An effective scheme for such analysis 
lies in the choice of two comparative jurisdictions. For 
the south, one strategic pairing is Virginia and Louisiana. 
Virginia is an obvious choice because of the influence 
the Old Dominion had in the development of the nation's 
judicial system. Virginia's lawyers, judges, and legal 
scholars pioneered professional techniques and often 
migrated to neighboring states seeking fortune and fame. 
Within those communities, Virginians frequently assumed 
prominent positions among the elite. Thus as politicians, 
litigants, judges, and lawyers, the sons of the Old Dominion 
played important roles in creating the legal culture of 
their adopted states. The court structures and legal 
lHistorians have yet to provide students with a sound 
analysis of judicial development, the rise of the bar, and 
the relationship between courts and society even in a 
regional context. 
---------------
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procedures first fleshed out in Virginia became the 
foundations upon which the southern legal system was built.2 
Louisiana, however, may seem an odd choice. Its 
diverse creole culture and civilian heritage have led 
historians to conclude that Louisiana 1 s legal system 
represents an anachronism in American law. Home-grown 
historians have reveled in the minutiae of its uniqueness, 
and mainstream American legal scholars have shied away from 
studying Louisiana because of its civil law traditions. 
Even scholars of codification in America have shunned the 
study of Louisiana, arguing that its civilian legal system 
differs too much from the marriage of codes and common law 
that typified American practice elsewhere in the nineteenth 
century.3 But these scholars misinterpret the origins of 
Louisiana's legal system. 
~ihen the French prefect, Pierre Clement de Laussat, 
arrived in Louisiana to receive the colony from Spain in 
1803, he suspended all of the offices of the Spanish 
government. Laussat's actions are inexplicable since the 
2A. G. Roeber, Faithful Magistrates and Republican 
Lawyers: Creators of Virginia Legal Culture, 1680-1810, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press in 
Association with the American Society for Legal History, 
1981), 258. 
3Lawrence Friedman has recently stated that Louisiana 
has no common law heritage, Lawrence Friedman, American_Law: 
An Introduction, (New York: w. w. Norton & Company, 1984), 
44. Charles M. Cook, The American Codification Movement: A 
Study of Antebellum Legal Reform, (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1981), argued that Louisiana's codification 
movement was ancillary to the movement in America's common 
law states, "it occurred in its own very special milieu, 
quite independent of law reforms elsewhere," x. 
5 
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purpose of his mission required him to receive the colony 
merely for the purpose of transferring it to the Americans. 
since he did not have time to restructure the legal system 
before the transfer, the United States acquired a territory 
totally devoid of official laws and legal institutions. 
Thus, American authorities inherited a major jurisdictional 
problem: the legal vacuum would have to be filled under the 
watchful eyes of a cautious and distrustful anciene 
population that feared the suspension of its traditional 
legal customs at the moment of transfer would lead to 
confusion, disfranchisement, and dispossession. 
At the same time, Louisiana's entry into the United 
states required the extension of certain constitutional 
guarantees, some of them firmly rooted in the Anglo-American 
tradition of justice. President Thomas Jefferson and the 
men he chose as territorial officials wanted to impose a 
representative American system of law and justice on the new 
territory, hoping that conformity in the le~al arena would 
speed up the Americanization of Louisiana. Jefferson, 
however, was a practical man who understood that the 
wholesale destruction of the civilian system might spark 
resistance to the American administration. He accordingly 
advised his officials to pursue a cautious policy which 
ensured basic American liberties and encouraged the 
reception of American judicial principles, yet allowed the 
ancienne population to retain many of its familiar legal 
traditions. 
6 
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on the whole, Jefferson's policy succeeded largely 
through the efforts of a bench and bar. that was dominated by 
Americans, especially on the high appellate level. The 
study of Louisiana's law courts and legal culture in the 
early national period chronicles the success of Jefferson's 
policy. Comparison of Louisiana to Virginia, which may be 
considered a representative model of an Anglo-American 
comm,::>n law jtlrisdiction, will illustrate that the two states 
derived their legal systems from remarkably similar 
experiences. 
The question of how to study these two seemingly 
disparate systems raises difficult research problems. 
Parish and county records are far from complete and offer 
more to social historians than to legal or political 
scholars, since the lower courts' records mainly reflect 
local considerations. Although local legal concerns are 
useful tools in uncovering the intricacies of the legal 
system, the role of the judiciary in the development of the 
states' higher courts of appeal is a more attractive 
subject. In those courts, judges defined their 
jurisdictions, set standards of practice and education for 
the bar, and articulated time and again the role of the 
judiciary within the limits of their respective 
constitutions. As yet, the history of these early 
jurisdictions has attracted the attention of few scholars. 
General studies of Virginia legal institutions have 
been written. A. G. Roeber's Faithful Magistrates and 
7 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Republican Lawyers offers the most consistent treatment from 
the revolutionary through the early national period. After 
describing the Old Dominion's legal system from the 
beginning through the American Revolution, Roeber argues 
that the republican ideology of the era assisted Virginians 
in a major effort to transform their jurisdiction into a 
forward-looking model of Ainerican justice. By the early 
nineteenth century, Virginians recreated their courts, law, 
and bar into modern, American institutions, creating a 
wholly new jurisdiction for the Old Dominion.4 Roeber, 
however, is concerned with an ideological investigation of 
the legal system as a whole and does not deal with specific 
courts in detail. 
Two older institutional studies probe the history of 
Virginia's courts. Unfortunately, Oliver P. Chitwood and 
George Lewis Chumbley ended their investigations with the 
American Revolution.5 Hugh Rankin's study of criminal 
proceedings before the General Court also stopped short of 
4Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, passim. Roeber's 
critics have accused him of overstating the dynamic aspects 
of Virginia's revision its courts and legal system. J. 
Thomas Wren, has even argued that Roeber has not only 
misunderstood the ideology at work in the Virginia 
commonwealth, but also weakened his analysis by employing 
Morton Horwitz's transformation thesis. 
5oliver P. Chitwood, Justice in Colonial Virginia, 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1905); 
George Lewis Chumbley, Colonial Justice in Virginia: The 
Development of a Judicial System, Typical Laws and Cases of 
the Period, (Richmond: The Dietz Press, 1938). 
8 
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the early national period.6 
Thomas R. Morris's, The Virginia supreme court: An 
Institutional and Political Analysis, offers a substantial 
treatment of Virginia's appellate system; however, Morris 
focuses on analyzing the modern court. Consequently, he 
offers only a bare-bones institutional description of the 
early court, a list of its judges, and a brief treatment of 
the conception of judicial review.7 
John Thomas Wren's critical legal study "Republican 
Jurisprudence: Virginia Law and the New Order, 1776-1830 11 
presents a detailed analysis of the jurisprudence of the 
court of Appeals. 8 Wren argues that the decisions of the 
court placsd a "conservative gloss" on the republican 
9 
settlement of the Revolution in Virginia. Judges adhered to 
the ideals of the Revolution, but in a pragmatic and 
conservative way, usually deferring to the legislative will. 
Wren's investigation represents the only detailed discussion 
of the jurisprudence of Virginia's Supreme Court; however, 
it does not deal closely with the men who sat on the bench 
or the procedures they developed. 
Study of Virginia's judges and its bar are scarce. 
6Hugh F. Rankin, Criminal Trial Proceedings in the 
General Court of Colonial Virginia, (Williamsburg: Colonial 
Williamsburg, 1965). 
7Thomas Robbins Morris, The Virginia supreme Court: An 
Institutional and Political Analysis, (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1975). 
8John Thomas Wren, "Republican Jurisprudence: Virginia 
Law and the New Order, 1776-1830, 11 (Ph. D. diss., College of 
William and Mary, 1988). 
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Biographies of St. George Tucker, Spencer Roane, and Edmund 
Pendleton9 focus on their roles as shapers of the Old 
Dominion's political tradition rather than their 
contributions as appellate court judges. Of these, Charles 
T. Cullen in "St. George Tucker and the Law, 11 presents th~ 
only real glimpse of how a judge in the post-Revolutionary 
period influenced the growth of the state's legal system. 
Most of the literature on Virginia's early lawyers and 
10 
judges is relegated to brief, antiquarian (and largely 
unreliable) memorials and sketches in nineteenth-century bar 
journals. Much of the scholarship in the bar journals, 
however, was executed by reporters who, quite often, were 
relatives, friends, or students of the subjects. 
No procedural studies of the early court exist. 
Specialized studies of court rules, the relationship between 
the bench and the bar, and the use of judicial decisions a.nd 
statutes are desperately needed. One asp8ct of the 
relationship between the bench and bar, however, has been 
studied--legal education. In the best analysis of the 
subject, w. Hamilton Bryson employs a biographical study of 
9Mary Haldane Coleman, st. George Tucker, Citizen of No 
Mean city, (Richmond: The Dietz Press, 1938); Charles T. 
Cullen, 11St. George Tucker and the Law in Virginia, 1772-
1804,11 (Ph. D. diss., University of Virginia, 1971); Rex 
Beach, "Judge Spencer Roane, A Champion of States' Rights," 
(M. A. thesis. University of Virginia, 1941); Clyde c. 
Gelbach, " Spencer Roane of Virginia, 1762-1822, A Judicial 
Advocate of states Rights," (Ph. D. diss., University of 
Pittsburgh, 1955); Margaret E. Horsnell, "Spencer Roane: 
Judicial Advocate of Jeffersonian Principles," (Ph. D. 
diss., University of Minnesota, 1967); David J. Mays, Edmund 
.Pendleton, 1721-1803: A Biographv, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), 2 vols. 
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11 
every major Virginia law professor from George Wythe (1726-
1806) to Ralph Tunnicliff Catterall (1897-1978), but he doe~ 
not investigate the role of the court in policing the 
standards of legal education in the Old Dominion.10 
Nonetheless, sketches provided by Charles Cullen, E. Lee 
Shepard, George Curtis, and Bryson himself offer an 
excellent overview of the impact of individual professors on 
the study of law in the Old Dominion. Work in progress by 
E. Lee Shepard promises an even more comprehensive approach. 
Thus the history of the appellate courts in the Old 
Dominion presents an intriguing topic for historical 
analysis. Basic intellectual and institutional questions as 
well as the history of the state's jurisdiction remain to be 
considered. Their coverage will offer a vibrant 
illustration of the inner workings of the judicial aspects 
of early American state-building. 
Louisiana's high court of appeals presents an even more 
challenging topic. So little has been written about this 
state's early courts that even the most humble contribution 
will provide valuable insight. Most of Louisiana's legal 
history consists of specialized studies of the fine points 
of civil law in legal publications. Since this literature 
is so prevalent and so specialized, it has caused historians 
to interpret Louisiana as a unique, almost mystical 
jurisdiction, whose study is open only to civil law experts. 
lOw. Hamilton Bryson, Legal Education in Virginia,l779-
1979: A Biographical Approach, (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1982). 
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12 
Moreover, the emphasis on the subtleties of the civilian 
jurisdiction have obscured contributions of the common law 
to Louisiana's legal heritage. One exception to this, 
however, may be glimpsed in warren Billings' bibliographical 
study "The Sources of Louisiana's Legal History," which 
provides not only a solid analysis of both primary and 
secondary sources but compelling suggestions on the 
opportunities for research in the fie1d.11 
The best general studies of Louisiana's legal system in 
the early national and antebellum eras follow this standard 
interpretation. Despite their overemphasis on Louisiana's 
civil heritage, these works offer informative glimpses into 
the origins of the state's legal system. In "Louisiana Law: 
Its Development in the First Quarter Century of American 
Rule," Samuel Groner traces the transition from territory to 
state. Groner's overarching thesis, however, centers on the 
conflict between Louisiana's ancienne populat~on and its new 
American citizens (a clash that Groner and subsequent 
critics misnamed the "creole-American conflict") over the 
nature of the jurisdiction.l2 Groner analyzes the motives 
11warren M. Billings, "Louisiana Legal History and its 
Sources: Needs, Opportunities, and Approaches," in Edward F. 
Haas, ed., Louisiana's Legal Heritage, (New Orleans: The 
Perdido Bay Press, 1983), 189-202. 
12Groner defines "Creoles," as the various native 
inhabitants of New Orleans. American-born newcomers such as 
Edward Livingston, however, were allied with the 'creole' 
faction, and the many members of the group which constituted 
Louisiana's anciene population allied themselves with the 
so-called 'American' faction of the struggle. Moreover, the 
term is problematical since outside of Louisiana, all 
American born inhabitants of the Atlantic coast are referred 
--------
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behind the so-called Code of 1808 and views the creation of 
the legal system as a triumph for the civilian oriented 
members of the ancienne population.l3 
Elizabeth Gaspar Brown's "Legal Systems in Conflict: 
1804-1812 11 and "Law and Government in the Louisiana 
purchase: 1803-1804" offer fine legal analyses of the 
territorial period. Brown, like Groner, portrays the 
ancienne population and American groups in an adversarial 
relationship which culminates in the adoption of the Digest 
of 1808, again seen as a triumph for the civilians. 
Consequently, Brown does not consider the role of English 
and American judicial and legal traditions in creating the 
state's mixed jurisdiction.l4 
Following the traditions established by Groner and 
Brown, George Dargo also focuses on the •creole-American 
conflict' in his Jefferson's Louisiana. Dargo, like his 
intellectual predecessors, places most of his emphasis on 
the compilation of the Digest of 1808 and on the celebrated 
batture case which involved the ascendancy of certain 
aspects of civil law as the basis for r.ouisiana' s private 
13 
to as "creoles," therefore, many of the so-called 
"Americans" in this conflict could technically be considered 
"creole." 
13samuel B. Groner, "Louisiana Law: Its Development in 
the First Quarter Century of American Rule," Louisiana Law 
Review, (January 1948), 350-382. 
14Elizabeth Gaspar Brown "Legal Systems in Conflict: 
Orleans Territory, 1804-1812, 11 American Journal of Legal 
History, (1957), 35-75; "Law and Government in the Louisiana 
Purchase: 1803-1804 1 11 Wayne Law Review, 2 (1956), 169-189. 
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law. Although buried inside Dargo's analysis (which is 
aptly subtitled the "Clash of Legal Traditions") is the 
crucial statement tha'c. the civilian emphasis of Louisiana 1 s 
legal tradition applies only to specific areas of private 
law, the overarching tone and exposition of Dargo's study 
obscures that telling admission.15 By emphasizing the 
batture controversy, Dargo leaves room for a broader 
interpretation of the role that the territorial appellate 
courts played in creating Louisiana's mixed jurisdiction.16 
Richard H. Kilbourne, Jr.'s A History of the Louisiana 
civil Code: The Formative Years. 1803-1839 follows in the 
tradition of Groner, Brown, and Dargo,17 but takes on added 
14 
jurisprudential sophistication. By analyzing the social, 
political, and legal conditions which led to the drafting of 
the Digest of 1808 and the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, 
Kilbourne presents a thoughtful analysis of the development 
of Spanish legal conventions in Louisiana. He rightly 
15George Dargo, Jefferson's Louisian~: Politics and the 
Clash of Legal Traditions, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1975), 171. 
16:r.ruch of what Dargo left out may be gleaned from an 
investigation of the records of the Superior Court for the 
Territory of Orleans and from Lewis Kerr's An Exposition of 
the criminal Laws of the Territory of Orleans, (New Orleans: 
Published in Pursuance of an Act of the Legislature of the 
Territory, Entitled, 11An Act for the Punishment of Crimes 
and Misdemeanors," (sect. 48), Passed May 4, 1805; rept. Wm. 
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., 1986). 
17Richard H. Kilbourne, Jr., A History of the Louisiana 
civil Code: The F~ ·mative Years. 1803-1839, (Baton Rouge: 
The Center of civll Law studies, published by The 
Publications Institute Paul M. Hebert Law Center Louisiana 
state University, 1987). 
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concludes that the early codes of Louisiana drew much more 
from the Spanish legal tradition than from the French. 
Also, via a selective analysis of the jurisprudence of the 
Superior Court for the Territory of Orleans and the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana, Kilbourne reveals the existence of a 
strong common law tradition in Louisiana--a tradition based 
on Spanish civil law! English and American principles of 
law and jurisprudence do not concern Kilbourne's study. 
Elizabeth Gaspard's "Rise of the Louisiana Bar" presents a 
fine starting point for a history of the state's bar. 
Although her work focuses on the period from 1813 to 1840 
and does not consider the territorial period, it offers 
revealing evidence about the state's early legal culture. 
15 
Most important, Gaspard chronicles the doininance of American 
attorneys, pointing out that only 13% of the state's 
attorneys could boast Creole origins.18 
On legal education, Warren M. Billings's "A Course of 
Study" explores the requirements that the early judges set 
for prospective members of the bar. His study identifies 
the law books assigned by the judges and assesses the 
profound impact of those works on the state's law and 
jurisprudence, however, a large-scale attempt at defining 
the role of the court in ministering to the modernization of 
18Elizabeth Gaspard, "Rise of the Louisiana Bar," 
Louisiana History, (Spring 1987), 183-197; Gaspard is 
currently at work on a dissertation which will present a 
larger scale history of the bar during this period. 
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legal education in Louisiana remains untried.l9 
Louisiana's judicial history is almost non-existent. 
Although specialized studies of the role of the judge in 
Louisiana in the modern period hint that aspects of the 
common law principle of stare decisis20 owe their origins to 
Louisiana's early courts, they do not follow up that insight 
into the state's legal history. The best of these studies 
is Joseph Dainow's The Role of Judicial Decisions and 
Doctrine which probes into various differences between the 
mixed jurisdictions of Quebec, Louisiana, South Africa, 
France, Germany, Scotland, and Israel. Jean Baudouin•s 
analysis of the impact of common law on the legal syste1:ts of 
Louisiana and Quebec presents the most useful investigation 
of Louisiana's courts. Baudouin points out that Quebec's 
present-day judges adhere to doctrine much more closely than 
th~ir counterparts in Louisiana, who must mingle stare 
d~ci~is into their decisions (this requirement is still 
evident after the civilian renaissance of the 1940s). 
Albert Tate, Jr., further builds on Baudouin's distinctions 
as he analyzes the differences between civilian judges ~n 
France and Louisiana. Tate argues persuasively that 
Louisiana's judges are trained to practice in an entirely 
different milieu from those in civilian jurisdictions. 
Although both of these studies concentrate on the role of 
19warren M. Billings, "A Course of studies: Books that 
Shaped Louisiana Law," in Billings, ed., A Law Unto Itself: 
Essays in the History of Louisiana Law, (forthcoming). 
2Dsee appendix I. 
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the judge in modern Louisiana, it is important to recognize 
that the judicial procedures that they discuss grew out of 
the experiences of the superior court and supreme court 
justices of the early national period.21 
Recent efforts to investigate the history of 
17 
Louisiana's ten constitutions also shed light on the Supreme 
Court's early history. Of special interest is Warren 
Billings's discussion of th~ ~onstitutional convention of 
1813 which tempers the conventional analysis of the 'Creole-
American' conflict. In the section on the judiciary 
article, Billings argues that Louisiana's ancienne 
population was basically content with its "victory" in 
compiling the Digest of 1808. He points out that the 
ancienne population's primary concern in the 1813 convention 
was to secure equal apportionment in the legislature. 
Billings's minimizes the role of the 'creole-American 
conflict' on the creation of the judicial system and 
suggests that the clash became subsumed by a larger contest 
raging between urban and rural constituencies.22 
Individual studies of the Superior Court for the 
21Jean Baudouin, "The Impact of the Common Law on the 
Civilian Systems of Louisiana and Quebec," Albert Tate, 
Jr., "The Role of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The 
Louisiana Experience," in Joseph Dainow, ed., The Role of 
Judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Civil Law and in Mixed 
Jurisdictions, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1974), 1-23, 23-38. 
22warren M. Billings, "From This Seed: The Louisiana 
Constitution of 1812, 11 in Billings and Edward F. Haas, eus., 
In Search of Fundamental Law: Louisiana's Constitutions, 
1812-1874, (forthcoming). 
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Territory of Orleans and the Supreme Court of Louisiana are 
even more scarce. Henry Plauche Dart sketches, in the form 
of an extended outline, the basic institutional structure of 
the court. Dart's study, however, is wholly narrative, and 
offers no interpretation.2 3 Richard Kilbourne's assessment 
of the working of the territorial court in "An overview of 
the Work of the Territorial Court, 1804-1808, A Missing 
Chapter in the Development of the Louisiana Civil Code," 
like his book length study of the code, centers on the 
reception of Spanish legal conventions.24 
Robert B. Fisher, Jr.'s, "The Louisiana Supreme Court, 
1812-1846: strangers in a Strange Land" presents an 
especially problematic interpretation to the legal scholar. 
Fisher's analytical framework, previewed by his use of 
Robert Heinlan's title, is too simplistic. He argues that 
Louisiana's early justices, a group of men whose background 
and selection are not covered in the essay, were common 
lawyers who simply did not understand the finer points of 
the civil law. Thus, Fisher surmises, the judges fleshed 
out a bastardized jurisdiction in which they marshalled 
familiar tenets of the common law any time the civilian 
23Henry Plauche Dart, "The History of the Supreme Court 
of L011isiana," speech at the centenary of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, Louisiana Annual Reports, v. 133, (St. Paul: 
West Publishing, Co., 1914}, xxx-lxi. 
24Richard H. Kilbourne, Jr., "An Overview of the Work 
of the Territorial Court, 1804-1808}, A Missing Chapter in 
the Development of the Louisiana Civil Code," in Edward F. 
Haas, ed., Louisiana's Legal Heritage, (Pensacola: The 
Perdido Bay Press, published for the Louisiana State Museum, 
Studies in Louisiana Culture Series, 1983}, 107-129. 
---------------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
authorities stranded them. Furthermore, Fisher suggests 
that these practices marked only a temporary detour in the 
court's inevitable evolution into a pure civilian 
jurisdiction.25 This interpretation, while quite 
understandable as a logical assumption, ignores basic 
political, historical, and historiographical evidence. The 
court defined its jurisdiction in order to impose an Anglo-
American court system upon a traditionally civilian 
territory. Louisiana's early judges were hardly well-
intentioned boobs who failed to understand the civil law. 
Rather, they were learned legal scholars who sought to use 
their institutional positions to move their state ever 
closer to a representative model of American justice. 
Warren M. Billings's The Historic Rules of the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana presents a wealth of information on the 
origins of the early jurisdiction, but is a. documentary 
edition in which Billings deliberately refrains from 
analyzing his documents for the user.26 My ot..rn "From Chaos 
to continuity," chronicles the important period after the 
court's first constitutioual revision. Although I argue 
that th~ court, following the 1845 constitution, 
deliberately set about to mold itself into a more 
25Robert B. Fisher, Jr.f "The Louisiana Supreme Court, 
1812-1846: Strangers in a Strange Land," Tulane Civil Law 
Forum, ( 1973) , 1-42. 
19 
26warren M. Billings, The Historic Rules of the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana, 1813-1879, (Lafayette, Louisiana: 
Univer~ity of Southwestern Louisiana Press, published for 
the Center for Louisiana Studies, u. s. L. History Series 
no. 15, 1985). 
----·---
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representative organ of American jurisprudence, I pay scant 
attention to the formative years of Louisiana's judicial 
20 
system. Hence I offer only tentative conclusions to explain 
the mid-century objective, and I do not connect the argument 
to the profound contributions of the earlier court.27 
These few attempts at writing the Louisiana 
court's history, as in the case of Virginia's high court, 
hardly present a cogent framework for systematic historical 
analysis. Any history of either state's high appellate 
courts must involve broader judicial history. Such an 
attempt must begin with an analysis of court organization 
and procedure, since any interpretation of jurisprudence 
loses important contextual references without attention to 
practice. 
Thus the comparison of Louisiana and Virginia's 
appellate systems in the early national period offers 
important clues not only to the origins of state government 
in the two states, but to judicial development as well. In 
order to execute such a study, however, two important 
questions must be considered. 
The first question is what the study of such apparently 
different jurisdictions can do to forward an understanding 
of the legal history of the American South? To answer that 
question, it is necessary to look at the similarities in 
both systems. At the same time, both states grew out of 
27Mark F. Fernandez, "From Chaos to Continuity: Early 
Reforms of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1845-1852," 
Louisiana History, (winter 1987), 19-41. 
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colonial settlements which, for different reasons, ended 
rather abruptly, leaving the door open for legal revolution. 
In both cases, and in varying degrees, the states adopted 
judicial organs which allowed for sweeping changes in their 
legal systems. Both states also retained important 
traditional aspects of their colonial legal orders. The 
resulting legal cultures, accordingly, reflected both 
revolutionary and conservative elements of legal evolution. 
In stable societies, law, of both civilian and common 
law origin, is a traditional and conservative force. Change 
occurs slowly and is usually initiated by a legal and 
constitutional order that is controlled by a conservative, 
lawyer-dominated segment of soci2ty. But revolutions in law 
are frequent, if not prevalent, events in history. Scholars 
of comparative law posit four sets of occasions which 
encourage revolutionary change: when tradition has made the 
law "cumbrous and remote from social realities"; when there 
is a "realistic possibility" of borrowing from foreign 
systems; when there has been political and social 
revolution; and when a forceful ruling elite uses law as its 
instrument for a revolutionary reshaping of society. 28 
The creation of judicial institutions in Virginia and 
Louisiana produced both traditional and revolutionary 
changes in the realm of law and legal institutions. 
Traditional influences, namely the common law in Virginia 
28These conditions are discussed thoroughly in Alan 
Watson, The Evolution of Law, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1985) see especially pp. 110-114. 
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and the civil law in Lousiana, remained strong throughout 
the revolutionary phases of these early states' legal and 
constitutional history. Not only were these influences 
prevalent among members of the legal community, but they 
remained strong among the multifarious groups which formed 
the states' social, political, and economic fabric. 
conditions reflecting each precondition for 
revolutionary change also existed in both states in the 
early national period. In post-Revolutionary Virginia, 
centuries of practice had made the laws cumbersome and, in 
some instances such as aspects of the law dealing with the 
primacy of the crown, remote from social realities. The 
prospect of borrowing from foreign systems also presented 
22 
itselff hence the attraction of the civil law gained ground 
in the Old Dominion. Revolutionary ideas, both political 
and social, also reared their heads, a necessary feature in 
any society born of a violent revolutionary struggle. 
Finally, certain factions of Virginia's ruling elite meant 
to use the law as a tool to reshape society according to the 
principles of the American Revolution.29 
Louisiana's legal history following the Purchase 
reveals a similar experience. Traditional forces encouraged 
the retention of many civilian aspects of private law. But 
cumbrous practices, especially in the area of judicial 
administration offered openings for common law intrusions. 
29This aspect will be discussed more thoroughly in 
chapter two. 
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Attention to changing social realities also informed the 
reception of certain common law devices. American 
constitutional guarantees of trial by jury and habeas 
corpus, for instance, necessitated the adaptation of legal 
principles revolutionary to Louisiana. Borrowing from 
American and English legal structures became not only 
possible but practical as American trained lawyers and 
judges gained control of Louisiana's bar. A sense of 
political and social revolution emerged when Jefferson 
purchased the territory from France, Congress provided for 
American forms of government and representation, and when 
immigrants from American dominions began pouring into 
Louisiana at ever-increasing rates. Finally, both 
territorial officials and leading members of Louisiana's 
legal elite desired to use the law as a tool to shape the 
state into a representative model of American justice.30 
Thus the comparison of Virginia and Louisiana offers 
much in the way of studying legal stability and change in 
23 
the early republic. Moreover, the resulting legal orders in 
both states bear many striking procedural and substantative 
similarities. For Louisiana such similarities suggest a 
revision of contemporary notions of the state's role in the 
American legal system. 
30That they sought to do so cautiously and in moderate 
terms reflects Jefferson's eagerness to provide for a smooth 
assimilation of Louisiana into the United States. But the 
caution and conciliation of Jefferson and his territorial 
appointees should not hide the fact that they eventually 
hoped to turn Louisiana into a model of American justice. 
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The second question necessary to a comparison of 
Virginia and Louisiana appellate systems is what the 
contrast can reveal about each jurisdiction. For Virginia 
an in-depth analysis of the judicial settlement which 
followed the American Revolution will illustrate--within the 
boundaries of the legal community--the effect of the 
Revolution on the state's laws and legal institutions. 
Carrying the argument into the early national and antebellum 
periods will test the resiliency, or lack thereof, of. the 
revolutionary settlement. In the case of Louisiana, the 
comparison with Virginia will question whether or not 
Louisiana's legal order should be viewed as an anomaly in 
the American judicial system. 
Questions of legal history notwithstanding, the 
comparative investigation of the two jurisdictions will shed 
light on important and overlooked aspacts of the political, 
intellectual, economic, and social character of each 
community. Since courts constitute the most active arena in 
which citizens and state interact, the history of judicial 
bodies--especially in regard to constitutional, ideological, 
and mundane forms of litigation--illustrates not only the 
challenges faced by growing communities, but the 
intellectual and pragmatic ways in which the communties seek 
to resolve the problems. 
For both states it is vital to recognize that courts 
are political creations: judges are either elected officials 
or they owe their appointments to them; lawyers depend on 
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the leadership of judges to regulate professional 
associations, to police ethical standards, and to establish 
and to enforce procedure. The legal establishment itself 
often produces the politicians who direct the legal system 
from state and national capitals. Consequently, the 
25 
background, education, and ideological allegiance of the 
judges of each state form a major part of the investigation. 
As John c. Calhoun pointed out in the nineteenth 
century, law serves a universal purpose in society--to 
protect the individual from the community and vice versa.31 
From this standpoint, it matters not whether a particular 
society adopts a specific legal system. All that matters is 
that some accepted form of regulation is employed to direct 
individual and corporate relationships. Consequently, 
application of civilian or common law principles is really 
unimportant to the development of social stability. on the 
other hand, the choice of one system over another speaks 
directly to the character of a particular society--whether 
it allows its legal community to interpret and to innovate 
upon its law via the courts through the consistent use of 
precedent, or whether it binds its lawyers and ~udges by an 
inflexible series of codes.32 
31John c. Calhoun, "Disquisition on Government," Works 
of John c. Calhoun, (New York: 1863), 4 vols., 15, 16, 25; 
this is analyzed carefully in James Willard Hurst, The 
Growth of American Law: the Lawmakers, (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1950), 439-447. 
32For a detailed examination of both forms of law, see 
appendix I. 
-------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26 
In Virginia, nearly two centuries of settlement had 
established the ascendency of common law. But in the late 
eighteenth century, the civil law gained respectability and 
attractiveness in the Old Dominion. By the early nineteenth 
century, calls for a uniform code began to echo in the 
state's halls of justice. Louisiana's judicial history on 
the other hand began with civilian precepts, until in the 
nineteenth century American and English precedents began to 
inform its judicial discourse. The attraction of the civil 
law remained prominent, especially among Louisiana's creoles 
and their political allies. The initial stages of this 
comparison, accordingly, reveal two systems moving ever 
closer to the conception of a mixed jurisdiction, though 
from opposite directions. That Louisiana arrived at that 
juncture earlier in its history than other states merely 
reflects the break with tradition orchestrated by the 
Purchase. The Virginia example reveals that the common law 
jurisdictions of the new nation were not far behind the 
example at the mouth of the Mississippi. 
Such profound legal changes have less to do with 
communal attitudes and ideologies than with the role of 
lawmakers in their respective societies. The judges, 
lawyers, and politicians of any particular community 
determine the extent to which the law is written, applied, 
and interpreted. Thus, in the legal realm of society, 
change moves usually from the "top down." Members of 
society's elite read and apply the law and inform their 
--- ----- ----·-
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readings by ideological and environmental world-views.33 
In comparing the judicial organization of Louisiana and 
Virginia, therefore, the historian must attend to the battle 
for cultural hegemony that is reflected in the ideologies of 
the members of the bench and bar. The study of these elites 
in competition allows for the incorporation of both 
ideological and environmental considerations.34 Thus the 
nineteenth-century movement from "moral" or republican legal 
principles to more practical applications may be glimpsed in 
its social context by examining the institutional 
development of Virginia and Louisiana's appellate bodies.35 
Any story reads best when begun at the beginning. 
Unfortunately! to investigate the long and diverse colonial 
backgrounds of these two systems in great detail would prove 
33A strong case for this interpretation of change in 
the law is in Arthur A. Leff, "Injury, Ignorance and Spite--
The Dynamics of Coercive Collection," Yale Law Journal, 
(November 1970) 1 1-46. Nonetheless, it is evident that 
social conditions may also force changes in the law from the 
"bottom up" as ·the courts respond to various upheavals in 
society. Excellent examples are in Eugene D. Genovese, Roll 
Jordan Roll, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975)i and E. P. 
Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act, 
(Ne~1 York: Pantheon Books, 1975). 
34The flexibility of the cultural hegemony model is 
hailed in T. J. Jackson Lears, "The Concept of Cultural 
Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities," American Historical 
Review, (June 1985), 567-594; and the usefulness of using 
the model for a "top down" approach is considered in John 
Patrick Diggins, "The Misuses of Gramsci," Journal of 
American History, (June 1988) 141-145. 
35An excellent example of this type of analysis in 
Kentucky's Federal District Courts is Sandra F. VanBurkleo, 
"'That Our Pure Republican Principles Might not Whither•: 
Kentucky's Relief Crisis and the Pursuit of 'Moral Justice,' 
1818-1826," (Ph. D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1988). 
--------- --·-
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to be an onerous and largely unnecessary task. Therefore, 
the narrative will begin from the moment each dominion 
entered the Union--Virginia in 1776 and Louisiana in 1803. 
Chapters two and three are concerned with the establishment 
of the two jurisdictions and their structural foundations. 
Chapters four and five investigate the structure and 
jurisprudence of the two systems and the contribution of 
their judges in the courts• developmental phases. Chapter 
six examines and compares the judiciary of both states at 
the time they reached full maturity near the end of the 
Jacksonian era and draws basic conclusions about how the 
judicial settlements influenced antebellum justice. At the 
center of the study is the question of how Anglo-American 
principles became part of Louisiana's legal heritage. The 
comparison of Louisiana with the Old Dominion, therefore, 
centers on illustrating ~he similarities between the two 
systems as well as how Virginia natives influenced the 
development of Louisiana's legal culture. The impact of 
Anglo-American legal principles on Louisiana and of civilian 
precepts on American jurisdictions began during the early 
national period. Louisiana was the first jurisdiction to 
confront American jurists with the problem of integrating 
two systems of law, but the confrontation continued 
throughout the United states in the nineteenth century. 
Comparison of Louisiana's legal system with Virginia's, 
considered by many the proto-typical southern jurisdiction, 
therefore, will provide a useful frame of reference for 
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scholars interested in the development of law and justice in 
the American South and West. 
-----··---
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Chapter Two 
Revolution and Reform 
The Americanan Revolution wrought great changes in the 
Old Dominion. Once Virginians rejected the rule of England, 
they found themselves not only in the midst of a military 
engagement but also facing the responsibility of creating a 
new government. Leaders of the resistance assumed the ta::.k 
of building a new political order armed only with their 
experiences in colonial government and the loose ideological 
principles which orchestrated their break from the mother 
country. Thus when Virginia's republicans faced their first 
major test--to construct an effective government based on 
institutions dedicated to ensuring the new-found treasures 
of American liberty--they responded in an ambivalent 
fashion, mingling truly revolutionary reforms with 
traditional British ideals of law and justice. 
Revolutionary activities interrupted the operation of 
Virginia's governing bodies. Early in the c~isis, the 
courts of the Old Dominion were closed to British creditors, 
effectively suspending judicial operations and making them 
an important hostage in the resistance.1 Since the colony's 
governing institutions received their authority from Great 
Britain, the formal break with mother country in 1776 
1warren M. Billings, John E. Selby, and Thad w. Tate, 
Colonial Virginia: A History, (White Plains, New York: KTO 
Press, 1986), 330. 
30 
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required Virginians to create a new governmental 
establishment. 
Just six days prior to the signing of the Declaration 
of Independence, Virginia's revolutionary convention adopted 
a new constitution and plan of governnment. Under the 
constitution, drafted largely by George Mason, Virginia was 
endowed with a powerful legislative assembly embodied in a 
strong House of Delegates and a moderate Senate, a weak 
executive division consisting of a governor and a coordinate 
council, and a judiciary department, including a high court 
of appeals. Mason, however, merely sketched out guidelines 
for the judiciary department, leaving it poorly defined and 
charging the legislature with the task of creating the 
courts. The convention elected Patrick Henry as the Old 
Dominion's first state governor on the day after the 
constitution was passed, and he was sworn in a week later. 
Henry governed with advice of council until the fall, when 
the first assembly convened. Since the constitution vested 
the legislative branch with the power to define the 
judiciary, the creation of the judicial branch had to wait 
until the legislature drafted the necessary bills to 
establish courts of justice.2 
When the legislature convened for the fall session of 
1776, pressing wartime concerns and the multitude of details 
inherent in creating a new government occupied most of the 
2John E. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 1775-1783, 
(Williamsburg: The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 1988), 
119-121. 
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assembly's schedule. Accordingly, the fall assembly quickly 
divided up according to political and personal allegiances 
and animosities. Old feuds raged between Richard Henry Lee 
on one side and Benjamin Harrison and Carter Braxton on the 
other. Conservatives and radicals argued about the course 
the new government should take. Amid the fractious swirl of 
Virginia politics, however, a new and revolutionary movement 
began, one that would cross over the petty divisions of the 
delegates and enable Virginia to take the lead in the 
creation of a new brand of state government. That the 
movement began and persisted in a friendly fashion within 
the tempestuous atmosphere of revolution rests largely on 
the shoulders of a practical redhaired delegate from 
Albemarle County.3 
By the fall of 1776, Thomas Jefferson was eager to 
repair the damage he perceived had resulted from the fact 
that his draft of the Virginia constitution had arrived 
late, forcing the convention to adopt George Mason's more 
conservative document. Moreover, Jefferson feared that 
conservatives within the legislature would block efforts to 
achieve a truly revolutionary settlement. Turning down an 
appointment to serve as commissioner to France, Jefferson 
accepted a seat in the House of Delegates. He used the seat 
to begin a campaign to re-shape the Old Dominion into what 
he perceived to be a representative republican commonwealth. 
3selby, Revolution in Virginia; Dumas Malone, Jefferson 
and his Time: Jefferson the Virginian, (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1948) v. 1, 247-257. 
---------
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Luckily, enthusiasm for the war had not faded since the 
fateful events of May 1776, nor had conservative members of 
the movement yet realized their distrust of more radical 
revolutionaries. Consequently, Jefferson was able to 
marshall support for his vision of Virginia from 
conservatives such as Carter Braxton, Robert carter 
Nicholas, and Edmund Pendleton.4 The basis for this 
diverse coalition rested in the quest to equip the Old 
Dominion with a judiciary, a workable system of laws, and 
clear policies regarding western lands and religion.5 In 
order to revamp Virginia's legal system, two things needed 
to be done. Virginia's laws had to be revised and stripped 
of their monarchical vestiges and the courts had to be 
recreated and opened. Two major obstacles impeded the 
speedy recreation of the legal system--the financial 
implications inherent in opening the courts to British 
creditors,6 and the questionable nature of the new 
government's authority.? 
4selby, Revolution in Virginia, 138-140. 
5The questions regarding western lands and religion, 
however, are of little concern to this investigation. 
6selby, Revolution in Virginia, 148; Emory G. Evans, 
"Planter Indebtedness and the Coming of the Revolution in 
Virginia," WMQ, 3rd ser., 19 (1962), 511-533; , 
"Private Indebtedness and the Revolution in Virginia, 1776-
1796," WMO, 3rd ser., 28 (1971), 354-374. 
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?That is, once a shadow government had been set up to 
replace the king's governing hand. The American attachment 
to jurisdictio, the problems it presented to 
revolutionaries, and the manner in which it influenced the 
development of the American constitution, and by inference 
the constitutions of the states, is ably sketched in Stanley 
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The financial implication of opening the courts was 
simple. Tidewater planters built their society on tobacco. 
34 
Marketing the leaf, however, posed significant problems. 
Mercantile selling strategies and the pressures of 
overproduction left most of Virginia's gentry susceptible to 
the boom and bust cycles of a staple economy. This economic 
situation influenced the creation of a social structure in 
which status increasingly came to be judged according to 
land ownership and the accoutrements of English gentry life. 
The symbols for Virginia's "golden age" became great 
Georgian plantation houses and lavish displays of wealth and 
luxury, thus an enormous amount of capital was expended 
merely to keep up appearances. Cyclical expansion of the 
tobacco economy, however, curtailed the availablility of 
currency and forced the planters to become more and more 
dependent upon "next year's crop," and the availability of 
foreign credit. In addition to consumption, the extension 
of capital through informal networks throughout the 
Chesapeake forced the planters, both large and small, to 
become tangled in a complicated web of credit alliances. 
Neighbor owed neighbor, planters owed foreign creditors, and 
credit alliances had become the central feature of the 
regional economy. These tendencies created a tobacco 
N. Katz, "The American Constitution: A Revolutionary 
Interpretation," in Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and 
Edwin c. Carter II, eds., Beyond confederation: Origins of 
the Constitution and American National Identity, (Chapel 
Hill: University of North carolina Press, published for the 
Institute of Early American History and Culture, 
Williamsburg, Virginia, 1987,), 35-37. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
culture mentality that embraced debt as the central feature 
of its ideology.8 
35 
8Although Jefferson estimated that the pre-
Revolutionary British debt amounted to L2,000,000 sterling, 
and other contemporary estimates rated it at nearly 
L2,700,000, recent scholars have emphasized the fact that 
smaller, less formal debts actually comprised the bulk of 
the Chesapeake debt Evans, "Planter Indebtedness," 5lln; 
Jacob Price, France_and the Chesapeake: A History of the 
French Tobacco Monopoly. 1674-1791. and of Its Relationship 
to the British and American Tobacco Trades, v. 2 (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1973); , Capital and 
Credit in the British Overseas Trade: The View from the 
Chesapeake,l700-1776, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1980); , "Economic Growth of the 
Chesapeake and the European Market, 1697-1775, 11 Journal of 
Economic History, XXIV (December 1964), 496-511; Timothy 
Breen, Tobacco Culture: The Mentality of the Great Tidewater 
Planters on the Eve of Revolution, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), passim; Robert A. East, "The 
Business Entrepreneur in a Changing Colonial Economy, 1763-
1795," Journal of Economic History, VI (1966 supplement), 
16-28; Myra L. Rich, "Speculations on the Significance of 
Debt: Virginia, 1781-1789, 11 VMHB, LXXVI (1968), 301-317; 
Louis Morton, Robert Carter of Nomini Hall: A Virginia 
Tobacco Planter of the Eighteenth Century, Williamsburg: 
Colonial Williamsburg, Inc., 1945), 203; John J. McCusker 
and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British North America, 
1607-1789: Needs and Opprotunities for study, (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, published for the 
Institute of Early American History and Culture, 
Williamasburg, Virginia, 1985), 138-139. An important 
feature of this system is that planters often became 
creditors to their neighbors as well, increasing the role of 
credit in the Chesapeake economy, Aubrey c. Land, "Economic 
Behavior in a Planting Society: The Eighteenth Century 
Chesapeake," The Journal of Southern History, XXXIII 
(November 1967), 471, 478-479; , "Economic Base and 
Social Structure: The Northern Chesapeake in the Eighteenth 
Century," Journal of Economic History, XXV (December, 1965), 
649. These relationships affected debtors and creditors 
alike, Samuel M. Rosenblatt, "The Significance of Credit in 
the Tobacco Consignment Trade: A Study of John Norton & 
Sons, 1768-1775," WMO 3rd ser. XIX (July 1962), 386, 399. 
For a good overview of how these economic relationships 
influenced the revolutionary character of Virginia see Marc 
Egnal and Joseph A. Ernst, "An Economic Interpretation of 
the American Revolution," WMO, 3rd ser., XXIX (1972), 1-32; 
Marc Egnal, A Mighty Empire: The Origins of the American 
Revolution (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1988) . 
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Virginians of the revolutionary era were no strangers 
to the pressures which dependency on British capital could 
place on their liberty.9 Increasing disagreements between 
the provinces and the metropolitan government over colonial 
policies following ~he Seven Years' War, and the failure of 
Scottish lending institutions led to the curtailment of 
British loans and ushered in a credit crisis in 1772. 
Because of their reliance upon British credit, Virginians 
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suffered greatly in the affair. As consignment merchants 
such as John Norton & Sons stopped extending credit to their 
clients in the colonies, planters were forced to seek 
alternative measures to finance their activities. Some of 
these alternatives, such as th.e substitution of English with 
Scottish lenders, alleviated the problems to a certain 
extent, but the plante~s remained in difficult straits 
throughout the crisis.10 
Those troubled times were a vivid memory for the 
revolutionaries who met and argued about which course the 
new Virginia government would likely take. Heaped on top of 
those remembrances were the pressing needs of a nation at 
war. In Virginia, as in the other colonies, the war once 
again interrupted credit, creating a monetary crisis which 
impeded the capitalization of both old and new ventures. 
Virginians worried that opening the courts to British 
9Egnal and Ernst, "Economic Interpretation," 1-32. 
10Richard B. Sheridan, "The British Credit Crisis of 
1772 and the American Colonies," The Journal of Economic 
History, 20 (June 1960), 175-177, 185. 
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investors would severely threaten their monetary reserves.ll 
Accordingly, their consternation over opening the courts 
combined with legislative battles over law reform and legal 
independence to delay the creation of the court system. 
Even after the General Assembly created new courts they 
remained closed to British merchants until 1793.12 
The obstacle of debt collection, however, was not the 
only restriction on the establishment of Virginia's legal 
system. As Virginia's revolutionaries set about one of 
their first tasks--revising the Old Dominion's laws--they 
brooded, as did their colleagues in the other rebellious 
provinces, that their newly elected representatives lacked 
the erudition and the authority needed to curb legislative 
excess. Although out of step with contemporary British 
ideas of constitutional theory, anglicized colonists 
ew~raced revolution to combat what they perceived as 
parliamentary violations of fundamental law and applied the 
same restraint to their own legislation. Many of the 
influential revolutionaries who embraced such radical whig 
ideas were lawyers trained in the common law tradition. 
Their reverence for law and custom, strongly influenced by 
the seventeenth-century writings of Sir Edward Coke and 
llwil1iam H. Seiner, "Economic Development in 
Revolutionary Virginia, 1750-1810, 11 unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, College of William and Mary, 1982. 
12The issue was dealt with in Jones v. Walker, w. A. 
Low, "Merchant and Planter Relations in Post-Revolutionary 
Virginia, 1783-1789, 11 VMHB 61 (1953), 308-318. For a 
thorough edition of Jones v. Walker, see Hobson et al., The 
Papers of John Marshall, v. 5, 264-295. 
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reinforced in their own century by sir William Blackstone, 
made the revolutionaries rely on their legal traditions as 
checks on the excesses of government. such reliance 
influenced them to retain much that was British as they 
shaped their revolutionary order. At the same time, the 
revolutionaries bowed to a new fascination with the 
legislative will.l3 Once these lawyers joined in the 
creation of a new republic and turned to the task of 
organizing state governments, a dual reliance on tradition 
and legislative innovation, with its inherent paradoxes, 
dominated debates over jurisdiction in the state houses. 
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The dual reliance influenced Virginia's revolutionary 
settlement by tempering the reform impulses of Jefferson and 
his cohorts with a conservative resolve to retain as much 
British legal influence as possible. 
In Virginia, the attempt to reorganize the legal 
system reflects the paradoxical nature of early American 
assemblies. Although manned by revolutionaries, these 
assemblies often adopted conservative measures to solve 
their governmental problems. The twin quest to revise the 
Old Dominion's laws and to create a state court system 
illustrates how Virginia's statesmen grappled with their 
constitutional paradoxes. 
Revising the laws of Virginia proved to be a difficult 
task, one that illustrated the ambivalent nature of the Old 
Dominion's revolutionary settlement. Although law revisals 
13stanley Katz, "The American Constitution," 35. 
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are usually routine endeavors (Virginia for instance had 
revised its laws seven times between 1619 and 1776), the 
Revolutionary revisal was fraught with legal, political, and 
practical problems. 
Legally, the revisors had to sift through a morass of 
problems related to the state's break with the mother 
country. Virginia's constitution and Declaration of Rights, 
along with the American Declaration of Independence, 
effectively severed the Old Dominion's ties with Britain, 
creating a legal vacuum as British and colonial statutes 
were essentially negated. In order to fill the vacuum, the 
Virginia assembly passed a reception statute in 1776 making 
the British common law and statutes passed before 1607 valid 
in the state. Many delegates, led by Thomas Jefferson, 
agreed that the reception statute alone would not suffice, 
as it excluded post-1607 statutory improvements. Common 
sense and the Anglo-American dependence on custom and 
tradition dictated inclusion of those statutes as well as 
other recent improvements in British and American procedure. 
Accordingly, Jefferson spearheaded a drive for a wholesale 
revisal of the Old Dominion's legal system. 
In 1776, and for the duration of the revisal, the main 
legal questions facing the revisors were: which statutes 
enacted after 1607 would remain in force? How should post-
1607 British common law set precedent in the Old Dominion? 
Which Virginia statutes passed between 1619 and 1776 should 
remain in force? And how far should the revisal go in 
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reforming existing rights vis-a-vis property (private law), 
crime and punishment (public law), religion, and individual 
rights? 
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Politically, the revision was influenced by two 
competing factions within the General Assembly. On the one 
hand, delegates such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 
viewed the revision as an opportunity for sweeping legal and 
judicial reforms. on the other hand, conservatives such as 
Edmund Pendleton and Carter Braxton advocated a 
reimplementation of the old colonial system and a 
continuation of the status quo. Because these factions 
exerted their influence with some success on different 
occasions throughout the revisal, the final product bears an 
ambivalent stamp--at different times being reformist and 
conservative in nature. 
As if such weighty political and legal matters were 
not enough, practical problems also hampered the revisal of 
the laws. The first problem stemmed from the sorry fact 
that no one in the state possessed a complete, authoritative 
copy of the laws in force. Collecting those laws proved to 
be a time-consuming, and in the end, impossible task. 
Jefferson's insistence on a comprehensive restructuring of 
both the laws and the legal system complicated matters 
further as a total revision required the construction of 
many bills, each subject to debate and emendation. In 
practice, then, Jefferson's influence ensured that the 
process of revising the laws would take a long time. 
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Finally, the lengthy nature of the revision wrought problems 
of its own--the business of revamping the legal system 
combined with other difficult legislative exercises related 
to the Revolution and the creation of a new government for 
the Old Dominion. All of these problems lengthened the 
duration of the revisal, and each was further complicated by 
the state's changing political climate and the demanding 
schedules of various revisors. 
These legal, political, and practical problems 
combined to complicate and muddle the already difficult task 
of revising the laws. Nonetheless, three distinct phases of 
the revisal may be identified. The first phase (1777-1779) 
can only be described as Jeffersonian, as Jefferson 
dominated the committee to revise the laws and personally 
drafted much of the legislation.. Phase two (1783-1785) 
centers on the Chancellors' Revisal, strongly influenced by 
the conservative Edmund Pendleton, although many of the 
Jeffersonian reforms of the first phase were eventually 
included in the Chancellors' Revisal thanks to the political 
maneuvering of James Madison. Finally, the last phase 
(1785-1792) created an ambivalent settlement as politics, 
sticky technical difficulties, and personnel problems 
combined to interupt deliberations in the assembly. 
The first phase of the revisal, which bears Jefferson's 
signature as prominently as does Monticello or the 
University of Virginia, began in 1776, after the assembly 
passed the reception statute that legitimated all of the 
--------
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English statutes passed prior to 1607. Jefferson found this 
measure less than adequate since all of the post-1607 
improvements on British statutory legislation were excluded. 
Thus in 1776, at Jefferson's insistence, the legislators 
appointed him along with George Wythe, Edmund Pendleton, 
Thomas Ludwell Lee, and George Mason a committee to revise 
the Virginia code.14 At first, the most difficult task of 
the committee consisted of identifying and collecting all of 
Virginia's laws-in-force, as no one in the state possessed a 
complete copy. Once a suitable, but nonetheless incomplete, 
compilation was collected, the committee agreed on revisions 
and presented their report on 13 January 1777. After 
debating and amending the plan, the revisors submitted the 
report on 18 June 1779. Although there was no formal text 
of the proposal, it is clear that it included a catalogue of 
bills prepared by the committee, a bill declaring when laws 
would go into force, Jefferson's notes on British statutes, 
his musings on Acts of the Assembly (October 1777-May 1778), 
an outline for a Crimes Bill, and his memorandum on future 
bills to be drafted.15 Jefferson intended the revi~ion to 
stamp out all vestiges of aristocratic and monarchic 
14Albert Ellery Bergh, ed., The Writings of Thomas 
Jefferson, Library edition, (Washington D. c.: The Thomas 
Jefferson Memorial Foundation of the United States, 1903) v. 
I, 62. Accordingly, the plan left the common law alone, 
seeking only a revisal of statute law, Notes on Virginia, 
137. 
15charles T. Cullen, "Completing the Revisal of the 
Laws in Post-Revolutionary Virginia," VMHB, (January 1974), 
84-85; Boyd, PTJ, v. II, 305-307, 310. 
-------
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principles and to provide Virginia with a republican legal 
system. Notable innovations in the revisions were the 
repeal of the laws of entail, the abolition of primogeniture 
and the introduction of partible inheritance, the 
establishment religious freedom and toleration of 
dissenters, and a provision for general education which 
would allow all citizens to acquire the knowledge necessary 
for them to understand their rights and privileges as 
citizens of the republic.16 Wartime concerns, however, 
prohibited the successful debate of the committee's report, 
and most of it was tabled in 1779, not to be taken up again 
until military victory was apparent. 
When the House of Delegates turned its attention to 
revising the laws for the second time in 1783, they ignored 
the 1779 report and created a new committee to compile all 
the laws passed since the last full revisal in 1769 (a task 
that the Jefferson committee had failed to accomplish in 
1779). The compilation was to be checked and amended by any 
two judges of the chancery court. The chancellors published 
their revisal and presented it to the November 1785 session 
of the G~neral Assembly. Initially, the Chancellors' 
Revisal was extremely conservative, closely resembling 
colonial regulations and falling far short of legal reform. 
Aware of the conservatism of the chancellors' revisal, James 
Madison, wishing to preserve as much as he could of 
Jefferson's earlier, more revolutionary revisal, directed 
16Boyd, PTJ, v. II, 305-09. 
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the report through the legislature and managed to 
incorporate into it many of the reforms proposed by 
Jefferson in 1779. Madison was unable to complete the task 
before the end of the session. Since he was about to depart 
for Congress, Madison engineered a bill to appoint a 
committee of three to complete the revision in the next 
session, ushering in the first of three committees which 
oversaw the final phase of the revisal.17 
John Blair, Edmund Pendleton, and George Wythe made up 
the first committee that oversaw the final phase of the law 
revisal. By 1787, however, it became apparent that the 
committee was not going to complete its work. Wythe tired 
of the task and refused to work on the revisal. Pendleton 
and Blair simply did not have time to complete their duties, 
though Pendleton desperately wanted to finish the revisal 
and urged Edmund Randolph to assume the responsibility. 
Reluctant at first, because he considered many of the 
revisions defective, Randolph took up the chore in 1789. On 
20 October 1789, Randolph recommended that the Assembly 
appoint a new commission to revise the laws. The old laws, 
he argued, were so confused that the legislature should 
forget them, collect all the acts on particular subjects, 
then draft a blanket statute repealing old laws and 
confirming the best features of the collected acts.l8 
The Assembly listened to Randolph and appointed a new 
17cullen, "Revisal," 85. 
18cullen, "Revisal," 85-87. 
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commission in November 1789. Eight "revisors," Randolph, 
James Innes, James Mercer, Henry Tazewell, Joseph Prentis, 
st. George Tucker, John Taylor, and John Marshall were 
approved on 18 November. Under Randolph's direction, the 
committee, relying on John Purvis's A Complete Collection of 
All the Laws of Virginia Now in Force ... (London, 1684), 
a few extant copies of laws passed between the 1705 and 1733 
revisions, Pendleton's copies of laws compiled in the 1748 
revisal, personal papers of Virginia lawyers pertaining to 
the 1769 revision, and the circulating copies of 
Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary acts, authored a final 
report which was presented to Governor Beverley Randolph on 
9 October 1790. In the final report, written by Edmund 
Randolph and Joseph Prentis, the revisors pointed out that 
much work still needed to be done before a complete revisal 
could get underway.19 
Edmund Randolph prepared a draft of a bill to repeal 
all acts of the assembly not included in the revisor's 
report and forwarded the bill and the report to the 
assembly. Governor Randolph submitted the report to the 
House of Delegates. Heartened at the prospect of finally 
bringing the lengthy exercise to completion, but wary of the 
complicated technical nature of the revisal, the delegates 
appointed a nineteen-man commission, led by John Marshall, 
to study the proposed revisions before final passage. The 
committee recommended an act appointing a panel of legal 
19cullen, "Revisal," 87-89. 
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scholars and giving them authority to complete the revision. 
Under the act, which passed in December 1790, Edmund 
Pendleton, Henry Tazewell, St. George Tucker, Joseph 
Prentis, Arthur Lee, and William Nelson, Jr., comprised the 
pane1.20 
On 21 February 1791, the panel, minus Pendleton, who 
declined his commission because he was swamped with work as 
chief judge of the Court of Appeals, received their 
appointments. In June, 1791 the Assembly appointed James 
Monroe to take Pendleton's place. Meeting in the capital, 
the revisors spent two weeks considering the provisions of 
the Randolph-Prentis report. They listed the laws prepared 
in 1789, decided which post-1607 statutes deserved 
retention, and after much haggling, turned their attention 
to the consideration of new bills. But the work of the 
committee faltered as the members could not fit regular 
meetings into their busy schedules. When it became apparent 
that the panel would fail in its assignment, Henry Tazewell 
proposed a new plan of attack. Fighting off illness, 
Tazewell compiled tables demonstrating the committee's 
actions and wrote a report for the legislature. He turned 
the report over to Prentis and Nelson for review, but the 
twosome weakened in their task. Tucker and Lee proposed 
that the committee not report to the current session. 
Rather they asked the legislature for assistance in defining 
their responsibilities and for suggestions on how they might 
20cullen, "Revisal," 89-90. 
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present the report to the next session. Agreeably, the 
assembly authorized them to compile a new edition of the 
laws, and not to create a revised code. The legislators 
also provided for the printing of 250 copies of the new 
edition to be distributed to the legislature prior to the 
1792 session, and they appointed John Rind as clerk to the 
committee.2 1 
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In Spring 1792 the committee met in Williamsburg and 
hammered out their edition. After some argument over who 
would oversee the draft, the committee turned the manuscript 
over to John Rind to publish the revisal. The first part of 
the edition consisting of forty-four bills was printed in 
July and the final thirty-seven bills were submitted to the 
governor on 18 August 1792. When the Assembly convened in 
October, copies of both sections of the edition were 
distributed for the perusal of the legislators. The 
legislators adopted all but five of the ninety-one bills 
suggested in the committee's compilation. After drafting 
ten additional bills, the legislature ordered the revisal to 
be published and distributed. Augustine Davis printed the 
work including the laws passed by the 1793 assembly, and 
published the Revised code in 1794.22 
The 1792 revision represented a conservative 
compilation of laws rather than a new code. The new laws, 
now stripped of monarchical vestiges, contained 
2lcullen, "Revisal," 90-96. 
22cullen, "Revisal," 96-99. 
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revolutionary principles mainly because Madison pushed 
Jefferson's 1779 draft in 1785 and 1786. Through the 
efforts of Jefferson and Madison, the republican principles 
which informed revolutionary ideology joined with more 
conservative efforts to define Virginia's laws, such as the 
first version of the Chancellors's Report of 1785, to form 
the Old Dominion's legal foundation.23 
The final revision covered a variety of legal issues 
including constitutional matters such as apportionment, 
election of public officials, habeas corpus, executive, 
legislative, judicial, and military affairs; estates and 
descents; levying public monies on both the state and local 
48 
level; laws dealing with maritime measures such as piracy 
and confiscation; regulation of public facilities; 
citizenship; slavery and servitude; punishment of crimes and 
misdemeanors; supression of riots and insurrections; 
ambassadorship; the College of William and Mary; public 
health; livestock and breeding; education; and religious 
freedom. Since the revisal proved to be such a difficult 
and unfocused exercise, it led many prominent members of the 
legal community, such as st. George Tucker, to embrace the 
notion of codification as an alternative to the loose 
23cullen, "Revisal," 85; Edmund Pendleton to James 
Madison, 19 December 1786, in David John Mays, ed., The 
Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1734-1803, 
hereinafter cited as PEP, 2 vols., (Charlottesville, 
University Press of Virginia, published for the Virginia 
Historical Society, 1967), v. II 491-492. 
-------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49 
application of common law and statute law.24 Because few of 
Virginia's lawmakers agreed upon the philosphical, legal, 
and jurisdictional issues involved in the revisal; because 
the pre-1776 statutes of the Old Dominion were scattered and 
difficult to compile; because the process of compiling and 
revising the laws was extremely complicated and took place 
amid a rapidly changing political milieu; and because the 
various revisors had to fit their duties into hectic 
schedules, the law revisal took a long time to complete and 
its final expression fell far short of true legal reform. 
As a result, the revisal provides a telling example of the 
ambivalence that characterized Virginia's revolutionary 
settlement. 
In the end, the revisal fell well short of legal 
revolution. Nevertheless, the Jeffersonians on the various 
committees did manage to influence the revisal in the four 
critical areas of private law, public law, religious 
freedom, and educationo Their efforts, however, did not 
succeed totally as certain revolutionary views were tempered 
by conservative emendations in the assembly. In terms of 
private law, Jefferson's attack on primogeniture and entail 
remained intact. Despite strong opposition from 
conservatives such as Pendleton, the statutes of descent 
passed between 1777 and 1792 effectively ensured a 
commitment to partible inheritance. The attack on 
24Boyd, PTJ, v. II, "Catalogue of Bills Prepared by the 
Committee of Revisors," 329-335; Wood, creation of the 
American Republic, 302. 
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primogeniture and entail, however, must not be viewed as a 
strict revolutionary reform. American lawyers and jurists 
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had long abandoned tbe notion of primogeniture, although few 
colonies or new states had actually prohibited the practice. 
On the one hand, Jefferson's posturing in favor of partible 
inheritance did little more thun confirm pre-Revolutionary 
practice. On the other hand, Jefferson's attack on British 
standards of private law marked a defeat for conservative 
forces within the assembly, gave the pre-Revolutionary 
movement toward partible inheritance statutory protection, 
and opened up new opportunities for land ownership and 
political participation to future generations of Virginians. 
Moreover, the abandonment of British practices regarding 
descents forecast a movement within the American system of 
law toward a more civilian-oriented view of private law, a 
view which would be cemented in the next century during the 
codification movement as Americans looked away from 
Blackstone and toward civilian authorities such as Pothier 
and Domat for direction in the realm of private law.25 
Another aspect of the revisal that fell short of true 
legal reform had to do with public law. The crimes bills 
provide a remarkable illustration of how even Jefferson's 
own liberalism was tempered by strict adherence to British 
tradition and custom. Jefferson intended for the crimes 
bills to produce a more humane and enlightened penal code. 
25van Burkleo, "That our Pure Republican Principles .. 
• ,
11 passim. 
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But the final drafts "did little more than restate generally 
accepted practices concerning capital offenses.n26 Even 
Jefferson himself realized that the penal code failed to 
reform criminal punishments. In his autobiography, the Sage 
praised the abolition of capital punishment, save in cases 
of treason or murder. Although Jefferson commended the 
revisal for substituting hard labor in favor of the death 
penalty, he described his revulsion at the retention of the 
ancient principal of Lex talionis in some cases.27 But the 
failure to reform the criminal code into a more enlightened 
expression of the law weighed heavily on Jefferson's mind. 
By his own admission, it was the reverence for British 
tradition which stayed the hand of Jefferson and the other 
revisors on the issue of penal reform. According to 
Jefferson, 
I thought it material not to vary the diction of the 
ancient statutes by modernizing it, nor to give rise to 
new questions by new expression. The text of these 
statutes had been so fully explained and defined, by 
numerous adjudications, as scarcely ever now to produce 
a question in our courts. 
Thus, the revisors, at Jefferson's behest, merely reformed 
the style of the earlier statutes by eliminating their 
"verbosity, their endless tautologies, their involutions of 
case within case, and parenthesis within parenthesis, and 
their multiplied efforts at certainty, by saids and 
26Boyd, PTJ, 505. 
27The legal principle of Lex Talionis [retaliation] 
originated in Mosaic law "an eye for an eye," etc. Black, 
Law Dictionary, 822. 
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aforesaids, by ors and by ands .•. u28 True reform, one of 
Jefferson's central concerns, escaped the committee as it 
revised the penal code. Once again, strict adherence to 
custom restrained the hand of innovation, making the crimes 
bills one of the truly illustrative aspects of the 
arnbivalent revolutionary settlement. 
Jefferson won his greatest successes in forcing the 
legislature to attend to the areas of religious freedom and 
education. The statute of religious freedom owed much to 
the growing political power of the state's evangelical 
protestants. And the bills governing education reflected 
the republican commitment to education.29 
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Thus the revisal represented moderate success both for 
Jeffersonian and conservative legislators--many reforms were 
implemented, others blocked. The settlement failed to bring 
about a true legal revolution. Nonetheless, the revisal of 
the laws did ensure that some aspects of Post-Revolutionary 
Virginia would be drastically different from its colonial 
predecessor. 
The effort to create Virginia's court system 
parallelled, indeed was part of, the revisal of the laws. 
Before the Revolution, justice was administered in county 
courts, usually dispensed by lay magistrates, with special 
28Bergh, Writings, 64-65. 
29Much to Jefferson's chagrin, the educational bills 
failed to pass the legislature. For an analysis of the 
statute on religious freedom see F. J. Hood, "Revolution and 
Religious Liberty: The Conservation of the Theocratic 
Concept in Virginia," VMHB (1971). 
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sessions of oyer and terminer to handle criminal 
proceedings. Appeals were made to the Virginia council 
sitting as the General Court. Vice-Admiralty courts 
controlled maritime jurisdiction with appeals to British 
admiralty courts. Finally, the General court possessed 
original chancery jurisdiction, although appeals could be 
made to the Privy council.30 
Suspension of the courts, however, forced the 
legislators to reconstruct the system from the ground up. 
Not only would they have to provide for county justice, but 
in the area of appeals, they had to fill the gaps left by 
the separation from England. Accordingly, Virginia's court 
revision consisted not only of a reconstruction of the 
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county and General Courts, but the creation of an entirely 
new system containing chancery and admiralty courts as well 
as a court of appeals. The Court of Appeals marks a major 
reform, as appeals before 1776 came under the purview of the 
General Court. Thus the Court of Appeals represents the 
first independent appellate tribunal in the history of the 
Old Dominion. 
As part of the revisal of the laws, Thomas Jefferson 
led the drive to recreate the courts. Although the 
legislative reconstruction of the courts proceeded through 
committees in the General Assembly, Jefferson drafted the 
3 OGeorge Le\vis Chumbley, Colonial Justice in Virginia, 
(Richmond: The Dietz Press, 1938), 55-76; for a fine 
discussion of these types of appeals, see the introduction 
to Joseph H. Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council from the 
American Plantations. 
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court bills which instituted Virginia's court system. 
Originally outlined in his draft of the Virginia 
constitution, the Sage's ambitious proposals received bitter 
opposition from conservatives in the legislature. 
Nonetheless, the restructuring of the Old Dominion's courts 
eventually succeeded, and they remain one of the lasting 
monuments of the American Revolution.31 
Many problems plagued the reconstruction of the 
courts. At an ideological level, the growing desire to 
separate the powers of the branches of government posed 
peculiar difficulties for legislators charged with creating 
a republican judiciary. British constitutional theory had 
long embraced the conception of mixed government. In 
practice, the branches of the British government were 
inextricably intertwined. The judiciary originally 
represented an extension of executive authority. Since the 
Whig theorists who informed the rhetoric of American 
revolutionaries feared executive corruption most of all, the 
judiciary had to become and tc remain independent. British 
courts had indeed become independent in the aftermath of the 
Glorious Revolution, but in colonial Virginia, judicial 
power remained a function of the legislative branch as the 
council sat as both the upper house of the legislature and 
as the General Court. Virginians, however, provided for a 
separation of powers when they framed the 1776 constitution. 
But Virginians refined their thinking on the matter of 
31Boyd, PTJ, vol. I, 605, 607. 
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separation of powers throughout the post-revolutionary era. 
In the early stages of independence the term merely meant 
the removal of executive authority from legislative and 
judicial prerogatives and the elimination of possibilities 
for dual office holding. By the late 1780s, the idea of 
separation of powers had matured into a conception of three 
separate and independent governmental branches. 
55 
Accordingly, as ideas about separation of power matured, so 
did the conception about the role of the various branches in 
the governmental process. For Virginia, the maturation of 
these ideas evolved into a movement to create an independent 
judiciary. 
For the Old Dominion, the evolution of the idea of 
separation of powers signalled a major legal and 
governmental reform. Physical separation of judicial and 
appellate responsibility from the council of state insured 
that the council's function would become purely executive. 
Construction of an independent judiciary with a high court 
of appeals created a new governmental official, the high 
court judge. The emergence of such judges and their attempt 
to define their role in government represents one of the 
most important and neglected aspects of the history of the 
early republic.32 
32The best discussion of the British conception of 
mixed government, ministerial corruption, and its impact on 
the American political system is in Bernard Bailyn, Origins 
of American Politics, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 
1967; on the separation of powers see Wood, Creation of the 
American Republic, 157-160; 446-463. 
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Replacing British institutions for resolving disputes 
and overlapping jurisdictions, however, were the most vexing 
structural problems facing the Committee for Courts of 
Justice. During the colonial period legal actions in 
Virginia followed two basic paths: domestic or metropolitan. 
Domestic suits consisted of home grown litigation in the 
county courts and appeals to the General Court. 
Metropolitan suits were varied in nature: appeals from the 
General Court; disputes between the General Assembly and 
Parliament; some admiralty and chancery appeals were heard 
in the privy council. Separation from England did little to 
change the activities of Virginia's domestic litigation, 
with the exception of closing the courts to British 
merchants and redefining roles of the governor and council. 
The need to settle cases formerly of a metropolitan nature, 
on the other hand, required Virginians to consider creating 
courts of a different stripe from those which had existed in 
the Old Dominion. Thus, the Committee for Courts of Justice 
not only had to replace the suspended Virginia courts but 
also to provide for appeals from the general court as well 
as matters of equity and admiralty. 
In recognition of the enormity and complexity of the 
committee's task, the House instructed it to bring in 
separate bills for each area of judicial administration: 
appeals, chancery, the General Court, admiralty, and the 
county courts.33 on 25 November 1776, Jefferson presented 
33JHD, 1 November 1776, 32-33. 
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his bills to establish a court of Appeals, a High Court of 
Chancery, and a bill to establish the General Court and 
Assize Courts. Two days later, the bills to create the 
Court of Appeals, the General and Assize Courts were read 
and committed to a committee of the whole house. After two 
more days, the bill to establish the High Court of Chancery 
was read and submitted to a committee of the whole house.34 
The following week, the house read through, debated, 
and amended the bills. On 4 December, the committee 
delivered the bill to create the Court of Admiralty. A day 
later, the House agreed to the bills to establish the 
chancery court and the assize courts, the bills were then 
engrossed and read a third time. By 9 December, the House 
was still deliberating the bill to create the court of 
Appeals. Since the session was winding down, the House 
resolved to put off the Court of Appeals bill till the next 
57 
session. The legislators then turned their attention to the 
Admiralty Courts. When it became apparent that the 
Admiralty bill would be the only one finished before the 
session ended, the legislators tabled the bills for 
chancery, the General Court, and the assize courts till the 
following session, a delay agreeable to all since it put off 
the question of reopening the courts to British creditors.35 
On 16 December 1776 the senate returned the Admiralty 
34Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 606. 
35Boyd, PTJ, v. I 606-607; JHD, 4 December 1776, 82; 5 
December 1776, 83. 
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bill to the House with an amendment. The bill was read and 
the House agreed to the Senate's changes. The following 
day, the ballots for appointments to the Court of Admiralty 
were tallied and sent to the Senate. The Senate confirmed 
58 
the appointments and Richard Cary, William Holt, and Bernard 
Moore became Virginia's first republican admiralty judges.36 
But opposition by conservatives in the Assembly, the 
fear of opening the courts to British creditors, and more 
pressing military issues delayed the passage of Jefferson's 
other court bills. A High Court of Chancery bill and a 
General Court bill did not pass until January of 1778. The 
bill to create a Court of Appeals did not pass until 
December 1778. And Jefferson failed to get the assembly to 
pass his county court bill.37 Despite these setbacks, the 
court bills of the Revolutionary assemblies reflect much of 
Jefferson's thinking on judiciary reform in the early 
republic.38 
The easy passage of the Admiralty Court bill owes its 
success to the nature of Virginia's economy rather than 
Jefferson's constitutional brilliance or his political 
acumen. Admiralty suits represented an important form of 
litigation in the Old Dominion during the Revolution. A 
flurry of privateering successes against British ships in 
36JHD, 17 December 1776, 100. 
37For a detailed analysis of the social and political 
significance of the county court bill, see below, 68-69. 
38Boyd, PTJ, v. I 605-607. 
----------- - .. - ------
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the Chesapeake Bay under the direction of Captain James 
Barron influenced the Virginia Convention to create a navy. 
Expecting continued success in the Bay, the delegates 
created a stopgap admiralty court in the summer of 1776 to 
condemn Barron's prizes.39 The Virginians' desire to 
legitimate the admiralty court and to provide a more concise 
blueprint for its procedures in handling prizes played a 
major role in the quick acceptance of Jefferson's admiralty 
bill. 
Jefferson's Admiralty Court bill dealt with three 
specific issues: the duties and ethics of the judges, the 
jurisdiction of the court, and appeals. In the first 
section of the bill, Jefferson provided for the appointment 
of three judges to be chosen by joint ballot of the two 
houses and commissioned by the governor, with any two judges 
making a court. The judges of the admiralty court were 
instructed in the proper oaths and actions necessary to 
serve the state in republican fashion. After swearing an 
oath of fidelity to the commonwealth, the prospective judge 
was required to take an oath in open court to "do equal 
right to all manner of people great and small, high and low, 
rich and poor, of what country or nation soever they be 
without respect of persons." Judges were prohibited from 
accepting fees and gratuities not provided for in their 
official salaries. The act restricted the judges from 
maintaining cases in which they were directly involved. 
39selby, Revolution, 76. 
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They were instructed not to delay letters or requests from 
any persons before the court, and to ignore letters coming 
to them from extra-legal means. Finally, the judges were 
instructed to conduct themselves "faithfully, justly and 
truly according to the best of your skill and judgment, do 
equal and impartial justice, without fraud, favor, 
affection, or partiality.n40 
The bill granted the court cognizance in all cases 
previously considered under admiralty jurisdiction. It 
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ordered the judges to use the regulations of the continental 
congress, acts of the General Assembly, pre-1607 British 
statutes and imperial laws, and Oleron and Rhodian laws,41 
"so far as the same have been heretofore observed in the 
English courts of admiralty" as the basis for its decisions. 
Furthermore, the bill recognized the supremacy of 
congressional laws over those of Virginia's General Assembly 
in cases involving war criminals and fugitives, but in other 
matters, the bill proclaimed the Old Dominion's laws 
supreme. Finally, in a bid to prevent competing 
jurisdictions, the bill denied the admiralty court the power 
40Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 645-649. 
4loleron laws were developed as a code on the Island of 
Oleron in the twelfth century by Eleanor of Guienne. 
Richard I, Henry III, and Edward III, each adodpted them for 
English practice. Citations from the Oleron laws frequently 
take precedence over decisions in the British Admiralty 
courts. Rhodian laws represent the oldest known maritime 
code. Adopted by the people of the island of Rhodes around 
900 B. c., only the articles concerning jettison survived in 
the revolutionary era (see Kent's Comm., 232-233), Black, 
Law Dictionary, 979, 1188. 
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to judge capital cases.42 
In addition to sketching out the boundaries of the 
admiralty court's jurisdiction, the court bill invested the 
judges with the basic powers they needed to carry out their 
judgments. The bill empowered the court to deputize 
marshalls and regulated the duties of those officers; to 
administer the oath of fidelity to the commonwealth to all 
officers of the court; to sell perishable items impounded 
for suits and to retain the monies from those sales for the 
litigants; to require security for cargoes under dispute; to 
award costs and executions, and to regulate the executions 
by comntonwealth sheriffs subject to court penalties; to 
condemn vessels; and to sell captured vessels.43 
The admiralty bill also directed court procedures by 
defining the method of filing libels, summoning shipmasters 
or owners, holding trials, and publishing decrees in the 
Virginia Gazette. Finally, the bill provided for appeals 
and writs of error to the Court of Appeals in cases 
involving enemies of the United States and in suits for 
values greater than an amount to be specified later.44 
Jefferson's draft was passed with only minor 
amendments and deletions. Procedurally, the completed act 
defined the role of the legislature in creating judiciary 
bills. By setting down the ethical standards of the judges, 
42Boyd, PTJ, v. I 645-649. 
43Boyd, PTJ, v.I, 645-649. 
44Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 645-649. 
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Jefferson (via the General Assembly) initiated legislative 
action to ensure republican virtue among the members of the 
bench. He mapped out the basic boundaries of the court's 
jurisdiction. Finally, by providing for methods of filing, 
summoning, trial, execution of judgments, costs, and appeals 
Jefferson delineated the general jurisdiction of the new 
court.45 Although recasting the admiralty court under the 
jurisdiction of the state of Virginia helped to define the 
role of the legislature in creating courts in the new 
republic, Jefferson's court bill did little to reform 
established procedure. In fact, the admiralty bill merely 
recreated the procedure of British courts under the 
jurisdiction of the state of Virginia. The lesson is 
simple. Virginia lawyers, steeped in British custom and 
practice, needed to legitimate their new courts and to 
define the relationship between those tribunals and the new 
state assembly; but they quailed at true legal innovation. 
Thus the creation of the admiralty court reflects the nature 
of the ambivalent revolutionary settlement--new courts were 
needed as a practical matter of separation, but the 
Virginians wished to retain much of their British legal 
heritage. 
Structurally, however, the admiralty bill offered 
important deviation from colonial practice. In the colonial 
period, the royal governor served as vice-admiral and county 
45Boyd, PTJ, v. I 645-649; William Waller Hening, The 
statutes at Large, "An Act for Establishing a Court of 
Admiralty," v. IX, 202-206. 
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courts or the general court heard cases of admiralty when 
the need arose. The passage of the admiralty bill, 
therefore, represents a structural reform since it created a 
separate court of admiralty and negated the governor's 
authority as vice-admiral. Both are important changes. 
Vesting judicial power in a separate court reflects a 
movement to streamline judicial activity and the growing 
importance of admiralty cases to the state's judicial 
system. Revoking the governor's power as vice-admiral 
illustrates the mouncing importance of separating judicial 
authority from executive influence in late eighteenth-
century America. 
The next court bill for which Jefferson engineered 
passage established the High Court of Chancery. In creating 
the equity court, Jefferson followed the basic structure of 
his bill to establish the admiralty court. Like the 
admiralty bill, the chancery act provided not only for the 
court's general jurisdiction, but also for the method of 
choosing its judges. The court consisted of three judges to 
be chosen by the joint ballot of both Houses and 
commissioned by the governor. Tenure for the judges was 
based on good behavior, with a majority of the members 
constituting a court.46 
As in the admiralty bill, Jefferson defined the 
standard of ethics that the judges would follow. He 
scripted the chancery oath along the same lines as the Court 
46Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 610-620. 
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of Admiralty. Of all the oaths Jefferson prescribed, for 
some inexplicable reason, this one was the only one sworn 
"So Help You God." Jefferson vested the court with general 
equity jurisdiction "over all persons and in all causes in 
Chancery whether brought before them by original process, 
appeal from any inferior Court, Certiorari, or other legal 
means." In order to regulate the court's caseload, 
Jefferson limited the court's original jurisdiction to 
causes with a value over L1o.47 
Unlike the admiralty court, Jefferson required the 
chancery court to sit for two eighteen-day sessions per 
year, one beginning on 5 April, one on 5 September 
(excluding Sundays). When the court was not in session, 
however, Jefferson vested it with the power to grant 
injunctions and to issue writs of ne exeat48 and "other 
64 
process allowed by the laws to be issued in time of Vacation 
by the Clerk of the General Court in Chancery." In 
addition, the bill gave the judges the authority to appoint 
a clerk.49 
In the next section of the bill, Jefferson spelled out 
the rules and procedures for filing and amending suits in 
47 d Boy , PTJ, v. I, 611. 
48Ne Exeat writs are issued to prohibit a person from 
leaving the country. Sometimes they are used to keep a 
person from fleeing a certain court's jurisdiction. The 
writs are also used to restrain persons from removing 
property at question in a civil action from the court's 
jurisdiction. 
49Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 612. 
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chancery; subpoenaing litigants; taking depositions; 
regulating attachments and contempt proceedings; swearing 
complaints and answers; filing exceptions; formulating rules 
to regulate pleadings, answers, replies, rejoinders, and 
other proceedings; examining witnesses; trying matters of 
fact by jury; changing venue; hearing cases originally 
assigned to the assize courts; setting aside dismissions and 
reinstating suits; and correcting proceedings. To preserve 
court records, the bill provided for the clerk to keep a 
general minute book and a special book relating to land 
titles. Jefferson also drafted legislation that allowed the 
chancery court to issue writs of injunction and stays of 
execution for all the common law courts in cases where the 
value of the dispute was sufficient to admit to orignal 
chancery jurisdiction (LlO}. Paralleling the admiralty 
bill, Jefferson allowed the court to hear all chancery cases 
pending at the dissolution of the last session of the 
General Court. Finally, the bill granted the court the 
authority to depose litigants residing outside of the 
country in their own place of residence. In order to 
enforce the court's powers, the bill allowed it to receive 
security for cases involving absentee defendants and to 
publish its orders in the Virginia Gazette or, following 
Sunday services, on the front doors of any churches which 
the complaintant chose. In cases where the defendants would 
not answer, the court was empowered to appoint attorneys for 
them, and provided for rehearings if the defendants were not 
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served. 5° 
As the legislature debated the chancery bill between 
1776 and 1778, it adopted amendments to establish the seats 
of the chancery court in Williamsburg and Richmond; to 
refine the process for taking interrogatories; and to hear 
evidence in viva voce examinations. In a major defeat for 
Jefferson, the legislature struck out clauses relating to 
the court's ability to change venue. Although Jefferson 
66 
fought vigorously to have the clauses reinstated, he failed. 
Finally, the legislature set the salaries of the chancery 
judges at L50o.51 
The writing, amending, and passing of the chancery 
bill reveals striking features of Virginia's revolutionary 
settlement. By approving the general nature of the bill, 
the legislature affirmed the pattern Jefferson defined for 
creating jurisdiction in the admiralty bill. Attention to 
the length of Court sessions, professional ethics, and basic 
procedures illustrated the depth of the legislature's 
control of the courts.52 Moreover, the legislature assured 
Virginians that their long-established British rights to 
both common law and equity remained secure. In striking out 
Jefferson's clauses on venue, conservative forces in the 
50Boyd, PTJ, v. I 612-620. 
51Boyd, PTJ, 610-620; Hening, Stat~utes, "An Act for 
Establishing a High court of Chancery," v. IX 389-399. 
52In fact, one might argue that in Virginia, the 
legislators replaced the British notion of the judiciary as 
an extension of the executive with judicial dependence on 
the legislature. 
-------
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legislature continued their lengthy and bitter battle 
against the intrusion of the central government into the 
counties. But in the end, Jefferson won a clear victory 
over the conservatives as he fended off Pendleton's attempt 
to make the jury provisions of the chancery bill voluntary. 
To Jefferson, making jury trials voluntary would have 
obliterated their usefulness as a request for a jury from a 
litigant would suggest that he distrusted the judge's 
discretion.53 Finally, in vesting chancery jurisdiction, 
formerly a function of the General Court, in a single 
tribunal, the legislature reinforced Jefferson's vision of 
establishing separate high courts with specific 
jurisdictions. 
Ten days after passing the Chancery Court bill, the 
legislature passed Jefferson's bill "For establishing a 
Court of Common Law of general jurisdiction for the more 
speedy and easy administration of Justice in this 
Commonwealth and for regulating the proceedings therein.n54 
Following the strategy he worked out in drafting the other 
court bills, Jefferson broke the bill up into three parts: 
ethics, jurisdiction, and procedure. Since the General 
Court was the most familiar to Virginians, it is not 
surprising that the bill to recreate it was the most 
detailed and extensive of Jefferson's three successful 
53Jefferson, "Autobiography," in Ford, ed., Works of 
Jefferson; cf., Selby, Revolution, 156. 
54Hening, Statutes, "An Act for Establishing a General 
Court, v. IX, 401. 
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judiciary acts. 
After spelling out the oaths and general standards of 
ethics, Jefferson described the jurisdiction of the court. 
Primarily, the five-man General Court (any three of whom 
comprised a quorum) would have jurisdiction over all persons 
and causes at common law valued over LlO or two thousand 
pounds of tobacco "whether brought before them by Original 
process, by appeal from any inferior Court Habeas Corpus, 
Certiorari, Writ of Error, supersedas, mandamus or by any 
other legal ways or means • 11 The bill prescribed that 
the court would sit for two sessions beginning 1 March and 1 
August each year (excepting sundays). One major difference 
between the General Court bill and those for admiralty and 
chancery was the creation of the office of chief justice. 
According to Jefferson 1 s draft, the chief justice was to 
serve as administrator over all of the court's business by 
bearing teste to all of the attachments and writs awarded by 
the court.55 
Since the General court would be the principal court 
of the commonwealth and would handle both civil and criminal 
cases, Jefferson referred to previous General Court acts as 
he carefully detailed the court's procedures. He wove into 
the act rules for summoning, filing, and executing judgments 
in original civil and criminal actions, and suits involving 
officers of the commonwealth. The bill empowered sheriffs 
to process executions based on the court's judgments. Local 
55Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 621-644. 
---------
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judges and JPs were authorized to receive bails when the 
court was out of session. And the accused were granted the 
rights to counsel and to call witnesses. Jefferson, again 
concerned about preserving court records, required the 
clerks to keep and to distribute order books and docket 
books at the end of each court session.56 
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A major section of the general court act dealt with 
the creation and specific rules and details of assize or 
itinerant superior courts. Mirroring British practices, the 
five judges of the General Court were to divide the assize 
court schedule among themselves. In each county, a judge of 
the General Court would sit on the Court of Assize. His 
judgments would then be reviewed at the following session of 
the full General Court. If confirmed, the judgments of the 
assize court would have the authority of General Court 
decisions. In order to record the work of the assize 
courts, Jefferson empowered each of the judges to appoint 
clerks. 57 
Creation of the assize courts was a controversial 
proposal. By going into the counties, the assizes brought 
the authority of the state into the jealously guarded 
bailiwicks of Virginia's gentry. Not only would these 
intrusions into the counties, the bastions of local power, 
put state officials in a position of superiority over the 
parochial elite, but also the increased presence of 
56Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 621-644. 
57Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 628-634. 
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professional lawyers and judges would no doubt exacerbate 
the already tense relations with local lay magistrates. 
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With Edmund Pendleton's encouragement, Jefferson introduced 
this bill to the House of Delegates on 25 November 1776 and 
he may have expected a bitter battle to get it passed. When 
the House of Delegates ordered the Co1nmittee for Courts of 
Justice to bring in a General Court bill, they did not 
mention the need for such an elaborate system of assize 
courts. Thomas Jefferson, however, titled his bill "An Act 
for establishing a General Court & Courts of Assize." The 
bill was read, amended, and engrossed in the fall session. 
But on 13 December 1776, the House postponed passage of the 
bill until the following session. At the commencement of 
the next session, Jefferson was again named to the Committee 
for Courts of Justice and ordered to bring in a bill to 
create a "General Court and Courts of Assize." In the 
following deliberations and amendments, the assize section 
of the bill was struck out by the senate as was Jefferson's 
provision for the post of chief justice. The delegates, 
however, reinstated the office of chief justice, when it 
passed the bill October 1777.58 
Omission of the assize section in the General Court 
Bill reflects a more difficult problem than the ordinary 
political contest between Jeffersonians and conservatives. 
Both conservative and Jeffersonian lawyers bemoaned the lack 
58JHD, 30 October 1777, 6-7; Hening, Statutes, "Act for 
. General Court," 401. 
--------
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of professionalism on the county court level. By embracing 
the notion of assize courts, the legal community could 
ensure a measure of professionalism in local matters. 
Familiar enemies such as Pendleton and Jefferson cooperated 
in support of the assize section of the General court bill. 
Thus, the defeat of the assize proposal, in political terms, 
better illustrates the depth of distrust which non-lawyers 
harbored against the growing legal profession rather than an 
ideological split between conservatives and Jeffersonians. 
Whether non-lawyers saw the extension of the assize system 
into the counties as a possible source of governmental 
corruption or whether they saw the intrusions of 
professional lawyers as dangerous to their local hegemony, 
the senators sent the judiciary a strong message in 
defeating the assize section of the General Court bill. 
Appeals courts were needed and wanted, but only on the 
superior court level. In the counties, original proceedings 
were to remain under the purview of the local, and mainly 
lay, magistrates.59 
Jefferson's county court bill similarly met with 
defeat rather swiftly. Traditionally, historians have 
blamed the defeat of the bill on the question of British 
debts. But Jefferson, on the advice of the delegates, 
included a clause in his original draft of the bill which 
59Edmund Pendleton to William Woodford, 2 January 1778, 
Mays, PEP, v.I, 240; Pendleton to Woodford, 16 January 1778, 
v. I, 246; Pendleton to Woodford, 31 January 1778, v. I, 
247. 
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denied British creditors the right to sue in Virginia 
courts. More recent evidence points to the reluctance of 
conservative assembly to legislate over these local 
institutions. In the interim, most localities recreated 
their county courts on their own, and by the time Jefferson 
drafted his legislation, they had resumed their operations. 
Failure of the county court bill restricted separation of 
powers on the local level by mingling judicial, legislative, 
and executive power in one body which oversaw the powerful 
office of the sheriff. Thus revolutionary ideology did not 
invade the county courts via legislation, and they remained 
"the bulwark of the old order.n60 More important, in 
judicial matters, the county courts were able to insulate 
themselves from the wave of republican reform marked by 
Jefferson's revision of the court system. 
The final bill in the restructuring of the courts 
established the Court of Appeals in 1778. Initially, the 
assembly envisioned a legislatively elected bench consisting 
of the judges of the General Court joined by three 
"assistant11 judges to hear appeals from Admiralty and 
Chancery; Chancery judges and the assistants to hear appeals 
from the General Court; and judges from either Chancery or 
the General Court with the assistants to hear appeals from 
Admiralty. Finally, the assembly granted the Court of 
Appeals jurisdiction over all cases pending appeal from the 
60Boyd, PTJ, v. I, 606-607. 
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General Court to the British Privy Council.61 Two annual 
sessions, one in March and one in August would be held in 
Williamsburg. But before the act went into effect, the 
chancellors completed their 1779 revisal of the laws. 
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To replace the 1778 bill, the chancellors drafted a statute 
which left the twice yearly sessions intact, but revised the 
constitution of the bench and more clearly spelled out its 
jurisdiction and procedures. Dispensing with the concept of 
elected assistants, the chancellors provided for the court 
to consist of all the members of the three high courts 
sitting together, with the chancellors taking the highest 
rank, followed in order by the judges of the General Court 
and the Court of Admiralty. Any five of these justices 
together would constitute a court. The chancellors adhered 
to Jefferson's wording of the judges' oaths. They gave the 
court original jurisdiction for jury trials, and enabled it 
to hear appeals and writs of error from the other three high 
courts in cases exceeding L50 or involving a freehold or 
franchise, making it the state's court of last resort.62 
After defining the court's jurisdiction, the chancellors 
spelled out its procedures involving appeals and writs of 
error. They provided for and defined the duties of clerks, 
docketing causes, writing briefs, and certifying 
61Hening, st.atutes, "An Act for Establishing a Court of 
Appeals," v. IX, 522-525. 
62Hening, statutes, "An Act Constituting the Court of 
Appeals," v. X, 89-90. 
- -----
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decisions. 63 
By ending the practice of legislatively appointed 
assistants and limiting the members of the Court of Appeals 
to sitting members of the state's high courts, the 
74 
chancellors struck a blow for the developing concept of 
judicial independence. The Chancellors' Revisal, insofar as 
the judges themselves defined the jurisdiction and 
procedures of their own courts, provided a striking, early 
example of judicial independence and the possibilities 
inherent in the separation of powers. 
Although Jefferson failed to have all of his reforms 
passed, the court bills represent his most important 
contribution to Virginia's revolutionary legacy. Since 
Jefferson's draft of the Virginia constitution arrived too 
late to challenge the adoption of George Mason's more 
conservative document in 1776, the reconstruction of the 
courts offers the most comprehensive expression of 
Jeffersonian republicanism in the development of the Old 
Dominion. Even though it was only a partial victory, 
Jefferson's success assured the continuation of Jeffersonian 
principles in Virginia's halls of justice. Moreover, the 
provisions for the Court of Appeals in the conservative 
Chancellors' Revisal actually improved on Jefferson's 
conception of court-building--a remarkable example of the 
political ambivalence of the revolutionary settlement. 
63Hening, statutes, "An Act ... court of Appeals" v. 
X, 90-92. 
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Once they were created, the courts of the post-
Revolutionary settlement began operation. In typical common 
law fashion, the judges of Virginia's courts played a 
creative role in defining their courts• position within the 
governmental structure. As soon as the courts opened, 
Virginia's judges, as a matter of practice, began 
interpreting their prerogatives as officers of the new state 
government. 
For the most part the Court of Appeals functioned in 
routinely conservative fashion. Nonetheless, when 
constitutional questions arose, the court faced them 
courageously and adhered to developing American conceptions 
of government. The most striking example of the court's 
commitment to these ideals is the case of Caton v. 
Commonwealth, commonly known as the Case of the Prisoners. 
In this case, the court for the first time formally 
addressed the issue of separation of powers. British 
victories in Virginia under the direction of generals 
William Phillips and Benedict Arnold heartened Tory 
sympathizers. Banastre Tarleton's dazzling raid on 
Charlottesville in 1781 emboldened the long quiet loyalists 
to avenge the harsh treatment they had received from the 
revolutionary government. But the loyalists' victory proved 
short lived. When Cornwallis retreated to Yorktown and the 
French navy swept the British out of the Chesapeake Bay, 
Washington seized his chance and reclaimed the lost 
territory. Washington's victory at Yorktown turned the tide 
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of the war in favor of the patriots. Thus, for the Tories, 
the spring of 1782 looked grim. Three of their leaders, 
John Caton, Joshua Hopkins, and James Lamb, were arrested 
for treason. The General Court convicted and sentenced them 
to death in an oyer and terminer session.64 
Facing death, the prisoners sued for mercy. Following 
the loosely phrased section of the 1776 constitution, Andrew 
Ronald, the attorney for the prisoners, requested a pardon 
from the General Assembly. The House granted the pardon, 
but the Senate did not concur. Nonetheless, on the day set 
for the executions, the attorneys for the condemned 
presented the House resolution to the sheriff and demanded 
the release of the "pardoned" prisoners. Thoroughly 
confused, the sheriff kept the defendants in custody, but 
stayed execution until the next meeting of the General 
Court.65 
When the General Court met for its October 1782 
session, the air was charged with anticipation over the fate 
of the prisoners. Representing the commonwealth, Attorney 
General Edmund Randolph asked the court to issue a new rule 
for the execution of the prisoners. Meanwhile, Ronald 
argued that the House resolution represented a full pardon. 
Randolph countered that the entire Assembly must concur to 
64Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 187-189; cf. PEP, 416-
427, although the actual case is cited in Daniel Call's 
edition of Virginia Reports (4 Call, 5), Edmund Pendleton's 
notes offer a more complete report of the proceedings as the 
judge documented several matters not reported. 
65Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 189. 
------- -------
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sanction a pardon. The motions of both counsels divided the 
General court. Not only did the judges disagree over 
whether the act violated the constitution, but also they 
split over whether the General Court had the power to 
nullify an act of assembly, raising the difficult question 
of judicial review. After taking a day off to ponder the 
matter, the court agreed to adjourn the case on difficulty 
to the Court of Appeals.66 
Upset over the General Court ruling, some members of 
the Assembly proposed an ad hoc committee of legislators and 
appellate judges to define the power of each governmental 
branch. Some officials, including Edmund Randolph, surmised 
that the matter might even be appealed to the people. 
Hearing of these suggestions, Pendleton rushed to Richmond 
to call the Court of Appeals into session in order to deal 
with the matter. Amid the commotion, the Court of Appeals 
met on 29 October 1782 to appoint a date to hear the case. 67 
Two days later, the Court met to hear the case. In 
response to Pendleton's invitation, the members of the bar 
who were present in Richmond packed the courtroom to lend 
their opinions as amici curiae. Sitting on the bench with 
Pendleton were his fellow chancellors, George Wythe and John 
Blair. Chief Justice Paul carrington and associates 
Bartholomew Dandridge, Peter Lyons, and James Mercer 
66Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 189-190. 
67Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 190-191. 
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represented the General Court.68 Richard Cary sat as the 
lone representative of the court of Admiralty.69 
78 
After hearing the motions of the attorneys 1 the judges 
listened to the opinion of the members of the bar. Two 
issues were at stake--whether the Court of Appeals had 
jurisdiction in the case and whether or not the act which 
sanctioned the pardon contradicted the treason provisions of 
the 1776 constitution. The problem grew out of the 
differences in wording between the 1776 constitution and the 
Act of Assembly which defined the assembly's power to grant 
pardons.70 According to the constitution, the power to 
pardon rested with the governor save in those instances 
where the prosecutions were directed in the House of 
Delegates. In those cases, the House alone was vested with 
the authority to grant pardons. The Act of Assembly, 
however, stated that the governor had no right to pardon in 
cases of treason. such authority rested solely in the 
"General Assembly." Thus, under the constitution, the 
defense did not need senate affirmation of the House 
Resolution. Under the Act of Assembly, however, both houses 
needed to approve the pardon. 
68Mays, Edmund Pendleton, 191-192. 
69The admiralty court had been reduced to one judge in 
1782, Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, 25 November 1782, 
in David John Mays, ed., The Letters and Papers of Edmund 
Pendleton, 1734-1803, hereinafter cited as PEP, 2 vols., 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, published 
for the Virginia Historical Society, 1967), v. II, 429-430. 
70Hening, statutes, v. IX, 168. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
79 
Most of the judges concurred that the Court of Appeals 
had jurisdiction in the case. Bartholomew Dandridge 
remained neutral on the issue and Peter Lyons argued against 
the court's ability to hear the case. Lyons agreed that the 
court could hear appellate cases from the General court as 
stipulated in the General Court Act. But Lyons questioned 
whether Caton v. commonwealth could properly be referred to 
as a "case" since it grew out of a criminal proceeding, thus 
raising the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals 
could render judgments in criminal matters. Finally, the 
court decided that it did have jurisdiction over the case.71 
On the matter of whether or not the act of Assembly 
which granted the pardon contradicted the constitution, the 
judges developed differing views. Lyons flatly denied that 
the court had the right to void an act of the assembly, but 
argued that because the senate did not concur with the 
House, the pardons were not valid. Richard Cary, Paul 
Carrington, and John Blair concluded that the act was not in 
conflict with the constitution and, therefore, was valid; 
accordingly, the pardons were void. James Mercer challenged 
the constitutionality of the act pointing out that under the 
constitution, the authority to issue a pardon for treason 
rested in the House alone; accordingly, the pardons were 
valid. Dandridge, reluctant to vest the court with the 
power of judicial review, argued that either the House or 
the Senate could grant a pardon; therefore, the pardons were 
71Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 194-195. 
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valid. Wythe argued that the court did have the right to 
declare an act of assembly unconstitutional. Although he 
stopped short of declaring the act in question 
unconstitutional, he argued that the sovereignty or 
"organic" power of the constitution presaged the doings of 
the assembly; therefore, the pardons were void. Wythe held 
that 
80 
if the whole legislature, an event to be deprecated, 
shall attempt to overleap the bounds, prescribed to 
them by the people, I, in administering the public 
justice of the country, will meet the united powers, at 
my seat in this tribunal; and, pointing to the 
constitution, will say, to them, here is the limit of 
your authority; and hither, shall you go, but no 
further. 
This declaration formed one of the earliest and most 
eloquent statements of separation of powers and judicial 
independence by defining the role of the high court in 
regard to judicial review. Pendleton likewise adhered to 
the principle of separation of powers and concluded that the 
act was not contrary to the constitution and sided with the 
majority. Thus the pardons granted by the Assembly were 
overturned by a six to two margin.72 
The ruling in eaton v. Commonwealth did much more than 
address the fate of three condemned prisoners. At the heart 
of the case lay the vital issue of the role of the 
constitution in a republic. That the judges actually ruled 
72Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 195-202. 
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on the constitutionality of a legislative act confirmed the 
role of the judiciary in the commonwealth and rendered the 
law of the constitution supreme to that of elected 
officials. Furthermore, Wythe's notion of the constitution 
as a "higher" or "organic" law marked a profound 
contribution not only to contemporary political theory in 
Virginia, but it represented one of the earliest expressions 
of judicial review in the new nation. Wythe's pronouncement 
bolstered the delicate condition of Virginia's political 
order (Only recently the Assembly had defeated a measure to 
create a dictatorship by a narrow margin). Thus the idea of 
the constitution as a "higher" law, superior to the 
prerogatives of the Assembly, forced Virginians to redefine 
fundamental constitutional principles regarding the 
relationship between the legislature and the judiciary in 
their new republic.73 
In response to the court's decision, the Assembly 
reconsidered the pardons. This time the houses agreed. 
Caton was pardoned and, along with other political 
prisoners, forced to serve in the Revolutionary Army until 
the war's end. Hopkins and Lamb were banished from the 
state until the end of the war.74 Jefferson's plan for an 
independent judiciary had withstood its first major test, 
and in doing so had taken a giant step toward defining the 
73Jefferson, Notes of the State of Virginia, 126-129. 
74Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 193-202. 
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republic.75 
The fact that Jefferson's plan of court revision 
succeeded only partially, created significant structural 
problems for the Old Dominion's courts in the 1780s. 
Especially vexing were problems of scheduling related to the 
chancery court's inablity to change venue and the fact that 
the failure of the assize bill put the county courts outside 
the direct control of the high court judges, frustrating two 
objectives that remained important to Jeffersonians in the 
Old Dominion. By the close of the decade, the legacy of 
Jefferson's court bills combined with the clarification of 
American legal principles in the Constitution of the United 
states to give rise to a movement for judicial reform which 
dominated the early history of Virginia's Supreme Court. 
Agitation for court reform came from various sources. 
Initially, the judges encountered problems stemming from the 
separation of appellate jurisdiction into three different 
courts. In this regard, Jefferson and the legislators may 
have been overly concerned in providing to many substitutes 
for the British appeals courts. Accordingly, in the early 
court sessions, especially in the Court of Appeals, the 
judges often found themselves with little to do.76 
75For the complete record of the Case of the Prisoners, 
see Caton v. Commonwealth, 4 Call 5; for Pendleton's 
account, which was omitted in Call's Reports, see PEP, v. 
II, 416-433. 
76Edmund Pendleton to William Woodford, 31 August 1779, 
PEP, v. II, 297; Edmund Pendleton to William Woodford, 9 
September 1779, ibid., 299. 
- ------ ------ ·- ---
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Edmund Pendleton noted that the courts did not achieve full 
employment until the spring sessions of 1783. By then, 
however, Virginians had begun to litigate vigorously. 
Pendleton wrote that the judges heard causes for six hours 
and used mornings and evenings "For digesting and settling" 
opinions. The grind was so demanding that Pendleton, 
already an ill man, considered resigning.77 
Throughout the 1780s the litigious nature of 
Virginians gradually increased the burdens on the courts. 
By 1788, the delays that had become a commonplace feature of 
the system forced both the Court of Appeals and the assembly 
to address the problem of burdensome dockets. 
In the Court of Appeals, as the judg~s slaved away, 
motions for appeal mounted and the dockets became clogged.78 
The Court of Appeals' addressed these considerations in its 
first rulemaking session in 1784. Hoping to reform its 
procedures for scheduling appeals in order to relieve 
immediate pressures on the dockets, the court provided that 
all cases brought before it for appeal, on difficulty, or by 
writ of error must be heard in the following term, unless 
either party could show good cause to permit a hearing at 
the present sitting.79 Almost immediately, however, the 
rule proved obsolete as more motions for appeal flooded the 
77Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, 26 May 1783, PEP, 
v. II, 447. 
78rbid. 
79Rule of court, 29 April 1784, 1 H&M, 10. 
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system. Two years later, the court amended the rule to 
prohibit hearings in the first term unless the court 
received reasonable notice of a motion for immediate 
action.80 Basically, the 1784 and 1786 rules had the same 
objective. The 1786 ruling, however, made the process more 
difficult by prohibiting the practice of immediate hearings 
as a matter of course and requiring special notices and 
motions for pushing a case up on the docket. Although these 
rules relieved immediate pressures on the dockets, they 
added to the logjam within the judicial system by extending 
the period of time in which appeals could be heard, thus 
further delaying the appellate process. Such delays 
threatened the constitutional rights to a speedy trial of 
those facing criminal charges. So in 1787 the court ruled 
to hear all criminal causes sent up from the General Court 
in the term when the record was scheduled for return, except 
when good cause could be shown otherwise.81 These 
procedural reforms failed to meet growing demands for 
appellate action and gave supporters and critics of the 
judiciary more ammunition to call for a comprehensive 
revision of the judicial system. 
Near the end of the decade, detailed plans for court 
revision began circulating among well-placed members of the 
legal community.82 Led by such leading political luminaries 
80Rule of Court, 6 November 1786, 1 H&M, 10. 
81Rule of Court, 13 November 1787, 1 H&M, 10. 
82see Appendix II. 
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as James Madison, a movement to reform both procedures and 
the overall conception of the court system attracted a great 
deal of legal and legislative support. Drawing its strength 
from the increasing dissatisfaction with both the county and 
superior courts, especially the General Court, the reformers 
created a system of district courts in December 1788. The 
new system established the district courts as an extension 
of the General Court. Primarily, the legislators designed 
the district courts to lighten the load on the General Court 
and to provide a more professional alternative to the county 
courts. And the response to the legislative program which 
created the district courts combined with maturing ideas of 
republican government to influence sweeping reforms of the 
entire appellate structure in the following year.83 
The road to the district courts was a bumpy one. 
Virginians of a Jeffersonian stripe, as well as many members 
of the professional legal community, had been bemoaning the 
demise of the assize bill in 1778 and the failure of later 
attempts to put the system into operation. In the nine 
years that followed, criticism of the county court system 
mounted and, by 1787, it had combined with the call to 
reform the General Court. In response to the growing 
criticism of both the county court and the General Court, 
the legislature debated a bill to create a system of 
district courts near the end of the year. Arguing that the 
delays in the General court were equal to a "denial of 
83Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, 201-202. 
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justice," the assembly passed the bill on 2 January 1788. A 
tremendously detailed document, the first district court 
statute divided the state into eighteen judicial districts, 
added four judges to the General Court (who by statute would 
also sit on the court of Appeals), changed the times of the 
sessions for Virginia's four high courts, and required the 
judges of all four courts to ride circuit throughout the 
districts at various times. The act carefully spelled out 
the jurisdiction and many of the practices and procedures of 
the court. In a decidedly Jeffersonian vein, however, the 
creation of new district courts represented a more 
professional alternative to the county courts.84 
The level of specificity in which the District Court 
bill regulated the procedures of the court was unprecedented 
in Virginia's history. Since the bill redefined the duties 
of all of Virginia's sitting high court judges, it is not 
surprising that opposition to the bill arose from those 
quarters. In the next session of the Court of Appeals, the 
judges issued the "Judges Remonstrance" attacking the 
constitutionality of the bill as it mingled judicial duties 
and forced the judges to provide for their own travel 
expenses.85 
In a letter to Governor Edmund Randolph on 12 May 
1788, Edmund Pendleton, as presiding judge of the Court of 
84Hening, statutes, "An Act Establishing District 
Courts," v. XII, 532-559. 
85"Remonstrance of the Judges," 12 May 1788, PEP, 504-
508. 
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Appeals, requested that Randolph transmit the remonstrance 
to the assembly at the next session.86 According to the 
judges, the imprecise wording of the act's directive to the 
judges to begin appointing clerks, even though the law did 
not go into effect until the following July, induced the 
court to rule upon it. The justices remarked that in the 
progress of their discussion they "found it unavoidable" to 
consider the constitutionality of the document. Exercising 
their powers of judicial review, first defined in the Case 
87 
of the Prisoners, the judges informed the assembly that they 
felt it necessary "either to decide those [constitutional] 
questions or resign their offices.n87 
The judges argued that although resignation would 
sustain their individual interests, their responsibilities 
to fellow citizens required commenting on the 
constitutionality of the issue. Accordingly, the judges 
proclaimed the act unconstitutional. Citing the passage in 
the declaration of rights that "no free government, or the 
blessing of liberty, can be preserved to any people but 
(among other things) by frequent recurrence to fundamental 
principles," the judges maintained that the "propriety and 
necessity of the independence of the Judges is evident in 
reason, and the nature of their office." Legislative 
blending of the duties of the high court judges in the 
86Edmund Pendleton to Edmund Randolph, 12 May 1788, 
PEP, 503-504. 
87"Remonstrance of the Judges," 12 May 1788, PEP, 
504-508. 
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district court bill, therefore, violated the fundamental 
principle of judicial independence. The repercussions of 
Caton v. Commonwealth here carne through with a vengance. 
Wythe's articulation of judicial review had allowed the 
judges to cite the doctrine in the face of the District 
Court reform, this time to bolster their own budding 
interpretation of the need for judicial independence. And 
in the "Judges' Remonstrance," the Virginia Assembly got 
much more than it bargained for when it created an 
independent judicial branch--a judiciary that acted 
independently.88 
Next, the judges argued that the bill created a new 
office for the judges of the Chancery, Admiralty, and 
General Courts that greatly increased their duties without 
providing for adequate compensation. such an attack on 
their financial position severely challenged their judicial 
independence. They remarked 
88 
For vain would be the precautions of the founders of 
our government to secure liberty, if the legislature, 
though restrained from changing the tenure of judicial 
office, are at liberty to compel a resignation by 
reducing salaries to a copper, or by making it a part of 
the judicial duty to become hewers of wood, and drawers 
of water, or if, in case of a contrary disposition, they 
can make salaries exhorbitant; or by lessening the 
duties render offices almost sinecures; the independence 
of the judiciary is in either case equally annihilated. 
Thus, the judges maintained that they ought not appoint the 
clerks because that would signify compliance with an act 
88"Remonstrance of the Judges," 12 May 1788, PEP 504-
508; I am grateful to Warren M. Billings for helping me to 
clarify this interpretation. 
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contrary to the constitution.89 
Finally, the judges urged the legislature to consider 
their objections. Should the legislature disagree, the 
judges suggested that they appeal to the people.90 Governor 
Randolph perceived the serious constitutional implications 
of the judges' objections and suggestions and called the 
legislature into session two days after receiving the 
remonstrance. But the timing of the special session could 
not have been worse. Before the legislators could deal with 
the district court bill, many had to attend the ratification 
convention. By the time that obstacle was overcome, the 
legislators found themselves approaching mid-summer. With 
harvest nigh, the assembly decided to suspend the district 
court bill91, putting off deliberations until the fall 
session.92 
By the end of the fall session, the legislature worked 
out a new district court plan. On 22 December 1788, the 
assembly concluded that the delays resulting from the dual 
criminal and civil jurisdiction of the General Court were 
still equal to a "denial of justice" as they 
are unnecessaryily burthensome to the citizens of this 
commonwealth, violations of the laws frequently pass 
with impunity from the difficulty with which witnesses 
89"The Remonstrance of the Judges," PEP, 508. 
90"The Remonstrance of the Judges," PEP, 508. 
91Hening, statutes, "An Act to Suspend the Operation of 
the Act, entitled An Act Establishing District Courts," v. 
XII, 644. 
92Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. II, 273-274. 
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attend from great distances and the authority of those 
laws would be more diffusively promulgated by the 
establishment of district courts .•.• 
The new district courts would meet at various times 
throughout the state with the exception of the district of 
Kentucky.93 
90 
In the first section of the detailed statute, the 
assembly defined the jurisdiction of the district courts and 
revised the General Court. It divided the state into 
eighteen judicial districts.94 To provide for enough 
judges, the assembly added three justices to the nine-member 
General Court. Every six months, the twelve judges would 
review their calendars and decide on which sessions of the 
eighteen district courts they would attend, adjusting their 
schedules so that two General Court judges would be in 
attendance at each meeting of a district court.95 
The second section of the statute specifically 
addressed the burgeoning criminal dockets. Legislative 
requirements provided that under ordinary circumstances only 
one General Court judge needed to attend oyer and terminer 
sessions of the district courts. When the courts heard 
criminal cases involving capital punishment or burning of 
93Hening, statutes, "An Act for establishing District 
Courts, and for regulating the General court," v. XII, 730. 
94The districts were Richmond, Williamsburg, 
Northumberland, King and Queen, Fredericksburg, Winchester, 
Staunton, Charlottesville, Dumfries, Monongalia, Washington 
and Montgomery, Suffolk, Petersburg, Brunswick, Prince 
Edward, New London, Accomack, and Lewisburg. 
95Hening, Statutes, "An Act ... District Courts, and 
..• General Court," v. XII, 730-732. 
--------
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the hand, however, two General court judges were required to 
attend the court unless the prisoner petitioned for trial 
with the absence of one judge notwithstanding. If two 
judges split over a criminal case either over an issue 
arising in the court or over final judgment or sentence, the 
case would be settled in favor of the prisoner. t~en there 
were too many criminal cases to satisfy in one term, those 
cases would be held over until the next term. If two judges 
failed to attend the next term, however, the prisoner would 
be bailed. If that prisoner then showed himself on the 
first day of the next court session, and there was not a 
sufficient court, he would be bailed on his own 
recognizance. Finally, if a sufficient court would not 
exist by the third day of that session, then the prisoner 
would be discharged.96 
The third section of the act dealt with the 
constitution of the district courts. In addition to the 
oath the judges would take as members of the General Court, 
they would also be sworn in as judges of the district 
courts. Providing for contingencies, the assembly allowed 
for court adjournments and continuances and forbade any 
district court to discontinue cases. 
A fourth section of the act defined the jurisdiction 
of the court to be over 
all persons, and in all causes, matters, or things at 
common law now cognizable in the general court, and 
96Hening, statutes, An Act ... District Courts, and . 
General court," v. XII, 734. 
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which shall amount to thirty pounds, or three thousand 
pounds of tobacco, whether brought before them by 
original process, by habeas corpus, appeal, writ of 
error, supersedeas, mandamus, certiorari, to remove 
proceedings on a forcible entry or detainer, or for any 
other purpose, or by any legal ways or means whatsoever. 
The assembly, in order to relieve the burden on the current 
General Court docket, granted the district courts 
jurisdiction in all causes currently pending in the General 
Court, except, in cases involving mills, wills, roads, 
letters of administration, orphans and guardians, and public 
debtors when the causes arose outside of the district.97 
The assembly also transferred admiralty jurisdiction 
to the General Court. As admiralty cases had not presented 
much of a challenge to the post-Revolutionary court system, 
and as the legislature had reduced the number of judges in 
the admiralty court, the assembly understood that, as a 
matter of practicality, the district courts could meet the 
demands of admiralty jurisdiction. Thus admiralty 
jurisdiction combined with that of the General Court in the 
districts.98 
Because the General Court would still hear original 
causes, the assembly continued to vest it with the power to 
summon juries, and to hear motions against sheriffs or other 
officers and for attornies at law for the directors of the 
97Hening, statutes, "An Act ... District Court, and . 
General Court," v. XII, 735-736. 
98Hening, statutes, "An Act •.. District Courts, and 
General court," v. XII, 736; the Admiralty Court had already 
been limited to one judge in 1782, Edmund Pendleton to James 
Madison, 25 November 1782, PEP, v. II, 429. 
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James River and Potomac companies.99 
Since the legislators designed the district courts as 
extensions of the General Court, they also envisioned that 
occasionally, the two district court judges would be faced 
with difficult legal questions which they might have trouble 
adjudicating on their own. In those instances, the act 
allowed causes involving difficult questions to be adjourned 
to the General Court. Likewise, the assembly gave the Court 
of Appeals direct discretionary appellate jurisdiction over 
the district court through use of the writ of error.lOO 
In order to assure an even distribution of the 
district court judges' circuit duties, the act provided that 
no judge could attend two successive sessions i~ the same 
district. Since the General Court was to be the presiding 
institution of the district courts, the assembly granted it 
the power to appoint clerks. But the assembly was not 
willing to give the General Court free rein in regulating 
district proceedings. In an effort to restrain recent 
advances in judicial independence, the assembly spelled out 
the procedures of the district courts in great detail. 
Accordingly, a goodly portion of the district court act 
regulated clerks' fees, forms and teste of writs, bonds, 
bails, exceptions, judgments, surrenders, and a plethora of 
99Hening, statutes, "An Act ... District Courts, and 
. General Court," v. XII, 736. 
lOOHening, statutes, "An Act ..• District courts, and 
.General Court," v. XII, 737. 
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minute details regarding practice in the courts.lOl Besides 
the usual procedural matters, the assembly spelled out the 
court's jurisdiction regarding witnesses, evidence, court 
costs notices, record keeping, fees for maintaining 
prisoners, holding grand juries, nominating commonwealth 
attornies, and even regulating lawyers's fees, All of these 
matters were much more clearly defined by the legislature 
than in the original court bills that created the judiciary 
system.l02 
The final section of the act restructured the existing 
General Court. Since establishing district courts 
necessitated the appropriation of portions of the General 
Court's jurisdiction, the act reflected the jurisdictional 
changes. Furthermore, all cases pending in the General 
Court save those that directly came under the court's 
purview, for instance, appeals, writs of error, supersedeas, 
special verdicts, case agreed, motions in arrest of 
judgment, or causes where a point of law was reserved, were 
distributed to the district courts. Two annual sessions 
were set in June and November. Three judges could 
constitute the court, except in cases of impeachment when 
all judges would have to attend.l03 
lOlHening, statutes, "An Act ... District Courts, and 
. General Court," v. XII 738-747. 
102Hening, statutes, "An Act ... District Courts, and 
. General Court," v. XII, 747-759. 
103Hening, statutes, "An Act ... District Courts, and 
. General Court," v. XII, 760-762. 
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Since the General Court presided over the district 
courts, the assembly granted it the power to try or to 
change venue in any case pending before a district court. 
In order to provide for the effects of the new act, the 
assembly decreed that any supersedeas or appeal granted by 
inferior courts before the act went into effect should be 
retried by the General court. The assembly guaranteed all 
deeds and wills under the jurisdiction of the court and 
validated all ongoing inquisitions and processes. Finally, 
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the assembly prescribed the rates of judicial taxes, 
provided rules for impeachment and disqualifications of 
judges, and repealed all previous laws which contravened the 
act.l04 
Because of the objections of the judges of the Court 
of Appeals to the first district court bill, the legislature 
passed a second act reconstituting the Court of Appeals, 
creating a truly separate appellate court and releasing its 
judges from any respon~iblity to other state courts. By 
virtue of the 1779 act the Court of Appeals drew its 
membership from the High Court of Chancery, the Court of 
Admiralty, and the General Court. Since the district court 
bill drastically increased the duties of the judges of the 
General Court by creating a gruelling circuit schedule, and 
since the bill vested admiralty jurisdiction to the General 
Court, the court of Appeals demanded certain changes. 
104Hening, Statutes, "An Act ... District Courts, and 
. General Court," v. XII, 762-763. 
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Accordingly, on the same day that it passed the district 
court bill, the assembly created a new Court of Appeals.l05 
The act provided for a five-man Court of Appeals, any 
three of whom would constitute a court. Richmond would be 
the primary seat of the court for its two regular annual 
sessions; however, the assembly or the governor could 
appoint new venues in case of emergencies. Moreover, the 
act provided for the dates of regular sessions, rules 
regarding impeachments, appointing clerks, and conflicts of 
96 
interest. Jurisdiction pending in suits before the court of 
appeals remained under the purview of the new court. The 
act also repealed portions of earlier statutes that 
conflicted with its new provisions.106 
Finally, the assembly completed its overhaul of the 
judicial system in December with three acts. Since the 
district court act required the General court judges to 
spend a great deal of time riding circuit, the assembly 
granted them a stipend of six pence per mile in travel 
expenses.l07 Another act abolished the Court of Admiralty 
by appointing its judges to the General Court.l08 Then, 
105Hening, statutes, "An Act for Amending the Act, 
Intitled An Act Constituting the court of Appeals," v. XII, 
764. 
106Hening, Statutes, "An Act •.. Constituting the 
Court of Appeals," v. XII, 765-766. 
107Hening, Statutes, "An Act Allowing travelling 
expences to the Judges of the General Court," v. XII, 
768-769. 
108Hening, statutes, "An Act Concerning the Court of 
Admiralty, and the Judges thereof," v. XII, 769-770. 
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since three judges of the General Court, Peter Lyons, Paul 
Carrington, and William Fleming, received appointments to 
the Supreme Court of Appeals, along with chancellors Blair 
and Pendleton, the assembly passed an act allowing the 
General Court to consist temporarily of only ten judges and 
ordered the court to begin allotments to district courts 
immediately.l09 
For the most part the "December Reform" which 
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redefined the court system marked a successful experiment in 
legislative revision of the judiciary. The district courts 
became a crucial part of Virginia's legal system. The 
General Court sat without interuption until the 
constitutional reoganization of 1851. creation of the new 
Supreme court of Appeals, now a separate and independant 
tribunal, marked the beginning of the maturation of the Old 
Dominion's judiciary. In fitting ambivalent fashion; the 
new court, born in a spirit of reform, contained a curious 
mixture of judg~s who represented both conservative and 
liberal elements of the political structure. The ways in 
which these men and their successors joined together in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals would inform the character of 
Virginia's legal system for the next four decades. 
Although the "December Reform" created a new and 
separate supreme court, the legislation that reordered the 
tribunal paid little heed to revising practice and 
109Hening, statutes, "An Act Concerning the General 
Court," v. XII, 770-771. 
-------------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
98 
procedure. The revision set up a new administrative 
structure for the court, but did little to address the 
problems caused by Virginia's ambivalent revolutionary 
settlement. Questions regarding substantive legal issues 
such as descents, the paradox of basing the court on British 
models but restricting it from employing post-1607 British 
judicial innovations, and the relationship between the 
supreme bench and the other branches of the Old Dominion's 
governmental organization were left for the judges of the 
new court to flesh out in the coming decades. How the 
justices answered these questions reveals much about the 
development of the supreme court and the definition of its 
role in Virginia's state government. 
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Chapter Three 
Courts and the 'Clash of Cultures?' 1803-1812 
The Territory of Orleans 
Only eleven years after Virginia's statesmen revised 
the state's laws and established a republican court system, 
Jefferson once again found himself involved in creating a 
new jurisdiction, this time in the recently acquired 
territories of the Louisiana Purchase. As was the case of 
Virginia, Louisiana's legal system boasted a long colonial 
heritage. Purchase of the territory by the United States 
left room for the reconstitution of Louisiana's legal system 
along republican lines, just as the American Revolution 
provided for a similar recreation in the Old Dominion. The 
manner in which the president, his officials, and the 
territory's assemblies approached the revision of 
Louisiana's legal system parallelled Virginia's 
revolutionary settlement. complicated legal, political, and 
cultural issues evident in the attempt to incorporate 
Louisiana into the American nation offer not only an 
illustration of territorial settlement in the early republic 
but also a compelling glimpse at how the practical and 
philosophical issues which informed Virginia's revolutionary 
legal reconstruction played a role in recreating what has 
been largely regarded as a unique jurisdiction. 
* * * 
On 20 December 1803, in a crowded hallway of the Hotel 
99 
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de Ville, Pierre Clement de Laussat solemnly passed the keys 
to the City of New Orleans to W. c. c. Claiborne and James 
Wilkinson. The three officials then moved to the balcony of 
city hall and watched as the Tricolor was lowered to allow 
the Stars and Stripes to take its place. When the two 
colors passed each other on the flagpoles, a single cannon 
shot rang out, touching off a salute from all of the forts 
and batteries along the Mississippi river.l With those 
opening salvos, initially a celebration of peace and 
transition, the ancienne population of Louisiana and its new 
American residents engaged in a complicated battle for 
cultural hegemony. one of the major skirmishes of that 
clash of cultures centered on the legal administration of 
the territory. 
Traditionally, historians have taken as the main 
battle between the rival cultures the struggle over whether 
to continue civilian precepts as the basis for the region's 
private law, a contest that scholars have usually judged a 
"victory" for a native or "creole" faction of the state's 
legal order. 2 Thus Louisiana has been characterized as an 
l"Act of Delivery, 20 December 1803, 11 American state 
Papers, Public Lands, V, 728-729. Pierre Clement de 
Laussat, Memoirs of My life, trans. Sister Agnes-Josephine 
Pastwa, ed., Robert D. Bush, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1978), 88. 
2samuel B. Groner, "Louisiana Law: Its Development in 
the First Quarter Century of American Rule," Louisiana Law 
Review, (January 1948), 350-382; Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, 
"Legal systems in Conflict: Orleans Territory, 1804-1812," 
American Journal of Legal History, (1957), 35-75; , 
"Law and Government in the Louisiana Purchase: 1803-1804," 
Wayne Law Review, 2 (1956), 169-189; George Dargo, 
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anomaly in the American judicial system.3 That 
characterization, however, obscures the profound influence 
of Anglo-American principles on Louisiana's legal 
development. Those principles invaded Louisiana's legal 
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heritage largely through the efforts of a bench and bar that 
were dominated by American lawyers and judges. The actions 
of those men, evident in the practices and procedures of the 
territorial courts, allowed for the smooth introduction of 
the common law into Louisiana's legal system. Thus 
Louisiana became a mixed jurisdiction, remarkably similar to 
Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal 
Traditions, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1975), passim; Richard H. Kilbourne, Jr., "An 
Overview of the Wo:t'k of the Territorial court, 1804-1808, A 
Missing Chapter in the Development of the Louisiana civil 
Code," in Edward F. Haas, ed., Louisiana's Legal Heritage, 
(Pensacola: The Perdido Bay Press, published for the 
Louisiana state Museum, Studies in Louisiana Culture Series, 
1983), 107-129. Kilbourne's analysis is especially 
problematical because his frequent encounters with conunc:-~ 
law precedents and procedures detract from that of the 
territorial court as a "missing chapter" in the development 
of the code. 
3There are numerous examples of this interpretation. 
Recently, in a work intended to introduce lay persons to the 
American legal system, Lawrence M. Friedman has commented on 
Louisiana's lack of a common law tradition, American Law: An 
Introduction, (New York: w. w. Norton & company, 1984), 44; 
perhaps the most significant example, however, may be seen 
in Charles Cook's decision not to include Louisiana in his 
study of codification in America, The American Codification 
Movement: A study of Antebellum Legal Reform, (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Contributions in Legal 
studies, Number 14, 1981), thus the example of the mixing of 
civil law and common law in American jurisdictions, first 
evident in Louisiana, has been ignored. Cook viewed 
Louisiana as unusual because of its civilian heritage. But 
when one views the development of private law in nineteenth-
century United States Courts, the solutions to the problem 
of mingling the two systems, first fleshed out in Louisiana, 
appear to be remarkably similiar. 
-- --- ---------------------
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those that arose in other American states as the 
codification movement swept the nation in the nineteenth 
century. 
During the codification movement, American lawyers, 
lawmakers, and judges eschewed "moral" or "republican" 
justice in favor of more "pragmatic" solutions. One of the 
features of the shift from moral to pragmatic justice 
involved replacing British authorities with civilian sources 
as the foundation of American private law.4 As American 
lawyers embraced civilian icons such as Pothier and Domat, 
their counterparts in Louisiana created a judicial system 
which depended upon Anglo-American patterns of procedure. 
Louisianians also embraced English and American authorities 
as the basis of their public law. Moreover, Louisiana's 
leaders, demonstrating the innate conservatism of the legal 
profession, retained civilian sources as the foundation of 
the state's private law. Thus, in Louisiana and in the rest 
of the nation in the early nineteenth century, the legal 
system was in flux. As most American jurisdiction 
gravitated toward civilian treatises as their guides to 
private law, Louisianians adopted an American style of 
judicial administration and embraced common law ideas on 
public law. The end result was that by mid-century, 
Louisiana closely resembled other jurisdictions around the 
4sandra F. VanBurkleo, "'That Our Pure Republican 
Principles might not Wither•: Kentucky's Relief Crisis and 
the Pursuit of 'Moral Justice,' 1818-1826. 11 Ph. D. diss., 
University of Minnesota, 1988. 
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nation--civilian sources governed the administration of 
private law while the state's court structure and its 
criminal procedures owed their origins to Anglo-American 
influences. 
103 
In order to understand the evolution of Louisiana's 
jurisdiction, it is necessary to investigate the manner in 
which the territorial officials constructed their legal 
order between 1803 and 1812, for it was in that critical 
period that Louisiana's leaders created a common law 
judiciary to preside over their complicated mixed 
jurisdiction--an administrative decision that allowed for a 
stronger measure of judicial leadership than would have been 
possible under a civilian judiciary (see appendix I). 
Moreover, the establishment of a powerful and creative 
judiciary ensured not only that judges would follow American 
procedures, but that they would be able to inject the Anglo-
American legal traditions--those that they were most 
familiar with--into Louisiana's jurisprudence more easily 
than if bound by the more limited authority of a civilian 
judge. Thus the very structure and complexion of the 
judiciary increased the influence of Anglo-American patterns 
of justice on Louisiana's judicial system. 
Although jurisdictional and operational difficulties 
plagued Louisiana's early courts, the cooperation of the 
bench and bar in creating the jurisdiction suggests that the 
clash of legal traditions did not play a major role in the 
development of those courts. In fact, American control of 
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the bench and bar and the latent conservatism of the legal 
profession ensured that battles between rival cultures 
occurred only rarely in Louisiana's courtrooms. 
When Prefect Laussat handed over the keys to New 
Orleans, however, he presented the United States government 
with an enormous administrative problem. Louisiana had been 
a civilian jurisdiction since the French king granted 
Anthony Crozat letters patent to "all the territory 
possessed by the Crown between old and new Mexico and 
Carolina" on 26 September 1712. Before that time the colony 
was subject to the quasi-military rule of various explorers. 
Crozat's grant marked a turning point in the colony's 
development by ushering in a period of conciliar rule which 
established Louisiana's first judicial system. Separate 
edicts of 12 and 23 December 1712 set up a temporary 
Superior council which gave way to a more permanent eight-
man council on 16 September 1716. Both bodies possessed 
legislative and judicial powers.5 
The edict which created the Superior Council granted 
it jurisdiction in all civil and criminal causes. New 
France's Intendant served as the honorary president of the 
council, but in practice a Senior Councillor presided over 
the court. He alone sat as the court of first instance in 
provincial actions, while a quorum of three was needed to 
5Ben Robertson Miller, The Louisiana Judiciary, (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, University Studies 
number 9, 1932), 1; Francois x. Martin, The History of 
Louisiana from the Earliest Period, 2 vols., (New Orleans: 
Lyman and Beardslee, 1827-1829), vo1. I, 178. 
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try all other civil cases. A five-man quorum determined 
criminal matters. Meeting monthly, the council operated in 
exactly the same fashion as those in san Domingo and 
Martinique.6 
In 1717 the Western Company, a joint-stock venture, 
assumed Crozat's charter and added a system of inferior 
courts to assist the council in its judicial duties. When 
the Western Company was a party, the case was heard in the 
Consular Jurisdiction of Paris with appeals before the 
Parlement of Paris.? 
The vigorous growth of the colony following 
Bienville's founding of New Orleans in 1718 provided for a 
redefinition of the western Company's charter in September 
1719. Under the amended charter, appeals from the inferior 
courts received final judgment in council, with the king 
reserving the right to review all decrees. By the time the 
company relinquished its charter in 1732, inferior courts 
had been organized into nine efficient judicial districts: 
Alibamons, Mobile, Biloxi, New Orleans, Natchez, the Yazoos, 
the Illinois and Wabash, Arkansas, and Natchitoches. The 
courts consisted of a director or agent of the company 
assisted by two local magistrates.8 
6Miller, Louisiana Judiciary, 2; Martin, History of 
Louisiana, 180-182. 
7 Martin, History of Louisiana, 198; Miller, Louisiana 
Judiciary, 2. 
8Miller, Louisiana Judiciary, 2-3; Martin, History of 
Louisiana, 198, 245. 
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Indian warfare in 1729, however, led the Western 
Company to abandon its hopes of making Louisiana profitable, 
and on 7 May 1732 it relinquished its title to the monarch. 
Louis XV quickly reorganized his possession by abolishing 
the inferior courts and replacing them with a thirteen-man 
Superior Council whose members served as "assessors" in 
cases of first instance.9 The assessors based their 
judgments on the Parisian laws defined in the Coutume de 
Paris and royal edicts. This system served Louisiana for 
the next thirty years.lO 
As Louis XV's ministers occupied themselves with 
imperial wars between 1732 and 1762, Louisiana experienced a 
period of "salutary neglect" similar to British policy 
toward that country's North American colonies in the age of 
Walpole. Viewing Louisiana as a poor stepchild to the 
richer preserve of New France, Louis XV allowed the 
officials and citizens of Louisiana to fend for themselves 
in a variety of political and administrative venues. 
Insofar as its legal responsibilities were concerned, 
Louisiana's council provided for a high level of judicial 
service, exceeding the quality of the mother country's 
9Miller, Louisiana Judiciary, 3; Martin, History of 
Louisiana, 215-216. 
lOFer a brief analysis of the evolution of the Coutume 
de Paris and its application in Louisiana see Jerah Johnson, 
"La Coutume de Paris, Louisiana's First Law," Louisiana 
History, (Spring 1989), 145-155. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
107 
courts in both civil and criminal causes.ll 
But the superb judicial administration of the 
Superior Council came to an end when France ceded the colony 
to Spain in 1762 for timely support in the Seven Years' War. 
In the interregnum Louisiana's government was severely 
neglected as Antonio de Ulloa did not assume control of 
Louisiana for the Spanish king until 1766.12 
Ulloa was an unfortunate choice for Spain's first 
governor of Louisiana.l3 An inexperienced, dogmatic, 
brusque, and overbearing presence, Ulloa did little to 
appease the wary French citizenry who feared that Spanish 
administrative and legal reforms would deprive them of their 
property rights and place them "under the yoke of Spain.nl4 
Almost immediately after his arrival, Ulloa began to feed 
those fears. 
In the early months of his administration, Ulloa made 
drastic changes in the colony's administrative and judicial 
systems. He abolished the civilian council that had 
governed the colony during the interregnum and in the 
process angered powerful Louisiana citizens who controlled 
llJohn Preston Moore, Revolt in Louisiana: The Soanish 
Occupation. 1766-1770, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1976), 32, 29n; cf. James D. Hardy, Jr., 
"The Superior Council in Colonial Louisiana," in John 
Francis McDermott, ed., Frenchmen and French ways in the 
Mississippi Valley, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1969)' 101. 
12Moore, ~evolt in Louisiana, 34-40. 
13Moore, Revolt in Louisiana, 34-40. 
14Martin, History of Louisiana, 353. 
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that body via a corrupt junto. Once Ulloa broke the 
council, he urged his superior, Jeronimo Grimaldi, to issue 
a series of decrees which revised the colony's laws and 
placed all judicial power into the governor's hands.15 
Grimaldi's revised "municipal code" represented a far-
reaching reform of Louisiana's laws regarding "Religion," 
"Manners," "Provisions," "Public Health," and "Public 
Safety." The disgruntled junto interpreted the 
comprehensive nature of the code and the dissolution of the 
Superior Council as a clear threat to the autonomy that they 
had enjoyed since 1762. Rigid enforcement of commercial 
regulations under the "Public Safety" titre or section of 
the code, hit the Orleanais merchant community especially 
hard. Since those merchants comprised the most influential 
segment of the colony's population, indeed many merchants 
had been leaders of the deposed junto, dissention grew as 
Ulloa's reforms seemed to forecast the very outcome that 
Louisiana's citizens feared most about Spanish rule.16 
As Ulloa pursued his vigorous reforms, the colony 
entered into an economic depression and a monetary crisis 
which threatened its stability. Angry merchants and deposed 
politicians seized the initiative and devised schemes to 
unseat the unpopular governor and to return a measure of 
domestic control to the native residents of Louisiana. In 
the fall of 1768, Louisiana, under the leadership of the 
15Moore, Revolt in Louisiana, 40-53. 
16rbid., 40-59; Martin, History of Louisiana, 355. 
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merchant community, erupted into open rebellion against the 
Spanish governor. By the end of October a citizen's council 
expelled Ulloa from the colony and awaited Charles III's 
response.l7 
Charles responded by sending a trusted soldier of 
fortune, Alexander O'Reilly, to crush the rebellion and 
restore order in the insurgent colony. O'Reilly quickly 
beefed up Spain's military presence, arrested and executed 
the leaders of the insurrection, and put an end to the 
revolt, a task which soon won him the nickname "Bloody 
O'Reilly." Nonetheless, O'Reilly realized that continued 
oppression would likely lead to further insurrection. In 
the months following the executions, he moved swiftly to 
solidify Spanish rule and to provide the colony with stable 
leadership. By removing all remaining French officials; 
establishishing Spanish as the colony's official language; 
creating a new legal code and judicial and administrative 
systems; and revitalizing the catholic church, O'Reilly 
ensured Spain's administrative control of the colony, and 
provided the residents with the social, economic, and 
17Moore, Revolt in Louisiana, 60-165; Light T. Cummins, 
"Anglo Merchants in Spanish New Orleans: Capital Migration 
and the Atlantic Economy, 1760-1803, 11 unpublished paper 
delivered at the 53rd meeting of the Southern Historical 
Association, New Orleans, 13 November 1987; Lewis William 
Newton, The Americanization of French Louisiana: A Study in 
the Process of Adjustment Between the French and Anglo-
American Populations of Louisiana. 1803-1860, (New York: 
Arne Press, A New York Times Company, 1980), 1; Martin, 
History of Louisiana, 356-359; Gayarre, History of 
Louisiana, v. II, 381-383. 
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political stability necessary to maintain the peace.lB 
O'Reilly's decisive policies quelled the rebellion and 
established Spain's undisputed control of the colony. From 
a legal and judicial standpoint, O'Reilly's administrative 
reforms provided Louisiana with a stable court system until 
Laussat reclaimed the colony for France in 1803. The new 
code that O'Reilly issued in 1769 drew its inspiration from 
the Recopilacion des las Indias, the Siete Partidas, and the 
French Code Noir of 1724. He dissolved a post-Ulloa 
citizen's council and established another concilliar body, 
the Cabildo, as the residence of the administrative and 
judicial offices of the Spanish government. Dividing the 
province into eleven districts under military commanders, 
O'Reilly vested each officer with nominal civil and criminal 
jurisdiction. The Cabildo would function as the general 
court with final judicial authority resting in the Captain 
General of Havana. A special tribunal of military and 
executive officials in Havana, with the Captain General 
presiding, heard appeals from the local courts.l9 
For the most part, O'Reilly's measures proved sound. 
He induced the Spanish government to recognize French land 
grants, thus soothing any fears of confiscation among the 
citizenry. The new courts functioned well and soon won the 
trust of the French inhabitants. Although minor differences 
18Moore, Revolt in Louisiana, 190-217; Martin, History 
of Louisiana, 356-359. 
19rbid., 209-217. 
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existed between French and Spanish legal tribunals, on the 
whole the civilian system of Castille differed little in 
theory from the French codes that Louisiana's citizens were 
accustomed to. Accordingly, the transition from French to 
Spanish leadership, insofar as judicial administration was 
concerned, proceeded smoothly after Ulloa's deposition. But 
when Laussat received the colony for Napoleon in 1803, he 
instituted a series of reforms which left the government, 
especially the judicial system, in a confused state when 
Claiborne and Wilkinson claimed Louisiana for the United 
States in 1803. 
Pierre Clement de Laussat possessed all of the talents 
of an imperial bureaucrat. Earning his stripes in the 
tropics, he looked forward to the passage of Louisiana to 
France following the treaty of San Ildefonso in 1800. He 
convinced Napoleon to appoint him governor of the colony. 
But before Laussat could reach Louisiana, Bonaparte 
negotiated the sale of Louisiana to the United States. Thus 
Laussat's instructions were changed to presiding over the 
retrocession of the colony from Spain and effecting cession 
of the territory to United States officials. In fact, the 
double transfer was to take place on the same day, but 
Wilkinson and Claiborne could not reach New Orleans in time 
and Laussat was forced to preside over the colony for three 
weeks. 
Although Laussat knew that his mission to Louisiana 
was short-lived, he inexplicably embarked on an effort to 
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restructure the colony's government. One of his first steps 
was to suspend the Spanish laws and the Cabildo, although he 
did not have time to erect a French substitute before he 
turned Louisiana over to the Americans. Accordingly, the 
Americans received a territory without courts or laws, and a 
citizenry clamoring for a means to resolve their mounting 
legal disputes.20 
Why did Laussat choose to disolve the Cabildo? Two 
possible reasons immediately come to mind; either he was 
pursuing his own foreign policy or he was engaging in a 
secret Napoleanic plot to cause confusion and revolt in 
Louisiana when the Americans took possession of the 
territory. Since Laussat was a proud man who had looked 
forward to his position in Louisiana, it seems possible that 
his administrative shenanigans reflected his own designs on 
the colony.21 No evidence exists, however, to give credence 
to the theory that the prefect was engaging in a clandestine 
attempt with Napoleon to create confusion in Louisiana and 
to foil the American takeover. Nonetheless, Laussat's 
actions created significant difficulties for the territory's 
new guardians. As in the case of the Spanish takeover, 
Louisianians viewed the new government with skepticism. The 
same fears of dispossession resulting from alien land 
policies rose among the anciene population. Moreover, 
20oargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 105. 
21E. Wilson Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy. 1759-
1804, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934),243-246. 
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Laussat•s actions exacerbated the situation by suspending 
the colony's administrative organs. In 1766, Charles III 
assumed leadership of a region that had benefitted from some 
form of civilian government. In 1803, Jefferson took 
control of a community populated by a suspicious and anxious 
citizenry and totally devoid of governmental or judicial 
direction. Moreover, Jefferson understood that his new 
charges had risen in rebellion under similar circumstances 
in 1768. His efforts to govern the territory required 
reconstruction of the government from the ground up, a 
proposition that in a seemingly more stable situation had 
precipitated rebellion. 
In view of the instability of the situation, Jefferson 
and Congress adopted swift measures to bring order to the 
Purchase. On 26 March 1804 congress divided the ceded lands 
into b:o territories. Orleans Territory, comprising most of 
the modern state of Louisiana, with a long-settled port and 
an ethnic hodge-podge of inhabitants, promised to be the 
most difficult to govern. To manage the province, congress 
provided for a system of conciliar government, with a 
governor and a thirteen-man legislative council at the 
head.22 Judging that the creole population of the territory 
would be suspicious of rash innovation and brusque 
leadership, Jefferson appointed w. c. c. Claiborne, a 
22"An Act Erecting Louisiana into Two Territories, and 
Providing for the Temporary Government Thereof, March 26, 
1804," u. s. Congress, Statutes at Large, comp., Richard 
Peters, (Boston: Little and Brown, 1845), 322. 
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cautious politician with experience in frontier government, 
as governor.23 
Unlike Ulloa, Claiborne fit the position perfectly. A 
politician, not a soldier, Claiborne had served a lengthy 
apprenticeship before he assumed a leadership role. At 
fifteen he accepted a post as clerk of the u. s. House of 
Representatives. Six years later, Claiborne returned home 
to sussex, Virginia, to read law. Upon finishing his 
education, Claiborne, like many young Virginians of his day, 
sought his fortune on the Tennessee frontier. There he 
established a thriving criminal practice and rose quickly 
through the ranks of the frontier elite. When Tennessee 
petitioned for statehood in 1796, Claiborne became a 
delegate to the territorial constitutional convention. He 
topped off that service with an appointment to the state 
supreme court in the same year and from there went on to sit 
in the House of Representatives when Andrew Jackson resigned 
in 1797 to pursue a senate post. These early achievements 
drew notice from Claiborne's cousin, President Jefferson, 
who appointed the young man governor of Mississipi. When 
Jefferson purchased Louisiana, he called on his territorial 
officials for advice on administering the new acquisition. 
Claiborne's counsel to his cousin on the Louisiana question 
23oictionary of American Biography, hereinafter cited 
as DAB, v. II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 
115-116; w. c. c. Claiborne to Thomas Jefferson, 5 October 
1804, Clarence E. Carter, comp., The Territorial Papers of 
the United States, v. IX, (Washington, D. c., u. s. 
Government Printing Office, 1940, 307; Brown, "Legal Systems 
in Conflict," 41-42. 
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and his prudent direction of Mississippi's Indian territory 
prodded the Sage of Monticello to offer him the Louisiana 
position when James Monroe turned it down.24 
Both Jefferson and his governor wished for a swift 
introduction of the common law as the basis for the 
territory's legal system, yet both suspected that such a 
step would foment dissent among the territory's creole 
residents. Nor did such vigorous revision have any 
precedent in Anglo-American traditions of judicial 
administration.25 Accordingly, Jefferson and Claiborne 
moved cautiously to construct a judiciary that would meet 
the pressing needs of the community, ensur~ American 
constitutional guarantees, and allow for a judicious 
intermingling of both American and civilian legal 
principles. 
Claiborne's first attempt to construct a court system 
reflects the cautious nature of his administration. Almost 
immediately after the cession, Claiborne created courts to 
24oAB, v. II (New York: Charles scribner's Sons, 1958), 
115-116; w. c. c. Claiborne to Thomas Jefferson, 5 October 
1804, Clarence E Carter, comp., The Territorial Papers of 
the United States, v. IX, (Washington, D. c., u. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1940), 307; Robert v. Remini, 
Andrew Jackson, (New York: Perennial Library, Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1966), 38. 
25British officials likewise adhered to the common law 
emphasis on custom and usage when they allowed French 
residents of the Canadian and western provinces to hold on 
to their 'laws in force' under provisions of the Quebec Act 
of 1774, see Clarence E. Carter, "The Office of Commander in 
Chief: A Phase of Imperial Unity on the Eve of the 
Revolution," in Richard B. Morris, ed., The Era of the 
American Revolution: Studies Inscribed to Evarts Boutell 
Greene, (New York: Columbia University Press, 183. 
--------- ------
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settle the rising number of suits that had been accumulating 
ever since Laussat had suspended the Cabildo. To deal with 
minor civil causes, Claiborne and the legislative council 
instituted a nine-man court of pleas with jurisdiction in 
matters under $3,ooo.oo. 26 Claiborne appointed Anthony 
Argotte, Beverley Chew, Benjamin Morgan, William Kenner, 
Paul Lanusse, Francis M. Guerin, Gaspard Debuys, William 
Garland, and Eugene Dorsiere as judges to the court of 
pleas.27 At the first session on 10 January 1804, the court 
adopted fifteen rules of procedure. Adhering to American 
practices 1 the court required all suits to commence by writs 
of summons, capias, or attachment and prescribed the form 
and manner in which the writs were to be issued.28 Article 
four of the rules ordered that "the court will proceed to 
trial immediately," thus guaranteeing defendants their 
constitutional right to a speedy trial.29 After describing 
the proper manner in which litigants should respond to the 
writs, the justices focused on the structural matters 
necessary to govern trials in the court. They allowed all 
26william c. c. Claiborne "An Ordinance to aid in the 
Administration of Justice," 30 December 1803, in Dunbar s. 
Rowland, ed., Official Letterbooks of W. c. C. Claiborne. 
1801-1816, hereinafter cited as OL, (Jackson, Mississippi: 
State Department of Archives and History, 1917), I, 317-319; 
Groner, "Louisiana Law," 358-361. 
27court of Pleas for the Territory of Orleans, Minute 
Book, Mss. City Archives, New Orleans Public Library, 
Louisiana Division, 1. 
28"Articles 1-3, 11 Court of Pleas Minute Book, 1-2. 
29"Article Four," Court of Pleas, Minute Book, 2. 
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parties to issue subpoenas, ascribed the liability of court 
costs to the losing party, and instructed the clerks, 
constables, and sheriffs on the proper manner of processing 
and executing judgments.30 Finally, the judges defined the 
offices that made up the court's staff. One crier was to be 
appointed by the court; each municipality within the city 
was to provide a constable; and the judges empowered the 
clerk of court, Etienne Mazaureau, to issue all oaths 
necessary for the operation of the tribunal.31 (see 
appendix IV) 
Louisiana's citizens responded to the court of pleas 
enthusiastically, and soon the dockets became clogged. 
Averaging five hundred cases per year,32 the court became 
the territory's busiest tribunal. As did later territorial 
and state courts in Louisiana, the court of pleas adopted 
Anglo-American procedures, writs, and summonses to govern 
its practice. In doing so, the court of pleas represented 
the first extension of Anglo-American judicial practices to 
Louisiana and forecast one of the most powerful aspects of 
Louisiana's legal settlement--the introduction of common law 
forms and procedures as the basis for the region's legal 
discourse. 
In addition to the court of pleas, Claiborne set up a 
'governor's' court to handle major civil actions, appeals 
30"Articles 5-7, court of Pleas, Minute Book, 2-3. 
3l"Articles 7-15, 11 Court of Pleas, Minute Book, 3-6. 
32court of Pleas, Minute Book, passim. 
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from the court of pleas in cases involving amounts over 
$500.00, and criminal appeals in capital cases. Finally, 
he took steps to develop a county court system to decide 
original civil and criminal complaints. Claiborne took 
great pains to attract competent men as justices of the 
peace, as he understood that traditional forms of lay 
justice, for instance those practiced in Virginia's county 
courts, would present magistrates with an extremely 
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difficult task, as the subtlties of placing an Anglo-
American system of court administration over a mixed body of 
laws could be confusing to the most astute legal scholar. 
Solving the personnel problems on the county court level 
proved to be one of the most vexing problems of Claiborne's 
administration. Many qualified members of the ancienne 
population, either wary of American ambitions or ignorant of 
American judicial procedures, declined appointments to the 
county bench. Claiborne, consequently, filled many 
positions with Americans, furthering American control of the 
bench and bar.33 
Claiborne, however, realized the inadequacy of these 
tribunals. County courts went unmanned for want of 
competant magistrates. The court of pleas was swamped with 
cases. But the most vexing problem, in Claiborne's opinion, 
33william c. c. Claiborne "An Ordinance to aid in the 
Administration of Justice," OL, I, 317-319; Groner, 
"Louisiana Law," 358-361. On the matter of county 
appointments, Claiborne's letters chronicle a long and 
difficult process. The author is currently involved in a 
study of the development of Louisiana's county or "parish" 
courts which he hopes to publish in the near future. 
----------------
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was the lack of an efficient appellate system. Although 
Claiborne was an accomplished lawyer, he recognized that his 
duties on the governor's court not only conflicted with his 
busy schedule, but also that his inexpert knowledge of civil 
law, which despite the reception of American forms and 
procedures still informed Louisiana's legal discourse to a 
great degree, impeded his ability to dispense justice. 
Moreover, given his heavy workload, Claiborne felt hard-
pressed to hear appeals in capital cases.34 
Louisiana's residents also grasped the weaknesses of 
the arrangement. Since one of the provisions of the cession 
treaty of 1803 was that "the inhabitants of the ceded 
territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United 
States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the 
principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of 
all the rights, advantages, and immunities, of citizens of 
the United States ..•. n35 When the act of 26 March 
created a territorial arrangement that limited the "rights, 
advantages, and immunities" of the territory's citizens, 
opposition to the government mobilized. 
The controversy revolved about a provision in the act 
of 26 March which placed an embargo on slave importation. 
34w. c. c. Claiborne to Robert Smith, 18 March 1811, 
OL, V, 183-184; Claiborne to James Madison, 15 June 1806, 
OL, III, 331; Claiborne to Thomas Jefferson, 17 June 1806, 
OL, III 333-335; Claiborne to Madison, 9 June 1804, OL, II 
197-199; Claiborne to Madison, 13 February 1804, OL, I, 371-
373. 
35oargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 30. 
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Only slaves from foreign ports imported into the United 
States after 1 May 1798 were allowed into the territory. 
Furthermore, the only slaves granted entrance were those 
brought by United States citizens "removing into said 
territory for actual settlement." Since the slave embargo 
directly contradicted Article I, section 9, of the Federal 
Constitution, which stated that no restrictions could be 
placed upon the slave trade until 1808, dissenters rightly 
contended that they were being denied a fundamental 
principle of the constitution.36 
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In the spring of 1804 a group of Orleans natives led 
by Americans Edward Livingston, Daniel Clark and Evan Jones, 
presented a memorial to Congress protesting Claiborne's 
management of the territory and petitioning for statehood. 
By quick acceptance, the petitioners hoped to gain 
admittance to the union and at the same time to preserve 
their cultural prominence in Louisiana by securing civilian 
traditions.37 They listed as oppressive in the memorial the 
slave embargo, Claiborne's "inadequacy" and the "extensive 
powers of the governor's office," and they criticized 
36Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 30-32; "An Act Erecting 
Louisiana •.. ," u. s. Statutes at Large, 322; "The 
Constitution of The United states of America--1789," in 
Francis Newton Thorpe, ed., The Federal and State 
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Organic Laws of the 
States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming 
the United States of America, (Washington, D. C.: u. s. 
Government Printing Office, 1909), v. I, 22. 
37warren M. Billings, "From this Seed: The Louisiana 
Constitution of 1812," forthcoming. 
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judicial system that Claiborne had created.38 
But Jefferson, the Congress, and Claiborne himself, 
questioned the abilities of Louisianians to govern 
themselves within the republican system.39 Consequently, 
all that the memorialists could gain was permission to 
organize a territorial government under the provisions of 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. That ordinance mandated 
the implementation of the common law, but it allowed local 
institutions to observe the recognized 'laws in force' of 
their regions.4° Under these narrower restrictions the 
Louisianians quickly established a new government. 
Claiborne remained as governor, but an elected assembly 
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replaced the legislative council. To handle legal disputes, 
the new legislature created a three-man superior court to 
decide both original and appellate causes. This new court, 
as directed by the Northwest Ordinance, drew its judgments 
from the 'laws in force' of the region.41 The framers of 
38oargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 32. 
39For congress, see Winthrop D. Jordan, White over 
Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812, (New 
York: W. w. Norton & Company, 1977; first published by the 
University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of 
Early American History and Culture, 1968), 389; Claiborne 
had first expressed this sentiment in a January letter to 
James Madison. Unfortunately, Claiborne's letter was leaked 
to an unidentified Federalist newspaper. When news of the 
letter reached New Orleans, considerable opposition 
developed among the anciene population, Dargo, Jefferson's 
Louisiana, 29. 
40united states Statutes at Large, 322; cf. George 
Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 128-129. 
41u. s. statutes at Large, 322; cf. Dargo, Jefferson's 
Louisiana, 128-129. 
----------
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the Northwest Ordinance, however, did not anticipate the 
takeover of as alien a jurisdiction as Louisiana. Thus the 
loose stricture of adhering to 'laws in force' presented 
unique problems to Louisianians. Since Laussat's suspension 
of the Cabildo had cast doubt on what the existing laws 
were, the legislature set out immediately to define them. 
Claiborne welcomed this initiative since his own experience 
as territorial judge demonstrated the need for 
clarification. 
As these efforts proceeded, Jefferson and the state 
department undertook the tedious task of filling judicial 
positions in the territory, a problem that would plague the 
court throughout its early history. Their initial choices 
demonstrate both the desire to create a common law 
jurisdiction and to appease creole inhabitants who feared 
wholesale intrusions of common law. John Prevost of New 
York, Pierre Etienne Duponceau of Pennsylvania, and Ephraim 
Kirby of Connecticut received the first nominations. 
Prevost spoke both French and Spanish fluently, a talent 
which made him an indispensible choice for the job. 
Duponceau, a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, was an accomplished common lawyer (and totally 
Americanized, in Philadelphia he was known as Peter Stephen 
Duponceau),42 but his French background would allay fears 
among the creole community. Ephraim Kirby, an ardent 
42conway Robinson to Samuel Jaudon, 14 July 1836, 
Conway Robinson Papers, Virginia Historical Society. 
--- -------------·-
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republican and supporter of the Louisiana Purchase, had 
established a reputation as one of the nation's first law 
reporters, but more importantly, like Jefferson, he was an 
early advocate of codification. Although Prevost was the 
only one of this triumvarite to claim his commission, since 
Kirby died enroute to New Orleans and Duponceau declined the 
post, their selection reveals the president's inclination 
toward implementing American legal reforms in a cautious and 
compromising fashion.43 The American judicial system had to 
be represented, but Jefferson sought to do so by appointing 
judges who, though thoroughly Americanized, would ba both 
appealing and sympathetic to the wishes of the territory's 
native inhabitants. 
Prevost, as the territory's first judge, was the 
single most important figure in Louisiana's judicial 
development. Since territorial judges made only $2000.00 
per year, numerous candidates for positions on the bench 
declined appointments. Consequently, Prevost, despite 
financial hardship,44 sat for two years as the territory's 
43Henry Plauche Dart, "The History of the Supreme court 
of Louisiana," speech at the centenary of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, Louisiana Annual Reports, hereinafter cited 
as La. Ann., 133, (St. Paul: West Publishing co., 1914), 
xxxiii; DAB, V, 423-424, 525-526; Eldred Simkins to Creed 
Taylor, 17 May 1803; Eldred Simkins to creed Taylor, 1 
August 1803, Creed Taylor Papers, Special Collections, 
Alderman Library, University of Virginia. 
44During his tenure as superior court judge, Prevost 
accumulated debts of at least$17,500. His inability to 
payoff his loans led to two Superior court cases as his 
creditors sought to recover their investments, see Carrick 
v. Prevost, superior Court Case #243 and McDonagh v. 
Prevost, Superior Court Case #1243. 
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lone appellate magistrate. During that tenure he 
courageously faced lengthy dockets and strove to render 
justice in a form that would satisfy both American and 
Orleanais interests, earning the profound respect of the 
governor, the citizens, and most importantly, the 
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territory's bar. on several occasions Claiborne; members of 
the bar, and influential New Orleanians urged officials of 
the United States to provide Prevost with brother justices 
and financial relief. Uniformly these requests praised 
Prevost's judical acumen. James Brown's remarks to Samuel 
Smith on this matter are illustrative 
To say that he [Prevost] has been upright in a 
country where the name of a Judge was formerly but a 
name for corruption, would, be no encomium; for thank 
God! altho the poor Louisianian stares at the idea of 
an honest judge, yet the opposite is hardly known in 
our happy country . • . But the penetration and 
diligence which could ingraft the practice of American 
courts, with its viva voce examinations of witnesses, 
trial by Jury, upon the principles of the Civil Law and 
digest a system of practice equally acceptable to the 
disciple of Lord Coke and of Justinian, are the 
qualities more rare and better calculated to excite our 
applause and command our gratitude. This has been done 
by Judge Prevost and the proof of it is the enclosed 
petition signed by the entire members of a bar where 
the French, English, and Spanish languages are in daily 
use and all of which are understood by the court. 
Yet despite such pleas, the administration failed to send 
additional aid to Prevost.45 
45w. c. c. Claiborne to Thomas Jefferson, 1 July 1804, 
carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 247;. "Petition to Congress 
by Lawyers of the Territory, 1805, 11 Ibid., 269; James Brown 
to Thomas Jefferson, 8 January 1805, Ibid., 365-366; Brown 
to John Breckinridge, 15 January 1805, Ibid., 369; Brown to 
Samuel Smith, 28 November 1805, Ibid., 537-539. 
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Nonetheless, the Prevost court proved to be the most 
influential of all of Louisiana's early courts merely 
because it was the first to deal with many of the sticky 
issues that arose from the transfer of jurisdictions. The 
most mundane example, important from a legal standpoint 
despite its apparent insignificance, came from the court's 
authority to issue summary writs. In this manner, Prevost 
directly influenced further courts by prescribing the form 
of the writs. An example of that authority is the oldest 
125 
surviving writ of habeas corpus issued by a Louisiana judge. 
Prevost issued the writ for a Mr. Wakefield who had been 
detained by Orleans county sheriff George T. Ross. 
Prevost's construction of the writ followed standard 
American forms, hence through simple actions such forms 
became commonplace features of Louisiana's legal 
discourse.4 6 
Unfortunately, none of Prevost's decisions have 
survived.4 7 Nonetheless, the records of the Superior Court 
reveal much about his judicial ability. Faced by 
unprecedented jurisdictional uncertainty, Prevost presided 
46writ of Habeas Corpus issued 19 April 1806, superior 
Court for the Territory of Orleans, New Orleans Public 
Library, city Archives, Box# 1171-1303, see Appendix III. 
47Indeed, one of the more serious problems with 
interpreting the legal records of territorial Louisiana is 
the fact that no judicial decisions are recorded in the case 
files prior to 1809 when Francois Martin began reporting and 
publishing the superior Court's decisions. The surviving 
documents for the pre-1809 period, therefore, are 
incomplete. Nonetheless, those judgments and pleadings that 
do survive offer some insight into the workings of the court 
during this formative era. 
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over many complicated proceedings. Confusion over the laws 
in force forced Prevost to cope with a plethora of problems 
caused by competing jurisdictions. French laws such as the 
"Code Noir" still governed the treatment of slaves.48 In 
Coudrain v. Bagneris and in other instances Prevost heard 
appeals of cases from Spanish tribunals which forced him to 
discern their methods and to rule upon their judgments.49 
Finally, since he alone constituted the court, Prevost was 
responsible for the entire Superior Court docket. Despite 
the many difficulties he encountered, Prevost performed 
admirably and provided a remarkable measure of judicial 
stability. 
By Spring 1806, however, Prevost realized that he 
could no longer manage such an enormous assignment. 
Inadequate compensation had forced him into debt, and the 
tremendous workload compromised his health. Prevost urged 
Secretary Madison to appoint a successor so that he could 
retire. Prevost pointed out that the workload was so great 
and the compensation so little that 
To justify the necessary sacrifices of time and 
feelings--on the one hand to penetrate the mysteries of 
a code so obsolete in practice from the corruptions of 
my predecessors to assimiliate this to the present 
government without legislative aid so as to form some 
48Gautier v. Sainet, no case #, Box #100-209. No dates 
will be assessed for unreported cases decided in the 
Superior Court since no decisions (the existence of which 
dete~nines the date of cases in standard court reporting) 
survive. 
49coudrain v. Bagneris, #87, Superior Court, NOPL, Box 
#3-98. 
---------
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kind of system, to give effect to my decrees and at the 
same time to unite public opinion has indeed proved a 
herculean task. 
In April 1806,50 Madison appointed William Sprigg of Ohio 
and George Mathews, Jr., a Virginian recently settled in 
Georgia, to fill the vacancies on the bench. Sprigg 
responded quickly and without reservation to his 
appointment, and Mathews also accepted, but he made it clear 
that he was concerned about the weight of the duties and the 
piddling compensation, and that he preferred to use his 
Orleans post as a springboard to a similar position in 
Mississippi. 51 
From that point on, the court's personnel remained 
stable. When Prevost resigned at the end of 1806, 
Kentuckian Joshua Lewis took his place. Sprigg retired in 
1808 and an American resident of New Orleans, John Thompson, 
accepted a seat on the bench. Judge Thompson shot and 
ratally wounded himself in 1810 and was that year replaced 
by Francois X. Martin, a judge on the Mississippi superior 
court.52 Martin was the last judge appointed to the 
superior court and served until the creation of the Supreme 
50J. B. Prevost to James Madison, 10 March 1806, Ibid., 
608. 
5loart, "Centenary," xxxiv; William Sprigg to James 
Madison, 8 April 1806, George Mathews, Jr., to James 
Madison, 20 April 1806, Domenic Hall to James Madison, 23 
January 1807, Carter, Territorial Papers, 626, 704. 
52oart, "Centenary," xxxiv, William Garrard to James 
Madison, 20 January 1812, TP, 998. 
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Court of Louisiana in 1813.53 All of these jurists shared 
an affinity for the American judicial system. Even Martin, 
a transplanted Frenchmen and a civilian scholar, was 
thoroughly Americanized when he accepted his appointment. 
The quest to find suitable judges for the territory, 
reveals an important aspect of the so-called 'clash of 
cultures•--that by the time the judicial system was 
organized, Americans, not creole Louisianians, dominated the 
territorial bench. Without significant numbers of the 
ancienne population involved in the judiciary, few chances 
for a 'clash' ever developed. Furthermore, largely through 
Prevost's efforts, the court forged a deep and lasting 
relationship with the bar (its strongest potential opponent) 
that made for a consistent measure of political stabilty 
within the territory's legal elite.54 
As in post-Revoltutionary Virginia, determining the 
'laws in force' proved to be the most troublesome problem 
facing Louisiana's legislature and its superior court. 
Prevost, and later George Mathews, ruled in favor of 
legislative resolutions proclaiming Roman, French, and 
Spanish civil traditions the core of Louisiana's private 
law. By 1806, it was apparent that these early measures 
53Martin later served for many years on the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana, for information on his influence on the 
development of that body, see Mark F. Fernandez, "From Chaos 
to continuity: Early Reforms of the supreme Court of 
Louisiana, 1845-1852, 11 Louisiana History 28 (Winter 1987), 
19-36. 
54see note 66 above. 
-----------------
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fell well short of presenting a concise map of the 
labyrinthine jurisdictional overlaps and contradictions 
caused by the lack of an official territorial code and the 
vague language and application of the Northwest Ordinance by 
American officials. Thus the rulings by Prevost and Mathews 
represented stop-gap solutions that failed to solve the 
pressing need for a clear body of laws in force.55 
Accordingly, the legislature appointed two jurisconsults, 
James Brown and Louis Moreau Lislet to digest the civil 
laws. 
Identifying the criminal law of the territory proved 
almost as difficult as defining its private laws. The 
Breckinridge Act, which organized Orleans Territory, 
required criminal law to be based on common law, but failed 
to provide much guidance, leaving the specific aspects of 
criminal procedure up to the governor and territorial 
officials. As such, the legislature passed a 'Crimes Act• 
in 1805. Most of the bills comprising the crimes act were 
drafted by an Irish lawyer named James Workman. In fifty-
two comprehensive sections, the Crimes Act of 1805 defined 
punishable offences, established original jurisdiction for 
misdemeanors in the county and superior courts, and granted 
the superior court sole jurisdiction in capital cases and in 
cases involving prison sentences of seven years or more. 
55oargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, 132; Richard H. 
Kilbourne, Jr, A History of the Louisiana civil Code: The 
Formative Years, 1803-1839, (Baton Rouge: The Publications 
Institute, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State 
University, 1987), 21-22. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Workman paid close attention to extend American guarantees 
of due process to the citizens of Louisiana; accordingly, 
sections of the crimes act dealt with establishing the 
rights of defendants to trial by jury and to face their 
accusers, both privileges were summarily denied under 
civilian regulations. Moreover, Workman introduced some 
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extremely enlightened sections into the act that guaranteed 
Louisianians certain rights that would not be extended to 
the residents of many American states and territories until 
later in the century. Thus by the Crimes Act, Louisiana 
residents received the benefit of counsel and "free access" 
to their attorneys, the right to subpoena witnesses, to 
"make any proof" of their innocence, to receive indictments 
and jury lists prior to trial, the latter being subject to 
the "discretion of the court."56 
As enlightened as it was, however, Workman's crimes 
bill raised difficult problems for the territory. 
Particularly vexing was the language in section 33 which 
stated 
all the crimes, offences and misdemeanors .•. , shall 
be taken, intended and construed, according to and in 
conformity with the common law of England; and that the 
forms of indictment, (divested however of unnecessary 
prolixity) the method of trial; the rules of evidence, 
and all other proceedings whatsoever in the prosecution 
of the said crimes, and misdemeanors, changing what 
ought to be changed, shall be except as is by this act 
othen1ise provided for, according to the said common 
56warren M. Billings, "Origins of Criminal Law in 
Louisiana," Louisiana History, XXXII, (Winter 1991), 63-76; 
"An Act for the Punishment of Crimes and Misdemeanors, 4 May 
1805, Orleans Acts. 
-- -- ---------
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law. 
The section proved extremely problematical. Louisiana's 
judges and lawyers had to decide just what Workman meant by 
the "common law of England." Did the act sanction only 
those British statutes passed prior to 1805? How were 
American criminal practices to be considered? What exactly 
"ought to be changed" regarding rules of evidence? Who was 
to judge what "prolixities" should be deemed "unnecessary?" 
Response to these questions arose almost immediately in 
Louisiana. Governor Claiborne, a lawyer himself, realized 
the prospective problems inherent in the legislation. 
Accordingly, he appointed Lewis Kerr, another Irishman and 
part of his household, to collect the criminal laws passed 
by the assembly and to mine the vast quarry of Anglo-
American authorities for pertinent emendations and 
clarifications. Kerr pursued his task as juri~consults 
compiled the civil digest.57 
The fruits of the compilation efforts to define the 
laws in force appeared in Lewis Kerr's Exposition of the 
Criminal Laws for the Territory of Orleans (1806) and James 
57"An Act for the Punisment of Crimes and 
Misdemeanors," Orleans Acts, 4 May 1805; Billings, "Criminal 
Law in Louisiana," 70-71. Although Kerr's Exposition, 
resolved numerous problems related to this section of the 
Crimes Act, problems related to its vague wording troubled 
Louisiana's lawyers until 1861. For a good illustration of 
this see state v. McClean, (1849) Docket no. 1333, Supreme 
Court of Louisiana Collection, Acct. 106, Department of 
Archives and Manuscripts, Earl K. Long Library, University 
of New Orleans. 
----------- -
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Brown and Moreau Lislet•s Digest of 1808. With those two 
publications, the branches of government came to a relative 
agreement about the laws in force.58 
Louisiana's civil laws, as compiled in the Digest, were 
drawn from a combination of Roman, French, and Spanish 
civilian authorities such as Justinian's Corpus Juris 
Civilis, the Code Noir, Domat, the French Civil Code of 
1804, Pothier's Obligations, the Coutume de Paris, the 
various projets of Post-Revolutionary France, the 
Compilation of Castille, the Siete Partidas, Febrero 
Adicionado, the Curia Philipica, royal ordinances, and the 
Fuero Real. Included in the Digest also were the 
pronouncements of great British legal commentators such as 
58Kerr's task was by far the easiest of the two since 
the Crimes Act of 1805 mandated that all crimes, offenses, 
and misdemeanors were to be construed in accordance with the 
common laws of England. Moreau Lislet and Brown, however, 
had to plow through relevant Roman, French, Spanish, 
English, and American authorities to complete their 
compendium. Accordingly, Kerr's Exposition appeared in 
1806, while the more comprehensive Digest, was not completed 
until 1808. For a lengthy analysis of the writing and 
development of the code, see Ru.Jolpho Batiza, "The Louisiana 
Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance," 
Robert A. Paschal, "Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply 
to Professor Batiza," and Rudolpho Batiza, "Rejoinder," 
Tulane Law Review XLVI (1972), 4-164, 603-652. "An Act for 
the Punishment of Crimes and Misdemeanors," 4 May 1805, 
Orleans Acts. This act is analyzed in state v. McClean, 
(1849) Docket no. 1333, Supreme Court of Louisiana 
Collection, Acct. 106, Department of Archives and 
Manuscripts, Earl K. Long Library, University of New 
Orleans. The anonymous interpretation in this case, though 
previously unpublished, constitutes the first 'history' of 
criminal law in Louisiana. Lewis Kerr, An Exposition of the 
criminal Laws of the Territory of Orleans, (New Orleans: 
Published in Pursuance of an Act of the Leg~slature of the 
Territory, Entitled, "An Act For the Punishment of Crimes 
and Misdeanors," (sect. 48), Passed may 4, 1805; rept. Wm. 
w. Gaunt & Sons, Inc.; 1986. 
---------- - . 
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Blackstone and Coke and various Louisiana statutes. As for 
criminal proceedings, Kerr's Exposition relied on the 
Louisiana 'Crimes Act' of 1805 and English commentators, 
especially Blackstone and Sir Mathew Hale. Ironically, the 
Code Napoleon, which is so often used to describe the 
foundation of Louisiana's legal theory had not reached the 
territory before these compilations were published.59 
As in Virginia's law revisal, the two jurisconsults' 
compilation of the civil laws and Kerr's Exposition failed 
to present Louisiana with a full-blown law code. 
Accordingly, the Superior Court judges did not view it as 
such, and neither document was invested with the authority 
of a code. When the judges referred to the Digest of 1808 
or to Kerr's Exposition, as they did on numerous occasions 
in the territorial period, they did so in the same manner as 
they referred to English authorities such as Blackstone's 
Commentaries--in the same way as Virginia's judges cited 
similar sources. In doing so, they deviated from 
traditional civilian practice in which the jurist's main 
occupation consists of applying appropriate code 
citations. 60 
Furthermore, agreement over laws in force and actual 
judicial practice are two different things. Although the 
legislature and the court accepted many civilian precepts as 
59Batiza, "Origins of Modern Codification," 584-585; 
Kerr, Exposition, passim; Martin, History of Louisiana, v. 
II, 291-292. 
60see appendix I. 
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the core of the terrritory's private law, the practices and 
procedures of the territorial court--the very engines which 
motivated the exercise and administration of the law--
deviated from civil tradition as they mirrored the judicial 
practices of other American states and possessions. By 
manipulating those practices and procedures, the judges of 
the territorial court insured the consistent intrusion of 
common law doctrines into Louisiana's jurisprudence. Those 
intrusions are best seen by examining the inner workings of 
the court's procedures. 
After Prevost resigned, as the court patiently awaited 
completion of the work of the jurisconsults, it did its best 
to dispense justice to the territory's citizens. 
Jurisdictional difficulties related to the transfer of the 
colony from one sovereign nation to another caused some 
problems. When Laussat suspended the Cabildo, Spanish 
proceedings came to an abrupt and incomplete end. 
Nonetheless, some Louisianians were still engaged in 
disputes with Spanish authorities. Matters normally handled 
by Spanish courts, were now thrown under the jurisdiction of 
the Prevost court, and several appeals of cases decided by 
lower Spanish tribunals remained unsettled. Seeking 
resolution of the disputes, the litigants in these cases 
turned to the Superior court for justice. In ruling on the 
petition of Louisiana planter, John F. Mericault, the judges 
voided a mercantile agreement made between Mericault and the 
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Spanish Royal Hacienda.61 On three occasions, the court 
ruled on cases previously decided by Spanish tribunals.62 
And in Ducourneau & Wife v. Darensburg & Others, the court 
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applied court costs pending before a Spanish tribunal to the 
case which had been continued in the Superior Court.63 But 
for the most part, the court engaged in the type of routine 
debt cases, criminal proceedings, and estate settlements 
that characterized American court proceedings and in these 
decisions, the judges struggled to render justice by mixing 
principles from Spanish, Roman, French, British, and 
American sources. Although the informal state of the laws 
in force in these causes allowed for the haphazard inclusion 
of common law tenets, it was the various structural measures 
related to the creation and operation of the court that 
provided the most reliable vehicle for the recepticn of 
English and American legal precepts. 
As in most cases in the Jeffersonian era, the 
territorial legislators required the superior court to ride 
circuit. They divided Louisiana into twelve counties and 
required the judges to go on circuit from 1 June to 1 
November. In 1807, the legislators relieved the judges from 
some of their travel duties by amending the circuit act, 
6lpetition of John F. Mericault, Superior court, case 
#1022. 
62Fernandez v. Gravier, Superior court, case #1165; 
Ducourneau & Wife v. Darensburg & Others, Superior court, 
case #1294; and Livingston v. De la Rionda & Wittz, Superior 
Court, case #1994. 
63oucourneau & Wife v. Darensburg & Others, supra. 
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dividing Louisiana into five appellate districts. The court 
then sat for fixed times in Donaldsonville, Pointe Coupee, 
Rap ides, and Opelousas with Nevl Orleans serving as the 
primary seat.64 
Originally, the legislature empowered the superior 
court to hear all civil and criminal appeals from the lower 
courts in the Practice Act of 10 April 1805. According to 
the act, litigants could base their arguments on original 
pleadings, or they could amend their causes to entertain 
either new or more complete arguments. The act authorized 
the court to entertain petitions, to mediate intercounty 
disputes, to render judgments in both English and French, to 
summon juries, to grant new trials, to conduct 
interrogatories, to keep dockets, to issue writs, to 
regulate sheriffs and coroners, to fine absent jurors and 
officers, to call witnesses, to appoint referees to settle 
complicated proceedings, to execute settlements, and to make 
its own rules whenever necessary provided that the court 
followed the strictures of English common law.65 
64 11An Act Providing for the Superior Court Going 
Circuit, 11 orleans Acts, 3 July 1805; 11An Act Supplementary 
to an Act, Entitled 'An Act Providing for the Superior court 
Going Ciruit,' and for Establishing courts of Inferior 
Jurisdiction, 11 Orleans Acts, 31 March 1807. New Orleans's 
district also served the new counties of st. Bernard, 
Plaquemines, st. Charles, and st. John. 
65 11 An Act Regulating the Practice of the Superior Court 
in Civil Causes, 11 Orleans Acts, 10 April 1805, such actions 
closely resembled the patterns of procedure fleshed out in 
Virginia following the American Revolution see 11Agreement 
between the Gentlemen Practicing at the General Court Bar," 
Robinson Family Papers, Mss. 1R5685bl582 (sect. 42) Virginia 
Historical Society. 
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As in other American jurisdictions, the legislature 
empowered the superior court to issue a wide variety of 
writs. Such writs were everyday features of American 
courts. Common bonds of attachment and execution were 
included in the enabling act as well as writs of fieri 
facias, distringas, quo warranto, procedendo, mandamus, and 
prohibition 11Which said writs shall pursue the forms, and be 
conducted according to the rules and regulations prescribed 
by the common law. 11 In pursuing these measures the 
legislature ensured that although Louisiana's body of laws 
would comprise a mixed jurisdiction, the courts that 
presided over those laws would follow established common law 
procedures.66 
In these matters, the superior court~s guideline's 
resembled Virginia's supreme court by requiring appropriate 
district and superior court justices to ride circuit, to 
entertain pleadings based on both original and amended 
briefs, and to issue necessary writs and executions 
according to the common law. Thus the day to day routine 
and forms of pleading in both jurisdictions were essentially 
the same.67 
66-b'd 
.:L.:L· 
67A. G. Roeber, Faithful Magistrates and Republican 
Lawyers: Creators of Virginia Legal Culture, 1680-1810, 
(Chapel Hill: Unviersity of North Carolina Press in 
Association with the American Society for Legal History, 
1981), 203-216; cf. Charles F. Hobson, et al. eds., The 
Papers of John Marshall, V, (Chapel Hill: University of 
North carolina Press in Association with the Institute of 
Early American History and Culture, 1987), xxviii-xxxiii. 
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The legislature also granted the superior court a 
certain measure of rule-making discretion. A need for 
courts to flesh out their own procedures to meet particular 
demands necessitated this extension of authority. Although 
there is nothing unique about allowing courts to make their 
own rules, the training, background, and judicial style of 
the superior court judges ensured that Louisiana's court 
rules would follow American patterns of judicial 
development, thus continuing the trend that the legislature 
started in the acts that defined the court's jurisdiction. 
Some of the early rules which the Orleans justices ordered 
offer important glimpses into what concerned their 
territorial tribunal in its formative years. 
For the period between 1804 and 1809, before the 
court's proceedings were reported, there are only two 
allusions to court rules. The judgment in Heyman v. Woods 
refers to a court rule that allowed the judges to appoint 
referees to examine Woods's accounts in order to determine 
the amount of debt he owed the plaintiff. A similar rule 
was alluded to in Jenkins v. Lartigue et al. where Joseph 
Faurie and Charles Patton were appointed a~ appraisers of 
the defendant's estate. Unfortunately, these brief glimpses 
are the only evidence of rule-making in the superior court 
found in the unreported cases.68 
After Francois Martin began editing his Reports in 
68Heyman v. Woods, superior court; case #787; Jenkins 
v. Lartigue et al., Superior Court, case #796. 
-~-------
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1809, the court engaged in three rule-making sessions. 
Thanks to Martin, the rules have been preserved in their 
entirety. Since the rules were of an elementary nature, it 
is reasonable to presume that the court was setting them 
down for the first time or placing them in the record to 
validate earlier, unreported strictures. In the first 
session that Martin chronicled, the judges authored 
important guidelines to facilitate the court's operation. 
Since jury trials were a new addition to Louisiana's legal 
system, the first recorded court rules established 
procedures regarding selection of juries. These measures 
specified the sheriff's duties, the obligations of the 
litigants, and the court's own ability to issue venire 
writs. Next, Martin reported the rules governing the 
processes involved in appealing criminal cases. These 
regulations prescribed the methods of filing transcripts, 
recording verdicts, receiving grand jury indictments, and 
docketing criminal hearings. To make court sessions proceed 
more smoothly, the judges prescribed methods of motioning, 
filing suits, securing fees, taking depositions, posting 
trial lists, and rotating dockets. Finally, the court 
ordered that attorneys and counsellors admitted to the bar 
must be American citizens.69 
At the request of the bar the court's next rule-making 
session dealt exclusively with lawyers. Just as the early 
Supreme Court of the United States had done, the Orleans 
69La. Ann., 1 Mart. (0. S.), 82-87. 
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court divided its officers into two categories.70 Lawyers 
were required each year to specify whether they wished to 
serve as attorneys or counsellors. Attorneys prepared and 
signed pleas, took out writs and citations, filed entries 
and orders, summoned all witnesses, and declared all summary 
motions. Justices empowered counsellors to examine and to 
correct pleadings and to argue special motions and trials. 
Moreover, the court ordered that no attorney could serve as 
a counsellor or vice versa during the year covering the 
original application, nor could superior court attorneys 
practice in the parish courts. Since the court required 
attorneys to practice under the auspices of a counsellor for 
at least two years before they could achieve the latter 
rank,71 these rules may be viewed as an embryonic exercise 
of the court's prerogative to govern legal education.72 
Creation of a graduated bar mirrors behavior in other states 
in the early national period where republican lawyers 
clustered in professional associations centered on high 
judicial institutitons.73 Thus the growing professionalism 
70Henry Campbell Black, Law Dictionary, 410. 
71La. Ann., 1 Mart. (0. S.), 140-141. 
72sometimes, the court and the legislature collaborated 
to draft comprehensive regulations. For instance, in 1805 
the legislature promulgated an explicit fee bill which set 
the standard fees which attorneys and counsellors could 
charge for their services, "An Act Establishing an Explicit 
Fee Bill," 27 April 1805. 
73rn Virginia, for instance, lawyers in the district or 
superior court bar actually rode circuit with those 
tribunals, see Charles T. Cullen, "Completing the Revisal of 
the Laws in Post-Revolutionary Virginia," Virginia Magazine 
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of the American bar informed Louisiana's legal system from 
the very beginning of its territorial development. 
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The rules promulgated in the court's last rule-making 
session suggests increasing pressure on the dockets. During 
the 1811 fall term the court redefined its methods of filing 
civil causes and questioning witnesses, and provided stiff 
penalties for litigants seeking continuances for frivolous 
reasons. The court also abandoned its practice of setting 
up special days for hearing jury trials, summary causes, and 
calendering pleadings. Finally, the court restricted the 
activities of members of the bar by admonishing them to 
annunciate their motions in a clear and orderly fashion and 
to police their seats after each session.74 
These early rules parallel practices in other American 
dominions in the early national period. Those tribunals 
made rules, regulated proceedings, policed the bar according 
to republican standards, and grappled with burgeoning 
dockets. In these matters, the practices of the superior 
court bear no resemblance to French civil courts or to the 
Spanish Cabildo. Forms of pleading in the Orleans court, 
use of juries and summary writs, citing precedents, and 
judicial rulings based on these procedures reflect distinct 
English and American judicial practices. In civilian 
jurisdictions, judges mainly manage written appeals and 
apply appropriate code citations in order to render 
of History and Biography, 82 (1974), 84-99. 
74La. Ann., 2 Mart. (0. S.), 1-10. 
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judgments. References to previous decisions take a backseat 
to the powerful codes.75 At the Orleans court, however, 
~nerican judges met with American lawyers and decided cases 
according to American juridical procedures. Such examples 
of judicial authority and the creative aspect of judge-made 
law are not features of the civilian tradition. 
The territorial period marked the beginning of a legal 
transformation of Louisiana. Laussat's suspension of the 
Cabildo and the subsequent failure to invest Louisiana with 
an authoritative code allowed for frequent borrowing from 
English and American judicial traditions. Further borrowing 
was made possible by legislative and judicial restrictions 
on the construction of summary writs. American domination 
of the bar started with the territorial court's regulatory 
provisions in rulemaking sessions--provisions promulgated at 
the request of Louisiana's lawyers. Thus a deferential 
relationship of court over bar developed within Louisiana's 
appellate structure since the very beginning of the 
territory's judicial history.76 
75For a lively discussion of these differences in the 
role of the judge in present-day civil and common law 
jurisdictions, see Jean Baudouin, "Impact of Common Law in 
Louisiana and Quebec," and Albert Tate, Jr., "The Role of 
the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The Louisiana Experience," 
in Joseph Dainow, ed., The Role of judicial Decisions and 
Doctrine in Civil Law and Mixed Jurisdictions, (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 1-38. Although 
both of these essays refer to modern courts, both authors 
include discussions of theoretical and historical role of 
the judge in common law and civil law. 
76For a good example of how this dominance continued in 
the antebellum period see Elizabeth Gaspard, "Rise of the 
Louisiana Bar," Louisiana History, 28 (Spring 1987), 
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At the cession of the colony to the United States, all 
of the preconditions necessary for legal change existed in 
Louisiana. Confusion over the laws in force had made the 
legal system "cumbrous and remote from social realities." 
The subsequent attempts to define the laws in force via the 
Digest of 1808 and Kerr's Exposition facilitated the further 
introduction of Anglo-American tradtions, thus allowing for 
the "realistic borrowing" of foreign legal principles. 
Although the transfer of Louisiana to the United States 
cannot be considered a social or political revolution, the 
rebuilding of the territory's administration according to 
American standards represented a change tantamount to a 
revolution in government. Finally, the change within the 
elite structure of Louisiana, stimulated by the Purchase, 
led many Americans to fill important governmental and 
judicial posts, thus allowing for a "forceful elite" to use 
"law as a tool" for legal change. 
The legal and judicial changes of the territorial 
period led to the development of a common law-oriented 
juridical discourse within a mixed system of laws. With the 
entry of Louisiana into the Union and the calling of a 
constitutional convention, Louisiana's lawmakers were 
presented with an opportunity to comment upon and to revise 
the structure of the state's judiciary. Whether they would 
incorporate the pattern of courts and judicial discourse 
that developed in the territorial period or revert to more 
186-187. 
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orthodox civilian patterns of justice depended upon the type 
of appellate judiciary they would create in the 
constitutional revision. 
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Chapter Four 
The Supreme Court of Appeals for the State of Virginia 
The "December Reform" centralized Virginia's appellate 
system. Although the General Court and the High court of 
Chancery still existed, their judges no longer sat on the 
Court of Appeals. District courts absorbed whatever 
admiralty jurisdiction that had not been assumed by the 
federal courts and much of the General Court's power. 
Stabilization of the Supreme court of Appeals, however, 
marked the most important feature of the 1788 reform.l 
Despite the stability, rising levels of litigation and 
increasingly complicated practices combined to create a 
docket crisis that eventually stimulated a new cry for 
reform and further redefinition of the court's jurisdiction. 
The effect of these disputes led to a continuation of the 
ambivalent settlement of the Revolution into the early 
national period. 
Continuation of the ambivalent settlement toolt on a 
new twist in the years following the December reform. 
Creation of the Supreme Court of Appeals as a separate 
tribunal extended the boundaries of judicial independence, 
as the judges could devote much of their time, effort, and 
lHening, statutes, "An Act for Establishing District 
Courts, and for Regulating tha General Court," v. XII, 730-
763; "An Act for Amending the Act, Intitled An Act 
Constituting the Court of Admiralty and the Judges thereof," 
v. XII, 769-770; "An Act Concerning the General Court," v. 
XII I 77 0-771. 
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expertise to question the role of the appellate court in the 
new republic. As the judges exercised their new 
independence within the context of a single tribunal, they 
assumed a greater measure of control over defining the 
practices and procedures of that court. In doing so, the 
judges exacerbated the paradoxes inherent in the creation of 
the judicial system and created others as they charted new 
territory. The investigation of such matters reveals the 
ambiguous nature of the court--anxious to exercise and to 
protect its new-found measure of judicial independence, yet 
equally attuned to a paradoxical American fascination with 
both common law tradition and the supremacy of the 
legislative will. In order to illustrate the impact of the 
1788 reform, it is necessary to focus on four elemental 
areas of the Supreme court of Appeals: the structural 
changes in the appellate court, the background of its 
personnel, the rules the court created for itself, and the 
important decisions which defined the role of both common 
law and statute in the Old Dominion. 
* * * 
Structurally, judges of Virginia's other high courts 
sitting in leave constituted the Court of Appeals before 
1788. The reform of 1788 sought to remedy the problems 
caused by the growing litigiousness of Virginians and 
recreated the Supreme court of Appeals as a permanent 
tribunal with its own personnel. Moreover, the 1788 
revision realigned Virginia's judicial elite. Before the 
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reform, Virginia's appellate judges shared nearly equal 
status since they all sat on the high court. Although 
Chancery judges ranked slightly higher than those of the 
other courts, distinctions mattered little as the other 
judges often reviewed chancery decisions. Revision of the 
court system drastically changed the arrangement. General 
Court judges divided their duties between that court's 
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sessions and a grueling district court itinerary. Chancery 
remained a separate tribunal, but became subordinate to the 
reconstituted Supreme Court of Appeals.2 Thus the judges of 
the Supreme Court of Appeals possessed higher status than 
any other members of the state's judiciary.3 As the supreme 
court judges exercised their higher status by promulgating 
new court rules and ruling on both appeals and matters of 
jurisdiction, the court assumed a position of leadership 
that it had not enjoyed previously. Specifically, the new 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia began to dictate not 
only judicial interpretations as a court of last resort, but 
the practices, procedures, and jurisdictions of other courts 
as well. 
Basically, the Virginia supreme court matured in two 
2rn fact, Chancery jurisdiction would soon come under 
attack. By the first decade of the nineteenth century, the 
chancellors had to fend off plans to reapportion the 
chancery court along the lines of the district courts. one 
popular method that was discussed involved blending equity 
and common law jurisdictions. John Minor to Creed Taylor, 
30 November 1809, Archibald stuart to creed Taylor, 20 
December 1809, 19 January 1812, Creed Taylor Papers, Special 
Collections, Alderman Library, University of Virginia. 
3rbid. 
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phases between 1788 and 1830 under five chief judges: Edmund 
Pendleton, Paul Carrington, Peter Lyons, William Fleming, 
and William H. Cabell. Between 1788 and 1803 Chief Judge 
Edmund Pendleton dominated the court. Although Pendleton's 
conservative views often presaged the substance of his 
opinions, he never hesitated to pen bold decisions in 
confirmation of the republican revolution. After 
Pendleton's death, the court continued operation on a 
consistent level; however, without his strong direction the 
court began to feel the strain of a changing ideology, one 
that rewrote Virginia's constitution and led to a new wave 
of judicial activism. 
The Supreme Court of Appeals under presiding judge 
Pendleton initially consisted of Peter Lyons, William 
Fleming, John Blair, Jr., and Paul Carrington. For the most 
part, these jurists represented the generation that reached 
political maturity with the American Revolution. Pendleton 
and Lyons hailed from the ranks of Virginia's conservative 
elite. They took to revolution cautiously and tempered 
their republicanism with the traditions of the old order. 
Fleming, Blair, and Carrington closely adhered to 
Jefferson's view of the Revolution. Each possessed singular 
talents, honed sharp through years of study and practice, 
that suited them for service on the fledgling court. 
Senior Judge Edmund Pendleton's qualifications for his 
honored position stemmed from almost a half-century of 
experience as a practicing lawyer and jurist. Pendleton's 
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judicial career reflected his training and experience as a 
county and General Court lawyer, burgess, and chancellor. 
Edmund Pendleton established his law career in the 
midst of Virginia's Golden Age. Born on 9 September 1721 in 
a portion of Essex that later became Caroline county, 
Pendleton faced bleak prospects early in life. His father 
died four months before Pendleton's birth. Thus, his 
mother, Mary Taylor, burdened with the upkeep of seven 
orphans, married Edward Watkins, a small planter, when 
Pendleton was two years old. Since the Watkins soon had two 
children of their own, Edmund eased into the industrious 
life of a middle child in a large family. By age fourteen, 
Pendleton caught the eye of county clerk B~njamin Robinson 
who took him as his apprentice and launched his legal 
career.4 
As Robinson's apprentice, Pendleton acquired the 
skills that would serve him for the rest of his life. In 
the mid- eighteenth century no standard governed legal 
education in the colonies. Some attorneys, such as St. 
George Tucker, read law after completing a formal 
education.5 Others, like John Blair, Jr., journeyed to 
4oavid John Mays, Edmund Pendleton, 1721-1803: A 
Biography, v. I, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1952), 6-12. 
5char1es Cullen, "St. George Tucker and the Law," 
(Ph. D. dissertation, University of Virginia); Cullen, "St. 
George Tucker," in w. Hamilton Bryson Legal Education in 
Virginia, A Biographical Approach, (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia 1982). 
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England to study at the celebrated Inns of Court.6 
Pendleton, like many Virginians of his day, pursued his 
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education in a more informal manner. Working in Robinson's 
office Pendleton steeped himself in the everyday activities 
of a law practice. Using his spare change to finance latin 
classes and to buy law books, Pendleton plunged into the 
complicated lessons of the law with a rare determination. 
Soon, Pendleton's portian attention to study and to detail 
landed him the clerkship of st. Mary's vestry in addition to 
his apprenticeship. Similarly, when Pendleton joined the 
county muster, he became the clerk of the court martial.? 
Immersion in the intricacies of the law brought 
Pendleton to the bar by age nineteen. 8 Between 1741 and 
1745, Pendleton built his law practice in Caroline County. 
In 1744 he was appointed deputy king's attorney for 
Caroline. And in 1745 he gained admitance to the General 
Court Bar. Although the General Court held the stronger 
attraction to the Old Dominion's lawyers, Pendleton's work 
as a prosecutor and the bulk of his private practice tied 
him closely to the Caroline County court. Accordingly, in 
December 1751, he accepted an appointment as a justice to 
that court. Other duties, however soon interrupted 
Pendleton's tenure as a justice of the peace. Just one 
6Alfred E. Jones, American Members of the Inns of 
Court, (London: The Saint catherine Press, 1924), xiii, 23-
21. 
?Edmund Pendleton, v. I, 12-22. 
8Mays,Edmund Pendleton, v. I, 24. 
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month later his neighbors elected him to the House of 
Burgesses where he divided his time between his duties as a 
lawyer, lawmaker, and justice of the peace until the 
Revolution. During that period, Pendleton employed the 
lessons he learned as a young apprentice to become one of 
Virginia's leading lawyers.9 
Pendleton's early experiences profoundly influenced 
the course of his life. The attention to detail and 
appreciation of things legal that became part of his persona 
as Robinson's clerk so dictated Pendleton's actions that his 
epitaph read 
He soon acquired a profound knowledge of the character 
of mankind, and of human affairs. And perhaps it was 
his happiness, throughout his life, to have extracted 
his opinions from realities, rather than from the 
speculations of philosphers. 
Such realities formed the hallmarks of Pendleton's judicial 
decisions.10 
Despite his conservative nature, Pendleton played an 
important role in Virginia's Revolutionary assembly. He 
served as delegate to the first Continental Congress, a 
member of Virginia's first revolutionary convention, 
president of the convention of 1776, and Speaker of the 
House of Delegates.11 Philip Mazzei reported that during 
9Mays, Edmund Pendleton, v. I 25-306. 
10American Epitaphs, cited in Mays, Edmund Pendleton, 
v. I 23. 
11David L. Pulliam, The Constitutional Conventions of 
Virginia from the Foundation of the Commonwealth to the 
Present Time, (Richmond: John T. West, Publisher, 1901), 27. 
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the Revolution "men of clear vision [ i. e., republicans]" 
called him "Moderation." In the revisal of the laws, 
Pendleton often opposed Jefferson. Mazzei remarked 
Four of the members were always in agreement; but Mr. 
Edmund Pendleton, a greater lover of legal matters than 
of philosophy, was often a dissenter, especiallY on the 
articles about religion and about inheritance.l2 
Despite his disputes with much of Jefferson's program, 
Pendleton unflinchingly supported the efforts to liberalize 
the courts.l3 
After the Revolution, Pendleton repeatedly 
distinguished himself as president of the chancery court. 
In fact, throughout his judicial career, Pendleton never had 
one opinion overturned.l4 In 1789, Pendleton turned down a 
presidential appointment as judge on the United States 
District Court of Virginia so that he could serve the Old 
Dominion on the Court of Appeals.l5 That Pendleton, despite 
his conservative bent, assumed so many important leadership 
positions in the new republic stemmed equally from his 
respected lawyerly achievements and the ambivalent nature of 
Virginia's republican government. As chief judge of the 
12nMemoirs of Philip Mazzei," trans., E. c. Branchi, 
second installment, WMO, 2nd ser., (October, 1929), 248. 
13This fact is evident in Pendleton's vigorous support 
of Jefferson's assize plan which drew loud opposition from 
conservative forces in the general assembly, PEP, v. I 
Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, 19 December 1786, 491. 
14The only exception to this was a decision that 
Pendleton himself found flawed. 
15pulliam, Constitutional Conventions, 27. 
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Supreme Court of Appeals, Pendleton's conservative nature 
and adherence to tradition forced him into the ironic 
position of being the judicial defender of liberal 
legislative efforts that he vehemently opposed as a member 
of the Virginia revolutionary convention.l6 
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The qualifications of other members of the Pendleton 
court complemented their president's excellent credentials. 
John Blair, Jr., was born into the ranks of Virginia's 
ruling elite in 1732.17 His father was president of the 
Virginia Council and could afford his son all of life's 
advantages. Since his great uncle, James Blair, co-founded 
the College of William and Mary, John matriculated there. 
In 1753 he ventured to London's Middle Temple where he 
joined fellow Virginians John Banister and John Ambler. 
Four years later he presented himself to the English bar.l8 
Education in the prestigious Inns of Court was a rarity in 
colonial Virginia; accordingly, Blair's training insured him 
instant success upon his return to the colony. 
Shortly after his return to the Old Dominion Blair 
began practicing law. In 1766 he engaged in a long career 
in politics and public service when he was elected as the 
College of William and Mary's representative to the House of 
16see the discussions of Thornton v. Smith and Brown et 
al. v. Turberville below. 
17DAB, 337. 
18Jones, American Members of the Inns of Court, xiii, 
21-23. 
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Burgesses.l9 He became the college bursar and the clerk of 
the Virginia Council in 177o.20 Three years later, he 
joined the Williamsburg Lodge of Masons and became its first 
Grand Master in 1778.21 
As a burgess, Blair exhibited an early disposition to 
resist Britain. He presided over the passage of a bill 
condemning a parliamentary resolution restricting the 
colony's right to tax and to petition in 1769.22 During the 
Revolution Blair played a prominent role in the resistance. 
An ardent republican, Blair sat on the committee that penned 
The College of William and Mary's "Declaration of Rights,n23 
served on the constitutional committee of the 1776 
convention, and became a member of Virginia's Privy Council. 
Republican commentator Philip Mazzei described Blair as "a 
man gifted with talent, a clear mind, and a good heart.n24 
Blair began his judicial career in 1778 by accepting 
an appointment to the General Court. Two years later he 
19DAB, 338. 
20nAccounts of Salaries in 1770, 11 WMO, 1st ser., 
(January, 1898), 189. 
2lnwilliamsburg Lodge of Masons," WMO, 1st ser. (July, 
1892) 1 10, 17. 
22 11 Resolves of the House of Burgesses Upholding the 
Rights to Tax and to Petition and Condemning a Resolution of 
Parliament," 16 May 1769, in Van Schreeven, etc., The Road 
to Revolution in Virginia, (Richmond: Virginia state Library 
and Archives, 1976?), 68-70. 
23"Education in colonial Virginia," Part V, WMO, 1st 
ser., (July, 1898), 2. 
24Mazzei, "Memoir," 250. 
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replaced Robert Carter Nicholas on the court of Admiralty.25 
In 1782, he participated in the important resolution of 
eaton v. commonwealth.26 Meanwhile, Blair kept up his law 
practice,27 served on the committee to study the lunatic 
asylum,28 and in 1787, accepted the Governor's appointment 
to the Philadelphia convention.29 Few Virginian's possessed 
his energy, lawyerly ability, and commitment to republican 
principles. Blair's choice for the Supreme Court of Appeals 
provided a fine counterpoint to the conservative disposition 
of the tribunal's chief judge. Unfortunately for the court, 
Blair's tenure as a justice was short-lived as he accepted a 
position on the Supreme Court of the United States in 1789. 
Peter Lyons also hailed from Virginia's conservative 
leadership. Born in Cork, Ireland, in 1734, Lyons read law 
in Virginia with James Power, with whom he formed a lifelong 
friendship,30 and gained admission to the Virginia bar in 
25DAB, 338. 
26see Chapter II. 
27John Blair to Governor Nelson, 15 July 1781, VCSP, v. 
II, 220. 
28John Blair, Nathaniel Burwell, John de Siqueyra, 
James Madison, and Joseph Prentis to Governor Nelson, July 
1781 "Report on the Deplorable Conditions of the 'Hospital 
for Lunatics,"' VCSP, v. II, 279. 
29John Blair to the Governor of Virginia, 25 December 
1786, VCSP, v. IV, 210-211. 
30peter Lyons to Bartholomew Dandridge, 1784, eustis 
Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society. 
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1756.31 Lyons soon became one of Virginia's leading 
attorneys, representing many prominent planters and legal 
figures. 32 His skill quickly led to an appointment as 
king's counsellor. As king's attorney, Lyons frequently 
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practiced before the the General Court. In his most famous 
action, he represented the crown in the affair of the 
Parson's Cause in 1755-1765. The victory over the 
flamboyant young Patrick Henry solidified Lyons's position 
as one of the colony's leading legal minds.33 Pendleton 
enlisted Lyons's aid in settling John Robinson's complicated 
estate, and the two judges remained good friends and 
colleagues for many years.34 Like many conservatives of his 
day, Lyons supported Virginia over the mother country in the 
Revolution. Soon his legal abilities and sound judgment 
thrust him into the forefront of the struggle. After the 
Revolution the assembly rewarded Lyons with a General Court 
judgeship. 35 Subsequently, on the Court of Appeals, Lyons 
31Jerry Kail, ed., Who Was Who during the American 
Revolution, (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1976), 463. 
32Judge Robert Carter to Thomas Claiborne, 16 April 
1771, Carter Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society. 
33Glenn Curtis Smith, "The Parson's cause, 1755-1765, 11 
Tylers Historical Magazine, 21 (1940), 140-171, 291-306. 
34Bond, Joseph and Benjamin Holladay to Peter Randolph, 
Edmund Pendleton and Peter Lyons, Robinson's admins., 30 
January 1767, Bond, Joseph Holladay to Benjamin Rawlins, 
Edmund Pendleton and Peter Lyons, Robinson's admins., 20 
January 1767 Holladay Family Papers, Virginia Historical 
Society; John Lewis to Edmund Randolph, 22 July 17[?], John 
Lewis Papers, Virginia Historical Society. 
35Kail, Who Was Who, 463. 
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played a role in many of the celebrated cases of the day 
including Caton v. Commonwealth.36 Thus like Pendleton, 
Lyons brought a conservative voice and long experience to 
157 
the new republican bench. And, as Pendleton, Lyons blended 
his conservative personality with republican ideals to 
become a powerful member of the revolutionary establishment. 
William Fleming was born in 1736. He graduated from 
the College of William and Mary in 1763 and began his legal 
studies. In 1772 he represented Cumberland County in the 
House of Burgesses. During the Revolution, Fleming attended 
the 1775 and 1776 Virginia conventions37 and served in the 
House of Delegates in 1776 and 1777.38 In 1778 Fleming 
accepted an appointment to the General Court, but left the 
following year to sit in the Continental Congress where he 
served the Old Dominion until 1781.39 He represented 
Cumberland County in the Virginia Ratification Convention of 
1788.40 During the Revolution Fleming became one of 
Jefferson's closest advisors41 and for the rest of his life 
36see Chapter II. 
37Edwin c. Carter, II, Angeline Polites, Lee w. 
Formwalt, and John c. Van Horne, eds., The Virginia Journals 
of Benjamin Henry Latrobe. 1795-1798, v. 2, 1797-1798, (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, Published for the 
Maryland Historical Society, 1977), 541. 
38william Fleming to William Preston, 15 December 1777, 
Preston Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society. 
39carter, et al., Latrobe Journals, 541. 
40Pulliam, Constitutional Conventions, 22. 
41Dumas Malone, Jefferson and his Time, v. I, 240-241. 
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he espoused the Jeffersonian vision of America. 
Paul Carrington's appointment to the court crowned a 
stunning law career. Born in Charlotte county in 1733, 
Carrington led the raucous life of a youth on Virgnia's 
southside frontler.42 A handsome and vigorous lad, he 
caught the attention of Colonel Clement Read, clerk of the 
158 
Charlotte County Court. Thus, like Pendleton, Carrington's 
legal apprenticeship began under the watchful eye of a 
county clerk. In 1750, Carrington moved into Read's home 
and began to read law with the colonel.43 He followed up 
that training by attending the College of William and Mary 
where he graduated in 1753.44 Peyton Randolph, John 
Brandford, and George Wythe signed Carrington's license to 
practice law in the colony's county and inferior courts in 
1755.45 Because of the wealth of legal business on the 
southside, Carrington secured licences to practice as crown 
attorney in Bedford, Mecklenburg, Lunenburg, and Charlotte 
counties between 1756 and 1770.46 
42pulliam, Constitutional Conventions, 21. 
43John w. Eggleston, "'Judge Paul Carrington,' an 
address delivered at an APVA meeting in 1954, 11 Lang Syne, 
Charlotte County Branch, APVA, (September, 1972), 15. 
44Kail, Who Was Who, 442-443. 
45peyton Randolph, John Brandford, and George Wythe, 
"License to Practice in County and Inferior Courts," 1755, 
Paul carrington Papers, Virginia Historical Society. 
46Robert Dinwiddie, "License to Practice as Crown 
Attorney in Bedford County," 3 May 1756, Paul Carrington 
Papers, Virginia Historical Society; Francis Fauquier, 
"License to Practice as Crown Attorney in Mecklenburg 
County," 1767, Paul Carrington Papers, Virginia Historical 
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Not surprisingly, Carrington used his legal career to 
further his political ambitions. He served as a burgess 
from 1765-1776. Embracing the resistance early on, he 
became a member of the Mercantile Association and sat in the 
first four Virginia conventions, the Committee of Safety, 
and the House of Delegates.47 Patrick Henry launched 
Carrington's judicial career in 1778 with an appointment to 
the General Court.48 A staunch republican throughout the 
Revolution, Carrington served in the ratification 
convention.49 
When John Blair, Jr., resigned shortly after joining 
the court in 1789, another staunch republican, James Mercer, 
took his place. Mercer was born into a rich Virginia family 
in 1736. He received most of his early schooling at home 
until he attended the College of William and Mary. After 
graduating from the College, Mercer read law and entered the 
bar. In the Seven Years' War, Mercer served as captain and 
commander of Fort Loudoun. Mercer's legal abilities and 
wartime service led to his involvement in colonial politics. 
He sat in the House of Burgesses from 1762-1775 and in the 
Society; Norborne Botetourt, "License to Practice as Crown 
Attorney in Charlotte County," 4 May 1770, Paul Carrington 
Papers, Virginia Historical Society; William Nelson, 
"License to Practice as Crown Attorney in Lunenburg County," 
Paul Carrington Papers, Virginia Historical Society. 
47pulliam, constitutional Conventions, 21. 
48patrick Henry, "Appointment to the General Court," 20 
February 1778, Paul Carrington Papers, Virginia Historical 
Society. 
49pulliam, Constitutional Convention, 21. 
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Virginia conventions of 1774, 1775, and 1776. His political 
skill and allegiance to Revolutionary ideals won him a spot 
in the 1779 Continental Congress.50 
Mercer's commitment to the law fostered in him an 
interest in legal scholarship. His family's considerable 
fortune allowed him to indulge that interest with the 
purchase of many law books. Accordingly, Mercer's volumes, 
along with his brother John's, formed one of the premier law 
libraries in colonial America. Nearly three-score of the 
tome5 belonged to James Mercer. Among the many English 
commentaries, how-to-do-it books, and philosophical tracts 
in Mercer's collection stood such standard works as Coke's 
Institutes and Blackstone's Commentaries. In addition to 
these classics, however, Mercer assembled one of the finest 
collections of abridgements and reports in the colonies. 
Moreover, Mercer's curiosity about things legal led him to 
purchase such diverse titles as Jean Domat•s civil Law and 
Sir George Mackenzie's Institutions of the Laws of 
Scotland.51 During the colonial period, Mercer's collection 
proved invaluable, especially to his brother John, an ardent 
collector in his own right,52 who compiled and abridged 
50Biographical Dictionary of the United States 
Congress, 1774-1989, Bicentennial edition, (Washington, D. 
C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), 1490. 
51such works were often consulted by colonial judges 
when the common law left them without a remedy. 
52John Mercer's collection of ninety-seven editions of 
law reports alone outdistanced his nearest rival in colonial 
Virginia by a three to one margin, w. Hamilton Bryson, 
Census of Law Books in Colonial Virginia, (Charlottesville: 
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Virginia's acts of assembly in 1769.53 During his tenure on 
the bench, Mercer's scholarship and his fine library 
assisted him on many occasions. 
Mercer's career as a jurist began with his appointment 
to the General Court in 1779. He served on the General 
Court and the High court of Admiralty until he received an 
appointment to the Supreme Court of Appeals in 1789.54 
When Mercer died in 1793, Henry Tazewell filled his 
seat. Tazewell was born in Brunswick county in 1753. Thus 
when Tazewell took up his post on the Court of Appeals, he 
became its youngest member. He graduated from William and 
Mary in 1772. Little is known about Tazewell's legal 
education and early career. He built up a thriving legal 
practice on the southside. In 1785 he was appointed to the 
General Court, and hence served briefly on the Court of 
Appeals. In 1793, he replaced Mercer on the Supreme Court 
of Appeals where he sat until he resigned to serve in the 
United States Senate in 1795.55 Although Tazewell served 
briefly and without distinction, his resignation had a major 
University Press of Virginia, 1978), xii. 
53Bennie Brown, Jr., comp. "Books in the Mason-Mercer 
Collection as of November 1, 1974, at Gunston Hall," 
typescript, Virginia Historical Society. 
54Pulliam, Constitutional Conventions, 26. 
55Who Was Who in the American Revolution, 482; Numerous 
documents in the Skipwith Family Papers, Department of 
Archives and Special Collections, Earl Gregg swem Library, 
College of William and Mary, reveal evidence of Tazewell's 
vigorous practice in Brunswick, Lunenburg, and Mecklenburg 
counties. 
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effect on the Court of Appeals when Spencer Roane accepted 
appointment to his vacant seat. 
Spencer Roane, like Henry Tazewell, represented a 
different generation from his brother justices. Born in 
1762, Roane grew up amid the rhetorical swirl that was 
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republican Virginia. He attended the College of William and 
Mary where he became a charter member of Phi Beta Kappa. 
After graduating from the College, he read law with 
Chancellor Wythe and gained admission to the bar in 1782. 
Only twenty-one years old, Roane entered the House of 
Delegates where he fought vigorously for the 
disestablishment of the Anglican church in opposition to his 
mentor, Patrick Henry. In 1784, Roane was elected to 
Henry's council. Two years later, he took a position in the 
Virginia senate. As a staunch anti-federalist, Roane fought 
vigorously against the ratification of the constitution and 
exhibited a profound distrust of the power of the national 
government for the rest of his life. Roane began his 
judicial career in 1789 when he accepted appointment to the 
revamped General Court. Despite his prickly personality, 
Roane was unanimously elected to the Supreme Court of 
Appeals in 1794 where he soon becdme a "storm center of 
controversy," especially in the years following Pendleton's 
death. 56 
56nJudge Spencer Roane of Virginia: Champion of States' 
Rights--Foe of John I1arsha11," Harvard Law Review, v. 66 
(1953), 1242-1246; DAB, v. 15, 642. See also the fine 
biographies of Roane by Rex Beach, "Spencer Roane and the 
Richmond Junto," WMO, 2d ser. XXII (1942), 1-17; and 
--------- --. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
163 
Each of these men brought something valuable and 
necessary to the court. Pendleton contributed his deep 
practical knowledge of the law. Lyons and Pendleton served 
as conservative bulwarks in a libertarian age. Fleming, 
Blair, and carrington brought energy, republican zeal, and 
considerable political skill to the tribunal. Tazewell and 
Roane brought the vitality of the Revolutionary generation. 
Roane's committment to Jefferson's brand of republicanism, 
especially, influenced the personality of the Court of 
Appeals as he often thrust himself into the center of 
Virginia's jurisdictional controversies. Accordingly, the 
supreme bench boasted a long heritage of judicial 
experience, political acumen, diverse ideologies, and 
balanced leadership as it faced its first years of operation 
as an independant tribunal. More important, the court 
benefitted from the respect that the associates had for 
Pendleton and from the chief justice's firm guidance and 
sound, consistent legal judgment. 
Unlike Louisiana's judges, Pendleton and his 
associates understood their court's jurisdiction and basic 
procedures from the beginning. A court of appeals had 
existed in Virginia since 1779. Although the Pendleton 
court represented a new creation, it continued the pattern 
Margaret E. Horsnell, "Spencer Roane: Judicial Advocate of 
Jeffersonian Principles," Ph. D. diss., University of 
Minnesota, 1967. 
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of the first tribunal.57 Thus the new bench benefitted from 
a decade of practice, experience, and operation. Moreover, 
no fewer than five legislative acts had defined the court's 
jurisdiction during its first ten years.58 
Thus when the Pendleton court convened for the first 
time in 1789, it had a keen sense of its role in the 
political process. Previous experience demonstrated the 
need for the court to take active control of its practices 
and procedures in order to ensure a greater measure of 
judicial independence. Under Pendleton, consequently, the 
court became more aggressive in defining its procedures in 
court rules. Before 1788 the Court of Appeals had kept 
rulemaking sessions to a minimum (partially because the 
Revolution did not precipitate a major break with 
established court procedures); consequently, the courts 
rules were easy to comprehend. The earlier court made rules 
only when docket pressures dictated a need. Those rules 
57Actually, the creation of a single and independent 
court of appeals greatly simplified the operations of the 
court. In previous sittings the bench was always in a 
precarious situation regarding membership. For instance, if 
a court convened with only the minimum number of judges in 
attendance, all cases in which interested judges were 
involved could not be heard in the session. As the court 
heard appeals from all of Virginia's superior courts, this 
problem alone provided a formidable obstacle in the 
tribunal's ability to render justice efficiently. 
58Hening, Statutes, "An Act for Establishing a Court of 
Appeals," v. 9, 522; "An Act Constituting the Court of 
Appeals," v. 10, 89; "An Act for Amending the Act, Intituled 
An Act Constituting the Court of Appeals," v. XII 764; "An 
Act Allowing Travelling Expenses to the Judges of the 
General Court," v. XII, 768; "An Act Concerning the Court of 
Admiralty and the Judges Thereof," v. VII, 769; "An Act 
Concerning the General Court," v. XII, 770. 
---~----
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consistently failed to meet the demands placed upon the 
dockets by litigious Virginians. The failure of the rule 
changes to solve the docket crisis became a major ingredient 
in the drive to redefine the courts in 1788.59 
Even the structural revisions of the 1788 reform 
failed to relieve the clogged appellate dockets as attorneys 
attached an endless string of motions to causes pending 
before the Supreme Court of Appeals. Two rules promulgated 
in 1790 sought to curb excessive motions. The court ordered 
that attorneys supporting or opposing motions could not 
submit affidavits without reasonable notice or without 
demonstrating good cause. In order to cut down on clerical 
inconveniences, the judges ruled that objections to 
securities placed upon writs of error, supersedeas, and 
appeals had to be made to the court to which the writ was 
returnable, rather than to the Court of Appeals.60 Each of 
these rules constituted time-saving measures and reflected 
increased pressure on the dockets. Thus the judges removed 
a major inhibition to the court's operations by reforming 
appellate procedures. 
Other court rules demonstrate the more aggressive 
attitude of the Pendleton court toward regulating its 
proceedings. Consequently, subsequent rules dealt with 
sweeping issues related to the administration of justice. 
Preserving court records had always been a problem in 
59see above, pp. 78-80. 
60Rule of court, 1 July 1790, 1 H&M, 10. 
-- -----· ---
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the Old Dominion. Despite vigorous legislative efforts to 
ensure efficient clerical standards, the court encountered 
problems in receiving records from district court clerks. 
166 
In 1795 the judges crafted regulations to solve those 
problems by ordering that when records failed to accompany 
appeals from a district court after two terms, that the 
record would not be received. The court reserved the right 
to receive the records by motioning the inferior court, thus 
making the materials available upon demand.61 The rule 
reflected the activist stance that the Pendleton court took 
in designing more efficient judicial practices. Moreover, 
the restrictions of the 1795 order illustrate the influence 
that the supreme court could wield over the state's lower 
courts. Thus the leadership role of the Supreme Court of 
Appeals extended beyond the court's right to review 
decisions of lesser tribunals. By changing its own rules, 
the Supreme Court of Appeals could dictate procedural 
changes in lower courts as well. 
In its last rulemaking session {1803), the Pendleton 
court echoed earlier Court of Appeals regulations of April 
1784 and November 1786 by requiring hearings in all cases 
during the term designated for their return, and dispensed 
with the 1786 requirement to file motions in cases requiring 
the court's immediate attention.62 Repetition of the type 
of rules passed in 1784 and 1786 reflected the fact that the 
61Rule of Court, 28 october 1795, 1 H&M, 10. 
62see above pp. 78-80. 
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court had routinely disregarded the earlier rules, thus 
disrupting the flow of cases through the dockets. The 1803 
regulation suggests a revival of earlier practices. 
Furthermore, the dispensation of the motion requirement 
reduced the amount of motions the court would need to hear 
and illustrated its flexibility in rescheduling hearings.63 
That the court revived its earlier docketing policies also 
suggests that the Supreme court faced the same troubles 
which plagued the court of Appeals in the mid-1780s--
mounting levels of litigation and impractical delays. 
For the most part, the Virginia court's early rules 
reflected growing litigiousness and the judges' concerns for 
streamlining the appellate and adjournment process. Long 
before the Revolution, Virginia's judges and lawyers had 
fleshed out such structural procedures as filing motions, 
summoning witnesses, providing for jury trials, hearing and 
taking depositions, processing executions, and regulating 
the bar. Virginia's judges, consequently, unlike 
Louisiana's magistrates, did not have to attend to such 
matters when they manned the reconstructed courts. 
As in the case of the early court rules, Virginia 
judges, unlike their Louisiana brethren, needed little 
precise direction from the legislature regarding their 
ability to issue summary writs. Since Virginia 1 s 
restructured court system adhered to ancient English legal 
principles, the judges dealt with the same writs that 
63Rule of court, 18 November 1803, 1 H&M, 10. 
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existed in the courts before the Revolution. Thus the 
assembly empowered the judges to direct the form of writs in 
any manner they wished, trusting them to follow the 
strictures of the common law.64 
Accordingly, the Virginia assembly allowed the judges 
more freedom to create and to interpret their day-to-day 
procedures than the Louisiana legislature extended to its 
magistrates.65 In only one area close to Jefferson's heart-
-the quest for more efficient record keeping--did the 
assembly closely spell out the court's policy regarding its 
clerks, the preservation of court records, and strict 
adherence to the dockets.66 But even in this crucial area 
64Hening, Statutes, "An Act for Amending an Act, 
Intituled An Act Constituting the Court of Appeals," v. XII, 
764; R. C. 1792. 
65Nonetheless, the Louisiana legislature's 
resistrictions on its judges to follow Anglo-American 
traditions in these matters were intended to keep the 
supreme court's practices on an American footing, thus 
reflecting Jefferson's and Claiborne's wishes to establish a 
strong common law foothold in Louisiana. See the Louisiana 
Practice Act of 1805. 
66see the detailed requirements in 10 Hening, ch. 22 
1779; ch. 63 R. c. 1792; and 12 Hening 1788. Although such 
detailed instructions seem unnecessary and obvious to modern 
students, they were significant reforms in the eighteenth 
century; in fact Virginia's lawmakers may be regarded as 
pioneers in the field. The recognition of the need for such 
regulation in Virginia stemmed from the problems encountered 
in the last colonial revisal of the laws in 1769 when the 
accumulation of existing statutes and reports would have 
been impossible if not for the splendid collection of John 
Mercer. Even with Mercer's assistance, however, the 
compilation of the acts proved to be a herculean task. 
Similar attempts to gather records greatly encumbered the 
revolutionary and post-revolutionary revisals (1776-1792). 
Like problems existed in the collection and preservation of 
court records. Addition of more courts to Virginia's legal 
system in the early national period exacerbated the already 
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the judges eventually had to assist the assembly in defining 
efficient court practices. 
During its three rulemaking sessions, the Pendleton 
court accomplished two important objectives. In a technical 
sense, the rule changes streamlined and modernized the 
manner in which litigation moved through the appellate 
process--a direct response to the problems caused by 
mounting pressure on the court's caseload. On a different 
level, the rules pertaining to record-keeping influenced the 
manner in which all of the state's lower courts dealt with 
their own records. The ability of the Pendleton court to 
face both tasks reflects the activist nature of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals--the judges took an active role in policing 
wasteful practices which often brought criticism down on the 
entire judicial system; and they took unprecedented, 
positive steps to ensure the preservation of the judicial 
system's documentary record. 
Despite legislative efforts to define the Old 
Dominion's laws in the Post-Revolutionary era, the Virginia 
court, like its Louisiana counterpart, faced some confusion 
over laws in force in its early years. When the Pendleton 
difficult problems. Recognition of these problems by the 
legislature put Virginia in the forefront of a new movement 
for systematized court reporting in the early American 
republic. In fact, the movement did not gain strength in 
the nation at large until the first decade of the nineteenth 
century. The early efforts of the Virginia General Assembly 
in this regard have often been taken for granted. One need 
only survey the damage that fire, war, and civil 
disobedience have inflicted on the manuscript records of 
Virginia's courts, however, to realize the worth of these 
early efforts at preservation and publication. 
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court first convened in 1789, Virginia's laws were still in 
the process of being revised. The reception statute, the 
Chancellor's revision, and Madison's reforms formed the core 
of the state's laws. Then, shortly after the court began 
operation, the Virginia legislature completed its revisal of 
the laws. Completion of the 1792 code equipped Virginia's 
judges with a reasonably stable body of statute and common 
law. 
Unlike the situation in Louisiana, the Revolution did 
not bring the Old Dominion's ancient traditions of justice 
into question. Everyone agreed that common law and 
precedent should define the state's jurisprudence. The 
reception statute passed during the Revolution provided that 
the basis of Virginia's common law tradition should be the 
English laws, as practiced before 
the fourth year of the reign of King James the first, 
and which are of a general nature, not local to that 
kingdom, together with the several acts of the general 
assembly of this colony now in force, so far as the 
same may consist with the several ordinances, 
declarations, and resolutions of the general 
convention, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be 
considered as in full force, until the same shall be 
altered by the legislative power of this colony.67 
Even the reform minded Jefferson believed that the law 
67Hening, statutes, 11 0rder of Convention, 3 July 1776, 11 
v. IX, 127 proclaimed the common law of England prior to the 
fourth year of James I's reign and all acts of the colony 
"now in force," which during the term of the Pendleton court 
meant those acts passed after 1769, that "may consist with 
the several ordinances, declarations, and resolutions of the 
general convention, shall be the rule of decision, and shall 
be considered as in full force, until the same shall be 
altered by the legislative power of this colony;" cf. Act of 
March 1661/62, 2 Hening 43. 
----- -------------
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revisal should not affect the common law.68 Nonetheless, 
the mingling of the state's prerogatives with English 
precedents presented some formidible conundrums to 
Virginia's justices. 
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The first and most difficult problem facing the judges 
involving the common law centered on the period between 1607 
and 1769, the years in which the force of British decisions 
was suspended in the repealing statutes promulgated during 
the Post-Revolutionary revisal of the laws.69 Simply put, 
how could judges reared on precedent disregard over a 
century and a half of legislation and decision? In 1792, 
Pendleton in Thornton v. Smith answered the question by 
arguing that Virginia's courts could not be bound by English 
precedents that addressed matters alien to the state's 
republican development. 
Thornton v. Smith came before the court of appeals by 
a writ of error. Thornton accused smith of slander and won 
a verdict of L55 in the Richmond court of hustings. Smith 
appealed the decision to the district court contending that 
the slander he was accused of did not fall within the 
husting court's jurisdiction. The district judges agreed 
and reversed the decision. Although the case came before 
the Court of Appeals for several reasons, the majority 
agreed with and affirmed the district court's decision. 
Pendleton, however, dissented, and commented on the 
68Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, 137. 
699 Hening, statutes 127. 
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application of the common law to Virginia. He conceded that 
the judgments of Virginia courts were based on precedent, 
but he argued that the decision of the district court was 
founded upon an English precedent not necessarily binding in 
the Old Dominion. 
This question is placed upon the authority of English 
precedents. I shall presently consider these cases at 
large, but let us first enquire how far we are bound by 
their authority. The ordinance of the convention of 
1776, declares all the statutes of England prior to the 
4th of James 1st, which were of a general nature, 
applicable to Virginia, and not local to that country, 
to be in force here. . • [but if there are] 
considerations in which ours totally differ from 
theirs, then the precedents cannot bind us.70 
In this dissent, Pendleton took a giant step forward in 
differentiating Virginia's common law even from that of 
England prior to 1607. Although his opinion did not dispute 
either the importance of stare decisis71 or the force of 
general English decisions prior to 1607 on Virginia's 
jurisprudence, Pendleton's discussion questioned the 
validity of parochial English precedents on American cases. 
Although such a view could shake the very foundations of a 
tradition-based legal system, Pendleton's dissent echoed the 
sentiment of the order of the 1776 convention which excluded 
those laws "local to that kingdom [England]" from being 
received into the common law of republican Virginia. 
Thornton v. Smith, however, did not settle the issue 
of interpreting the common law in the Old Dominion. In 
70Thornton v. Smith 1 Wash. 83-84. 
7lsee Appendix I. 
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1800, Pendleton again opined on the issue in Browne et al v. 
Turberville et al. The case hinged on a complicated suit in 
the High Court of Chancery. Browne, his wife, and their 
associates had been sued by several members of the 
Turberville clan and by George Fitzhugh over the intestate 
estate of George Waugh, a childless bachelor.72 Because the 
petitions in the case centered on interpretation of 
Virginia's complicated Statute of Descents (1792),73 which 
sought to condense the several revisals of acts on the 
subject, the Chancellor reasoned that the seventh section of 
the statute did not cover the specific claims mentioned the 
Turbervilles' suit. consequently, he extrapolated on the 
meaning of the act to find that the Turbervilles and 
Fitzhugh had legitimate claims on Waugh's estate.74 
Browne's attorneys argued that the seventh section of 
the 1792 act could not be interpreted in the manner in which 
the Chancellor Wythe proposed. They held that the 
Chancellor did not have the authority to "substitute words 
merely because the Legislature had not made any provision 
for the case." Consequently, the court must look to the 
various incarnations of the law as it appeared following the 
1785 revisal. In their reading of the several statutes 
between 1785 and 1792, the attorneys argued that they could 
72Browne et al v. Turberville et al, 2 Call 390-409. 
73Hening, statutes, "An Act to Reduce into one the 
Several Acts Directing the course of Descents," v. XIII, 
122. 
74Browne et al v. Turberville et al. 
----------
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detect a change in the legislative will regarding descents. 
Thus, they contended that the court should view the matter 
as casus omissus,75 and hence subject to the principles of 
common law.76 But reversion to the common law on the 
particular matter of descents attacked a fundamental 
principle of Virginia's republican settlement--abolition of 
the laws of primogeniture. 
The Turbervilles's attorney argued that since the 1785 
statute repealed the common law on the subject, the common 
law could not be revived. Judge Fleming opined that 
although the acts of assembly created great confusion, the 
1785 act did cover the situation, hence the common law 
argument of the appellants was irrelevant. Carrington cited 
some reservations regarding the Chancellor's opinion, but he 
concurred in theory with the chancery decision. Lyons 
agreed with the appellants that the legislative will was 
evident in the case; however, he proclaimed that as such, 
the facts supported the plaintiffs and the results of the 
Chancellor's decision held.77 
Pendleton himself took the opportunity once again to 
comment upon the force of English common law in the Old 
75The term casus omissus refers to situations where no 
contingency has been provided for in the law. It applies 
especially to cases which have not been addressed in a 
general statute on the subject. In these instances the 
issue is specifically to be covered by common law. Henry 
Campbell Black, Law Dictionary, 5th ed., 198. 
76Browne et al v. Turberville et al. 
77Ibid. 
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Dominion. In principle, Pendleton allowed that the common 
law represented the general law of Virginia where it had not 
been superceded by state statutes. Nonetheless, Pendleton 
asserted that the 1785 statute had "totally done away that 
common law, as to the course of descents." He argued that 
the rights of primogeniture had been thoroughly abolished in 
Virginia, and that when equal relatives could prove kinship 
in intestate proceedings, the principle of partible 
inheritance applied. Although the 1792 statute did not 
expound specifically on the circumstances surrounding 
Waugh's estate, Pendleton argued that Jefferson's 
revolutionary attack on primogeniture had been certified by 
the previous acts regarding descents. The legislative will 
was clear, it favored the maxim of partible inheritance. 
Accordingly, Pendleton concurred with his brother justices' 
decision and confirmed the Chancellor's decree.78 
Although the court could have settled the Browne case 
without considering the issue of Jefferson's attack on 
primogeniture--indeed Lyons, carrington, and Fleming easily 
avoided the matter--Pendleton boldly asserted his position 
as chief judge, and his decision echoed one of Jefferson's 
more revolutionary contributions to Virginia's republican 
settlement. Again, Jeffersonian principles found a staunch 
ally in Pendleton, the court's most conservative member. 
Even though Pendleton vehemently opposed Jefferson's views 
on abolition of primogeniture during the revisal of the 
7Brbid. 
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laws, once the General Assembly accepted the principle, he 
became its most influential supporter.79 
Throughout his legal career and as a leader in 
Virginia's Revolutionary conventions, Pendleton won a 
reputation as a cautious and conservative politician. 
During the Revolution, Pendleton frustrated Jefferson and 
his fellow republicans time and time again. The very 
qualities that led republicans to nickname Pendleton 
"moderation" and Philip Mazzei to characterize him as "a 
greater lover of legal matters than of philosophy," forced 
the judge into the ironic position as champion of the 
Jeffersonian revolution.80 Although as a revolutionary 
Pendleton shied away from the "speculations of 
philosophers," as a judge he was forced to deal with the 
fruit of such speculation. 
176 
Throughout its existence the Pendleton court dealt 
with important fundamental issues. First, the judges needed 
to make the court run smoothly in order to resolve its 
business smoothly and in a timely manner. In this regard, 
the rules of court provided solutions to problems of delay 
and the need to provide speedy trials. More important, in 
Thornton v. Smith and Browne et al. v. Turberville et al. 
the court grappled with difficult philosophical issues as 
Jeffersonian reforms clashed with traditional English 
79Branchi, ed., "Memoirs of Philip Mazzei," 2nd 
Installment, WMQ, (October, 1928), 248. 
80"Memoirs of Philip Mazzei," WMQ, 2nd ser., (Oct. 
1929), 248. 
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practices. At stake in these cases were crucial concerns 
that spoke directly to the role of the judiciary in the new 
republic. Specifically, the court had to deal with the 
paradoxical fallout of the revolutionary settlement. Five 
significant questions presented themselves: How could the 
court achieve judicial independence from Great Britain, yet 
retain its British heritage? How could the court resolve 
immediate conflicts between the two legal orders? How could 
the judges use their decisions to create strong guidelines 
to govern future decisions? How could a tradition-based 
judiciary remain true to the reforms of the Revolution? And 
how could the judges use jurisprudence to promote 
orderliness in judicial proceedings? 
In both Thornton v. smith and Browne et al. v. 
Turberville et al. the court's associate justices 
sidestepped these philosophical questions. Pendleton, 
because of his lifetime fascination with things legal and 
because he equated his position as chief justice with 
leadership, stepped out of character and faced the 
philosophical issues squarely. His response did as much to 
resolve those questions as to define the role of both the 
supreme court and the office of chief justice in the new 
government. Accordingly, it is instructive to investigate 
Pendleton's contributions to both decisions. 
Structurally, the Assembly provided little guidance on 
the day-to-day workings of the Supreme court of Appeals. 
The 1779 statute which created the Court of Appeals merely 
·······--···---
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stated that the judges of the court were bound to render 
decisions in cases before it. When the court was 
reconstituted as the supreme Court of Appeals during the 
1788 reform, the legislators remained silent on the issue of 
decisions, in fact, they simply let the provisions of the 
1779 statute remain in force.81 In creating the Supreme 
Court of Appeals in 1788, the Assembly devised the office of 
chief justice, but failed to define its authority. Thus it 
was left to the court to flesh out its procedures regarding 
judicial decisions and the role of the chief justice. 
At first, the judges balked at innovation and adopted 
a rather democratic way of going about their day to day 
affairs. In keeping with the democratic trend, the 
Pendleton court followed the cumbersome practice of writing 
seriatim opinions. Likewise, Pendleton treated his position 
as chief judge, at first, merely as an administrative 
position. But in Thornton v. smith and Brown et al. v. 
Turberville et al. Pendleton emerged as the court's 
undisputed philosophical leader. In doing so, Pendleton 
exhibited a commitment to Jeffersonian principles that we~t 
far beyond his own revolutionary politics. In those cases, 
the desire to achieve legal and judicial independence from 
Great Britain, to resolve the immediate questions before the 
court, to set consistent rules to govern future proceedings, 
to remain true to the reforms of the revolution, and to give 
orderliness to Virginia's judicial proceedings overrode 
81Hening, statutes. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
179 
Pendleton's innate conservativism. 
Throughout the battle with the legislature during 1787 
and 1788, Pendleton developed a high regard for an 
independent judiciary. That regard informed his decisions 
in both Thornton v. Smith and Browne et al. v. Turberville 
et al. Furthermore, once the battles over the law revisal 
had been fought, Pendleton assumed a true republican regard 
for the reforms the Revolutionary assembly had passed. When 
the two cases came before the bench, Pendleton recognized 
that they represented watersheds in the court's development. 
Although Pendleton could easily have sidestepped the issues, 
as his brother justices had done, he carefully considered 
his position as chief justice and penned bold decisions that 
would guide the court in future years. 
In doing so, Pendleton helped to clarify the legal 
relationship between Virginia's laws and those of Great 
Britain, taking a giant step toward legal and judicial 
independence. He also demonstrated a profound judicial 
commitment to revolutionary reforms. Finally, Pendleton 
redefined the office of chief justice from an administrative 
position to that of the court's philosophical leader. 
Up until his decisions in the Thornton and Browne 
cases, Pendleton's presence on the bench promoted a measure 
of conservatism. But when confusion emerged over various 
issues that the Revolutionary assemblies had failed to 
consider, Pendleton stepped out of character and created 
judicial precedents that echoed Jeffersonian reform. 
-----------
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Pendleton's decisions in Thornton v. Smith and in Browne et 
al.v. Turberville et al. went a long way in clarifying the 
applicability of British precedents in Virginia courts; 
however, the decisions did not provide comprehensive 
solutions to the problems of reconciling revolutionary 
reforms with traditional English precedents. Rather, 
Pendleton's influence provided direction for future cases. 
In this regard, Pendleton's leadership and his respectable 
presence on the court provided the fledgling bench with an 
important measure of stability. 
But the stability that characterized the court's 
initial phase of development proved only as strong as the 
will of its chief justice. When Pendleton died in 1803 the 
court lost its steadiest hand. Without Pendleton to guide 
the tribunal through difficult times, internal squabbles 
broke out among the judges over important legal issues. 
Consistency, conservatism, and traditionalism guided 
the court during the Pendleton era. Philosophical and 
ideological principles remained in the domain of others 
while the court focused its attention on the subtleties of 
the law. For the most part, the court favored tradition 
over innovation. But when the law itself called ideological 
and philosophical principles into question, the Pendleton 
court faced them squarely and in a Jeffersonian fashion.82 
After his death, however, the court sorely missed 
82see especially Thornton v. Smith, Brown v. 
Turberville. 
·---------·-·-·--- . 
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Pendleton's bold judgment when it faced cases of a similar 
nature. 
From 1789 to 1803, the court displayed a commitment to 
traditionalism, but gave way to reform on certain vital 
issues, such as descents. British precedent remained the 
guiding force behind Virginia's common law, but when 
revolutionary reforms clashed with precedent, the court 
bowed to the legislative will. In this regard, the Virginia 
supreme court embraced the ambivalence that defined 
Revolutionary Virginia. 
Pendleton's death ushered in a new phase of judicial 
development as the strong personalities of the associate 
justices emerged in the absence of a venerable chief 
justice. Coincident1ally, Pendleton passed as the nation 
was in the midst of a profound legal transformation--one 
that witnessed a shift from the "moral" legal principles of 
the republican era to more "pragmatic" practices that 
allowed for the intrusion of foreign, monarchical practices 
into American legal discourse. Although the shift from 
moral to pragmatic justice is generally exemplified by the 
reception of civil law precepts into the many state codes 
that evolved during the codification movement that gripped 
the country in the nineteenth century, in Virginia the 
transition also allowed for a greater emphasis on modern 
English practices.83 
83Historians have debated the motivations behind this 
transformation. Some insist that capitalism motivated the 
American elite to devise legal methods dispossessing the 
----·-···--· 
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In the Old Dominion, cases involving the 
applicability of British common law in the second phase of 
the court's development illustrate the rise of pragmatic 
justice. Following Pendleton's death, Paul Carrington 
assumed the office of Presiding Judge. carrington differed 
from Pendleton as he allowed other judges to dominate the 
court in cases involving the common law. Carrington's 
successors continued the trend. Another change in the 
complexion of the court following Pendleton's death involved 
his replacement, St. George Tucker. Tucker hailed from a 
wealthy Bermudan merchant family. Immigrating to Virginia 
in the 1772, Tucker entered the legal profession in search 
of a means of supporting himself in the thriving colony. 
Too poor to journey to Middle Temple, Tucker secured the 
best education he could in the Old Dominion. He soon 
established himself as one of the colony's leading attorneys 
poor, hence securing greater riches in their own hands. In 
this vein, monarchical principles, whether civil law or 
common law in nature, served to accomplish the task. Others 
argue that the law itself motivated these changes as it 
evolved inevitably toward its own ideal. still others argue 
that the codification movement of the mid nineteenth century 
reflected both changing social arrangements and the need to 
find simple, pragmatic legal remedies. Joyce Appleby, 
Capitalism and the New Social Order; Morton Horwitz, The 
Transformation of American Law. 1780-1860, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 
1977); Robert w. Gordon and William Nelson, "An Exchange on 
Critical Legal studies between R. w. Gordon and William 
Nelson," Law and History Review (1988), 139-187; Charles M. 
Cook, The American Codification Movement: A Study of 
Antebellum Legal Reform, (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, Contributions in Legal Studies, number 14, 1981); 
Sandra F. VanBurkleo, "'That our Pure Republican Principles 
Might Not Wither': Kentucky's Relief Crisis and the Pursuit 
of 'Moral Justice, 1 1818-1826, 11 unpublished Ph. D. 
dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1988. 
--------
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and judges.84 After establishing a successful law practice, 
Tucker succeeded George Wythe as Professor of Law at the 
College of William and Mary. Through the College Tucker 
became one of the most influential legal minds in the new 
nation, training a large number of attorneys. Not the least 
influential were his efforts to establish a bona fide law 
library at the College, a task accomplished by begging, 
cajoling, and threatening the school's board of visitors.85 
When Tucker joined the court, he had already established 
himself as one of the nation's premier legal scholars. 
Particularly, he had secured a reputation as a 
constitutional scholar. Tucker's 1790 edition of 
Blackstone's Commentaries, contained lengthy glossing notes 
dealing with the deviations between British and American 
legal tenets.86 
Accordingly, it would follow that after joining the 
Court of Appeals, Tucker, as resident expert on the 
applicability of common law in America, would have dominated 
the court's deliberations in cases related to the 
applicability of the common law in Virginia. But Tucker 
remained a staunch republican in an age when Americans were 
eschewing their republican legal traditions in favor of more 
pragmatic solutions. st. George Tucker's presence on the 
84cullen, "St. George Tucker and the Law." 
85st. George Tucker to Creed Taylor, n. d., Creed 
Taylor Papers, Special Collections, Alderman Library, 
University of Virginia. 
86cullen, "St. George Tucker and the Law." 
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court unsettled the tribunal as the progressive views of his 
contemporaries clashed with his dogmatic adherence to the 
accomplishments of the Revolutionary assemblies. 
The first time Tucker's republican views collided with 
a fellow justice presented itself in the case of Baring v. 
Reeder (1806) and marked the beginning of an internal 
dispute over the common law between Tucker and Spencer 
Roane. Tucker's literal interpretation of early 
revolutionary statutes, an example of his republican 
devotion to the legislative will, precipitated the struggle 
with Roane, who favored liberal borrowing from contemporary 
British sources. The central debate between the two men 
centered on the 1776 ordinance that prohibited the reception 
of English jurisprudence made after 1607. Tucker, in 
republican fashion, slavishly adhered to the 1776 
prohibition as a solid ~xample of the legislative will. 
Roane, professing allegiance to republican principles, 
nonetheless felt free to ignore certain elements of the 1776 
prohibition in order to build a better mousetrap. 
Procedurally, Baring v. Reeder brought out differences 
between England and Virginia's practices regarding the rules 
of evidence. The case came before the court via a writ of 
supersedeas. It hinged on the question of whether or not a 
wife represented a competent witness in a case in which her 
husband might be interested. Baring had lent various 
articles to Richard Claiborne's wife. Claiborne, then sold 
the goods along with other various and sundry items to 
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Reeder in 1799. Reeder, however, did not take possession of 
the property immediately. When Baring heard of the sale, he 
reclaimed his property from the Claibornes. Since Reeder 
felt that he had paid for the goods, he brought and action 
of trover for them in the Monogalia district court.87 In 
order to secure the bill, Reeder 1 s attorneys deposed Mrs. 
Caiborne on the subject of Baring's loan. Baring claimed, 
however, that Anne Claiborne, owing to her husband's 
potential interest in the bargain, was an incompetent 
witness. The jury disagreed and awarded Reeder $1148 in 
damages. 88 
When the case came before the Court of Appeals, Tucker 
agreed with the decision of the lower court. He found that 
Mrs. Claiborne's testimony should not have been considered 
since she could profit from the outcome of the case. 
Tucker's raasoning on the matter conflicted with 
contemporary English rules of evidence that would have 
allowed Mrs. Claiborne to testify. The conflict, however, 
did not bother Tucker as the reception statute of 1776 
accepted English law prior to 1607 as the basis of Virginia 
common law and prohibited Virginia's judges from citing more 
modern English decisions as precedent. Moreover, as an 
expert on the common law Tucker was aware that even in 
87 An action of trover, essentially, is a legal 
fiction designed to recover the worth of items wrongly 
converted by another for his personal use, Black, Law 
Dictionary, 1351. 
BBBaring v. Reeder, 1 H & M, 154-176. 
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England, the ancient rules of evidence in question were 
sometimes applied. To justify his position, Tucker cited a 
1792 decision of the British court of King's Bench, Davis v. 
Dinwoody. In Davis v. Dinwoody modern English judges 
favored the ancient English rules of evidence over modern 
innovations.89 
By citing Davis v. Dinwoody, Tucker raised a tricky 
legal issue, as he himself used a modern English decision to 
support his ruling. But Tucker pointed out that he was not 
citing the case as precedent, "since no decision in England 
since our independence commenced, has any authority in this 
court." Instead Tucker argued that he referred to Davis v. 
Djnwoody in order to demonstrate that even in England, where 
innovations on the rules of evidence had been pioneered, the 
pre-1607 practices could still apply. According to Tucker, 
Davis v. Dinwoody represented an "apposite case decided by 
able Judges upon the same law which as to this point 
prevails in this country." Consequently, Tucker upheld the 
ancient practices and supported the view of the lower court. 
Spencer Roane took exception to Tucker's adaptation of 
Davis v. Dinwoody on the subject of evidence. Roane felt 
uncomfortable with Tucker's borrowing from ancient English 
procedure when contemporary British rules of evidence spoke 
more clearly on the subject. Pointing out that the doctrine 
of evidence represented the most complicated area of 
89Davis v. Dinwoody, 4 Durnford and East's Term 
Reports, 678-680. 
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American law because the case reports on the subject had 
been so badly confused, Roane divided his analysis into two 
categories--ancient and modern. Citing another precedent in 
the Court of King's Bench90, Roane argued that the ancient 
sources, King's Bench in particular, were hopelessly 
confused about the rules of evidence. Conversely, Roane 
argued that in modern times the Courts of Westminster Hall 
had considered the rules more carefully and that their 
arrangements were more informed and more logical than the 
ancient wisdom on the subject. Accordingly, Roane contended 
that the American judge became bound to review those modern 
decisions.91 Those rulings, Roane argued, along with the 
"manly and independent" pronouncement of Lord Mansfield who 
in Lowe v. Joliffe (1777) proclaimed that "we do not sit 
here to take our rules of evidence from Keeble [sic] or 
Siderfin" represented the best guides for interpreting the 
rules of evidence.92 
90Abrahams v. Bunn, 4 Burr. 2251. 
91Baring v. Reeder. 
92Lowe v. Jolliffe, 1 Blackstone's Reports, 366; here 
Mansfield was referring to Samuel Keble's Reports in the 
Court of King's Bench at Westminster From the XII to the XXX 
Year of the reign of our Late Sovereign Lord King Charles II 
1661-1679, (London: w. Rawlins, s. Roycroft, and M. 
Fletcher, 1685), and Robert and Thomas Siderfin's Les 
Reports des Divier Special Cases Argue and Adjudge en le 
Court del Bank de Roy et Auxy en le Co. Ba. & l'Exchequer . 
. . 1657-1670 Colligees par Thos. Siderfin ... Inprimee 
par l'Original South son Maine Propre et Francaise. et oue 
Publie en Mesne le Language Ouesg; Deux Tables Matiess 
Notables, et Rasnes del Cases Contenu en Yceaux, (London: W. 
Rawlins and Edw. Atkins for Samuel Keble, 1683-1684), 
Mansfield's declaration represented a recognition of what 
Roane described as the defective understanding of the rules 
--------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
188 
Roane then seized the opportunity to comment upon the 
force of modern English decisions in Virginia. He argued 
that he personally believed that he was bound to "pare down" 
governmental aspects of the English common law to republican 
standards. Furthermore, Roane contended that he opposed 
wholesale borrowing of English procedure even in cases where 
it was more "progressive and mutable" than Virginia's 
practices: 
that law ought not to be received here, whether 
evidenced by old or new decisions, in the same extent 
that it is admitted in England, the circumstances and 
character of which nation varying from ours, produces 
(imperceptably perhaps) a correspondent variation of 
the rules of their common law. 
For example, Roane cited the fact that England's highly 
commercialized character made its legal needs vastly 
different from those of the Old Dominion. On the other 
hand, Roane opined that he had no qualms about consulting 
English judicial authorities "on such rules of common law as 
do not change." He went on to point out that Americans felt 
free to consult eminent European jurists and merchants on 
the laws of nature and the laws of nations. Finally, Roane 
concluded that "I do not see that we may not avail ourselves 
of the testimony of the eminent and able judiciary of 
England.n93 
On the surface, it may seem as if Roane and Tucker 
were positing similar positions. Both denied the binding 
of evidence by the Court of King's Bench. 
93Baring v. Reeder. 
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authority of post-1775 English decisions in Virginia. Both 
consulted those decisions as the musings of wise and able 
men. Thus the two judges agreed that the learned opinions 
of modern English jurists could inform the deliberations in 
the Virginia supreme court. The judges disagreed, however, 
on the manner in which British authorities could be 
consulted. Tucker cited Davis v. Dinwoody in order to 
demonstrate that the pre-1607 English rules of procedure, 
though widely considered antiquated, still informed 
contemporary jurisprudence in the court of King's Bench. 
Consequently, Tucker used the decision to prop up the notion 
that the 1776 reception order did not hamper operations in 
the Virginia court as the English court of King's Bench 
still applied the old rules of evidence. Roane used Lowe v. 
Joliffe to demonstrate that when court procedures become 
obsolete, judges should drop them and embrace practices that 
relate to contemporary situations. Just as Lord Mansfield 
shunned the thinking of Keble and Siderfin on the matter of 
evidence, Roane eschewed the aspects of the 1776 order which 
prohibited him from consulting modern English sources. 
Roane's opinion in Baring v. Reeder offers an 
important glimpse of the changes that were taking place 
within the American legal system. Roane was careful to 
identify himself with the republican Revolution: "I shall 
certainly not be accused of partiality towards the 
government of Great Britain." Nonetheless, he clearly 
considered the 1776 prohibition as an obsolete product of an 
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earlier era, and he favored a more moderate view of English 
society; "I wish not, without necessity, to sound the tocsin 
against that nation [England]." The previous generation of 
Americans had rejected everything associated with Hanoverian 
England as corrupt. Roane understood that important element 
of the Revolutionary ideology. But Roane also understood 
that the vehemence with which the previous generation had 
rejected British judicial decisions was misplaced when 
English jurisprudence provided sound, commonsensical 
innovations on antique procedures. 
Roane urged his brother justices to side with him and 
to use Baring v. Reeder to sidestep an obsolete legislative 
enactment. In essence, he asked his fellow jurists to put 
the rhetoric of the Revolution behind them. He wrote 
I am not willing that an appeal to my pride, as a 
citizen of independent America, should prevail over the 
best convictions of my understanding. I do not see 
why, upon principles of stable and unvarying law, such 
as those of evidence, for example, the epoch of our 
independence should be clutched with so much avidity . 
. . I wish it, however, to be clearly understood, that 
I would not only confine the reception of the modern 
decisions in England to doctrines of this description, 
but would not receive even them as binding authority. 
I would receive them merely as affording evidence of 
the opinions of eminent Judges as to the doctrines in 
question, who have at least as great opportunities to 
form correct opinions as we have, and are influenced by 
no motives but such as are common to ourselves: *and 
with respect to ancient decisions in England, what 
Judge would wish to go further?94 
In effec·t, Roane asked the judge:: to open their eyes to the 
important innovations in judicial procedure that had 
occurred in Great Britain in the years following 1607. By 
94Baring v. Reeder. 
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doing so, the judges would allow modern British 
jurisprudence to inform Virginia's legal discourse in the 
191 
same way other foreign authorities did. It was a matter of 
simple common sense as well as duty to consider English 
authorities in order to form the best opinion possible. 
Roane argued, 
shall we not have the privilege every day exercised in 
England, of detecting the errors of former times? 
Shall we •take our law of evidence from Keeble and 
Siderfin?' Shall we go back to the Gothic days of Lord 
Coke, and reject every man as a witness who is not a 
Christian? 
The argument was forceful and logical. The arch-
conservative Peter Lyons sided with Tucker, but William 
Fleming and Paul Carrington, once staunch Jeffersonian 
republicans, accepted the fact that times had changed and 
affirmed Roane's recommendation to reverse the lower court's 
opinion. Lyons himself, though in dissent, penned the 
majority ruling and remanded the cause to the lower court 
and instructed it to hear Mrs. Claiborne's testimony. 
The debate over Baring v. Reeder reveals an important 
aspect of the republican settlement in Virginia. Tucker, an 
ardent republican, viewed the language of the 1776 Order of 
convention quite literally.95 But Tucker's reluctance to 
consider modern British decisions deviated from what had 
become established judicial practice. American judges had 
consulted the wisdom of foreign judges on many matters in 
95Hening, Statutes, "Order of Convention," 3 July 1776, 
v. IX, 127. 
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the Post-Revolutionary era. Even the founding fathers had 
consulted foreign authorities on natural law and the laws of 
nation during the Revolution. 
Baring v. Reeder suberbly illustrates the differences 
between the theory and practice of the revolutionary 
settlement. Although the Virginia legislature clearly 
denounced the authority of modern British decisions in the 
1776 convention and in the subsequent revisal of the laws, 
the Old Dominion's judges nonetheless referred to those 
decisions when the codes and pre-1607 jurisprudence failed 
to present adequate legal remedies. Although such practices 
did not carry the weight of precedent, they became vital and 
useful tools in rendering decisions. Thus foreign 
principles of justice, even recent developments in British 
courts, came to inform Virginia's jurisprudence as the Old 
Dominion's judges sought practical remedies in modern 
British decisions. Once the practice of consulting British 
authorities resumed, Virginia's judges began to shirk off 
their reliance on republican traditionalism and became ever 
more receptive to foreign innovations in the law--even \·!hen 
those innovations came from Great Britian.96 
Three years after Baring v. Reeder the court again 
considered the application of the common law to Virginia. 
Once again, Tucker and Roane wrestled with the conundrum of 
weighing ancient principles against modern practice in 
96The same thing happened in Louisiana. See Reynolds 
v. swain, 13 La. Ann., 193. 
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Coleman v. Moody. Francis Moody, an enterprising resident 
of Mecklenburg County, petitioned the county court for 
permission to erect a dam on portions of Butcher's Creek on 
his property in order to build a grist mill. Consequently, 
Moody gave written notice of his intention to serve Thomas 
Coleman, who held in trust the land that would be affected 
by damming the stream, with a writ of ad quod damnum.97 
After hearing the matter before a jury, the court 
ascertained that the building of the mill would greatly 
benefit the neighborhood; accordingly, Moody received 
permission to begin his project. The court also determined 
that the land in Coleman's trusteeship would be rendered 
useless and awarded Coleman $50.00 in compensation. Coleman 
protested the decision and appealed to the Brunswick 
District Court and the Court of Appeals and lost in both 
courts. 98 
Coleman returned to the Court of Appeals and presented 
evidence that questioned the validity of the county jury. 
Evidently, the court and jury that granted Moody permission 
to build the dam had met at Moody's house. Over the course 
of the afternoon, Moody had entertained the jurors, 
supplying them with liberal amounts of grog. Coleman 
protested this questionable relationship between the 
97Ad quod damnum writs are derived from ancient British 
chancery jurisdiction. They instruct the sheriff to inquire 
what damages a proposed action might cause so that just 
compensation could be worked out; Black, Law Dictionary, 46. 
98coleman v. Moody, 4 H & M, 1-23. 
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petitioner and the jury. Ancient British regulations 
prohibited such entertainment as juries were likely to 
exhibit poor judgment after a tipple. Moreover, because the 
jurors indulged in their libations at the petitioner's 
expense, critics could argue that they had been coerced into 
their decision by Moody's generosity.99 Moody's attorneys 
argued that the jury's findings were sound even though they 
had accepted Moody's hospitality. Thus no impropriety had 
occu~red. Moreover, Moody's lawyer contended that Coleman's 
allegations were absurd as even Lord Coke had questioned the 
strictness of the ancient rules governing juries.lOO 
None of the judges of Virginia's supreme court were as 
bold as Lord Coke, so when they debated the merits of 
Coleman v. Moody they refrained from challenging the ancient 
laws regarding juries. Nonetheless, the judges agreed with 
Moody's attorney that the jury had rendered a proper 
decision. 
St. George Tucker again embraced a literal view of the 
1776 Order of Convention. Although he agreed that the jury 
had come to the correct decision, and that the rulings of 
all three courts were sound, he balked at affirming the 
judgment for fear of setting a dangerous precedent regarding 
jury trials. According to Tucker, ancient English 
regulations regarding juries formed a major portion of the 
common law that the 1776 order allowed Virginians to 
99rbid. 
lOOsir Edward Coke, Commentaries on the English Law. 
------ -------
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receive. To affirm the lower court's decision, no matter 
how correct, under these circumstances would amount to a 
subversion of the jurisdiction. Accordingly, Tucker voted 
to set aside the decisions of the lower courts. The other 
judges, again led by Spencer Roane, disagreed with Tucker 
and affirmed the judgment. Ancient precedents 
notwithstanding, the lower courts had determined the case 
correctly. Modern British rules regarding juries and 
practical considerations simply made more sense than the 
antiquated English strictures. Again, Tucker's literal 
interpretation of the republican settlement lost to a more 
pragmatic (and less costly) remedy.lOl 
Other cases in the Court of Appeals, such as 
Findlay v. Smith,102 touched on the variations between the 
common law in England and America; however, none of those 
decisions touched on important jurisdictional issues.103 
101coleman v. Moody. 
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102Findlay v. Smith et ux. et al., (1818) 6 Munf. 148. 
103rn this vein see Watson v. Alexander, (1794), 1 
Wash. 341-357; M'Williams v. Smith, (1797), 1 Call 123-127; 
Martin v. Beverley & Norman, (1805), 5 Call, 444-449; 
Templeman v. Steptoe, (1810), 1 Munf. 340-373; Alexander's 
Heirs v. Coleman, (1819), 6 Munf. 329-362; Burke's Admin. v. 
Levy's Exors., (1821), 1 Rand. 1-3; Bent v. Patten, &c., 
(1821), 1 Rand. 25-39; Royall's Admins. v. Johnson et al., 
(1823), 1 Rand. 420-435; Brooke v. Young, (1824), 3 Rand. 
106-122; Thomas M. Cowling, v. The Justices of Nansemond 
County, (1828), 6 Rand. 349-353; Stribling v. The Bank of 
the Valley, (1827), 5 Rand. 133-195; Thompson Blunt v. The 
Commonwealth, (1834), 4 Leigh, 690-692; Bank of Virginia v. 
craig, (1835), 6 Leigh, 399-440; Emory v. Erskine, (1836), 7 
Leigh, 267-271; Sitlingtons v. Brown et al., (1836), 7 
Leigh, 271-277; Towner v. Lane's Admin., (1838), 9 Leigh, 
262-293. 
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The battle over the force of the common law in the Old 
Dominion, then was contested in Thornton v. Smith, Browne et 
al. v. Turberville et al., Baring v. Reeder, and Coleman v. 
Moody. These cases centered on two issues: the primacy of 
state statutes over common law remedies and the court's 
prerogative to consult modern British decisions in variance 
with the 1776 Order of Convention. 
The court's attitude toward the precedence of state 
statutes over the common law, as evidenced in Thornton v. 
Smith and Browne v. Turberville, illustrated a curious 
aspect of the young nation's republican settlement. The 
break with England led colonial theorists to invest their 
trust in the sovereignty of the people. Nonetheless, 
revolutionary assemblies insisted on retention of many 
British legal and constitutional principles. When the 
states created their independent jurisdictions they 
uniformly passed blanket statutes receiving in large measure 
the English common law as the foundation of their 
judiciaries. Virginia provided no exception to this trend 
as the order of the convention of 1776 demonstrated. 
Retention of the common law seems perfectly consistent 
with prevailing theories of the American Revolution. The 
men who led the colonies in rebellion in 1776 did so because 
they feared that George III and his corrupt ministers had 
preempted their traditional rights as Englishmen, 
prerogatives that had been inflated in the minds of the 
colonists in the years following the Seven Years' war. In a 
-------
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sense, the Americans revolted because British imperial 
reforms compromised their sense of "Englishness." At first, 
then, the Revolution occurred because the Americans had been 
"Anglicized" as a result of the Seven Years' War and the new 
ministerial policies which it fostered. The leaders of the 
independence movement acted to preserve their English 
heritage in the face of what they perceived as a corrupt 
British executive. 
America's revolutionaries, however, soon found 
themselves in a paradoxical predicament. On the one hand, 
Anglicization had fostered in their new state legislators a 
reliance on traditional British theories of law and 
government. on the other hand, the political act of 
breaking away from the mother country forced the Americans 
to redefine and to reinvent their ideological notions of the 
political order. At first popular sovereignty emerged as 
the leading explanation of American social and political 
arrangements. But in the years following the Revolution, 
state politicians, in the view of some observers, took the 
notion of popular soveriegnty too far as local and state 
assemblies appeared to grasp too much governmental power. 
By 1787, many leading American statesmen had become 
disatisfied with the emphasis on the supremacy of the 
legislature and sought to create a more balanced political 
order. Madison's scorn towards local assemblies and his 
distrust of parochial interest, in fact, motivated his drive 
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for a constitutional convention.l04 
Adopting the federal Constitution further complicated 
matters when the authority of the constitution assumed a 
more important role in American jurisdictions than the 
workings of the independent branches of government it 
created. This trend influenced the relationship between 
state constitutions and their assemblies as well. In 
Virginia, the notion of constitution as a "higher law" had 
already been articulated in Commonwealth v. Caton in 1784. 
Thus the relationship within the republic between the 
branches of government and the Constitution became a 
contested issue. Similarly, the states grappled with the 
same questions in regard to the relationship between their 
constitutions and branches of government. All of the 
rhetoric and ideology of the Revolution invested power in 
the sovereign people and in the state assemblies as the 
embodiment of their power. The 1787 Constitution, however, 
blocked that trend by setting up a national and supreme 
governing instrument over the assemblies. Moreover, the 
acceptance of the federal Constitution as the higher law of 
the land reduced the overall significance of local governing 
bodies, and created the possibility of a political 
aristocracy. 
Although the adoption of the federal constitution 
104For a brilliant discussion of this transition in 
political theory, see Edmund s. Morgan, Inventing the 
People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and 
America, (New York: w. w. Norton & Company Ltd., 1988). 
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
199 
struck a blow against local power, the image of the state 
assemblies as bastions of Jeffersonian republicanism 
remained prominent. The dual existence of these competing 
bodies watered down the traditional reliance on common law 
in both the state and federal courts. During the colonial 
era the common law, as an integral part of the British 
constitution, held an almost deified position in American 
courts. But the creation of new states and national 
governments wore down American's reliance on traditional 
British theories of law and government. Virginia's 
reception statute paid homage to the Old Dominion's British 
legal heritage, yet it also provided for deviations from 
both Virginia and post-1607 incarnations. Subsequent law 
revisal, especially Jefferson's attack on state sponsored 
religion, primogeniture, and entail tore down hardened 
reliance on British precedent. Framing of the constitution 
and judicial practice in cases like Commonwealth v. Caton, 
Thornton v. Smith, and Browne v. Turberville represented a 
new, innovative and activist trend in American legal 
policies. Thus the pre-1607 common law and subsequent 
Virginia statutes assumed a less revered stance in 
Virginia's Post-revolutionary courts than it did in the 
tribunals that existed before 1776. 
As time went on, however, the need to innovate upon 
ancient legal precepts tore away at republican judicial 
principles. The court easily voted to suspend the 
legislative will on the matter of receiving post-1607 common 
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law, in Baring v. Reeder and Coleman v. Moody when 
established practice and practical circumstances dictated 
such deviation. St. George's Tucker's minority dissents 
reflected the fact that the traditionalism of the 
revolutionary era had dwindled in its effect on the judges 
of the Supreme Court of Appeals, allowing them to consult 
British, and for that matter other foreign, precedents more 
freely. Roane summed up his differences with Tucker in a 
letter to Creed Taylor "He [Tucker] is too lofty for me; and 
I cannot suscribe to his terms.nl05 Thus the important 
issue of the reception of British common law became cloudy 
as Virginia's judges followed their own counsel and 
consulted the sources as they personally saw fit. 
Increasing reliance on this method of decision making 
allowed for legal innovation in the form of increased and 
realistic borrowing from foreign sources.l06 This type of 
legal innovation bred confusion over the way in which 
British decisions informed the Old Dominion's legal 
traditions. In essence, Virginia's judges themselves were 
creating their own common law based on a wide variety cf 
international authorities, their own specific needs, and 
their own legal scholarship. 
105spencer Roane to creed Taylor, n. d., creed Taylor 
Papers, Alderman Library, University of Virginia. 
106Just as similar borrowing allowed for profound 
intrusions of common law borrowing in Louisiana. The best 
evidence for the influence of such borrowing on Louisiana's 
style of decision making may be seen in Reynolds v. swain, 
13 La. Ann., 193. 
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But Virginia's judges would go only so far in 
embracing innovation in order to render their decisions. As 
matters before the court became increasingly complicated, 
lawyers's arguments and judicial decisions got longer and 
more erudite. The opinions in the common law cases reveal a 
tendency toward lengthy opinions and numerous citations to 
various post-1607 British tribunals. So much discussion led 
to irksome delays in litigation and decreased the court's 
ability to render justice swiftly. Increased litigation in 
the lower courts led to a greater number of appeals. 
Consequently, at the same time that the judicial process 
slowed down to allow for a more measured consideration of 
cases pending on appeal, Virginians began to sue each other 
more often. Combination of the two trends created a docket 
crisis which paralyzed the appelate system and threatened 
the court's ability to provide for speedy trials. 
In response to the docket crisis, Spencer Roane 
suggested to his brethren in 1808 that the court should 
adapt some administrative innovations in order to speed up 
the judicial process. Roane proposed that the judges should 
meet in conference before rendering opinions. That way when 
the judges agreed over a cause, they could posit a single 
opinion rather than a cumbersome series. When the judges 
disagreed on a case, they would render informal written 
opinions before deciding the issue in order to cut down on 
the official number of majority opinions and dissents. But 
Roane's brother justices found these reforms too innovative 
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and lacking precedent.107 The judges once again failed to 
use their administrative powers to resolve a docket crisis. 
That failure left the matter to the executive and the 
legislature. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that in a legal 
climate charged by revolution, reform, legal innovation, and 
a docket crisis a new call to codify Virginia's laws rang 
loudly in the halls of the General Assembly. By the end of 
the first decade of the nineteenth century, the heralds of 
those calls screamed for recognition. 
The codification impulse sprang from two sources. 
Many of Virginia's statesmen had encouraged codification 
since the Revolution. In fact, the 1792 revisal of the laws 
represented just such a code. But the framers of the 
revisal, even Jefferson, because of their innate 
traditionalism, felt insecure in tampering with the ancient 
maxims of English common law. The 1792 revisal attended to 
the 1776 order of the convention which accepted most of the 
common law; accordingly, Virginia's judges had to serve two 
masters that often disagreed with one another: an 
incomprehensive code and the common law. This tension 
muddled the judicial interpretation of the laws in force, 
especially in places where legislation was incomplete and in 
107"Judge Spencer Roane of Virginia: Champion of 
states' Rights--Foe of John Marshall," Harvard Law Review, 
Vo 66 (1953) 1 1247 • 
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conflict with common law.l08 Mountains of litigation before 
Virginia's appellate courts also stimulated the effort to 
codify the laws because the high number of pending suits had 
caused a significant amount of docket pressure. Although 
the judges had endeavored to relieve some of that pressure 
in various rules, their solutions met with minimal success. 
Thus costly delays impeded the judicial process. 
Furthermore, day-to-day practice led away from strict 
reliance on the pre-1607 English sources as the judges 
embraced recent British innovations. But the conflict that 
developed over the interpretation of the 1776 Order of 
Convention led to cumbersome arguments and inconsistent 
jurisprudence. Advocates of codification in the first 
decade of the nineteenth century, including all of the 
judges except Tucker, eschewed traditionalism in favor of 
more contemporary solutions. 
Moreover, a general disallusionment with the legal 
community bolstered the codification impulse. Much of the 
disatisfaction in the first decades of the nineteenth 
century stemmed from renewed antagonism toward the 
professional bench and bar. The legal culture that had 
developed around most American courts, especially superior 
tribunals, excluded laymen, especially county magistrates. 
Lawyers and judges had increasingly made their profession 
seem more mysterious to the general public. Impenetrable 
108see Browne et al. v. Turberville et al. for and 
illustration of this confusion. 
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legal jargon and complicated procedures cut the common man 
out of the system and made him hopelessly dependent upon the 
men of the bar. Those who remembered simpler times viewed 
these changes with suspicion.l09 
Governor John Tyler, one Virginian with fond memories 
of simpler times, championed the cause of codification in 
the early nineteenth century, becoming its most vocal 
advocate. As lengthy debates in Virginia tribunals coupled 
with increasing levels of litigation, a severe docket crisis 
developed in the first decade of the nineteenth century. 
Late in 1810, Tyler solicited the legislature's assistance 
in resolving the crisis. Tyler argued that "the 
jurisprudence of this state is certainly not in the most 
desirable situation, particularly the Court of Appeals." 
The reason the jurisprudence was in such a sad state was 
that Virginia's legislators had been faced with a difficult 
task when they created the courts. on the one hand, Tyler 
pointed out that Post-Revolutionary lawmakers had to attend 
to a republican opinion that "too much delay in the 
administration of justice is a great evil.nllO On the other 
hand, the legislators also realized that that exceedingly 
swift justice also held great peril "summum jus. summa 
l09Roeber, Faithful Magistrates, Horwitz, 
Transformation, Cook, American Codification, passim. 
llOsuch delays had plagued the Old Dominion's legal 
system from its inception. In fact, the December Reform 
grew out of similar backlogs in the court dockets. See the 
introduction to the 1788 Court of Appeals bill 12 Hening, 
Statutes, v. XII, 764. 
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iniuria." In order avoid both evils, Virginia's legal 
luminaries chose a middle path. Moderation on the part of 
the creators of the legal system succeeded in preventing 
summum jus. summa injuria, but had done little to combat 
delays in the administration of justice for any length of 
time. 111 
205 
Aware of the deference to tradition and common law in 
Virginia, Tyler realized that he must posit his solution 
carefully. The first part of Tyler's solution stressed both 
institutional and procedural changes. Institutionally, 
Tyler recommended adding judges to the court to manage the 
increased workload. Procedurally, Tyler suggested a series 
of reforms designed to move case through the appelate 
process more quickly.112 
Tyler's first procedural reform sought to simplify the 
process of bringing a case before the supreme court. In 
common practice, attorneys sought appellate writs without 
supplying the judges with a summary of their specific 
objections.113 Consequently, when an appeal was filed the 
judges had to sift through the transcripts of earlier trials 
111John Tyler to the Honorable Speaker of the Senate 
and House of Delegates, 3 December 1810, Executive 
Letterbook, 15 January 1810-24 August 1811, Virginia State 
Library and Archives. 
112Ibid. 
113This had been a volatile issue in the past. The 
Remonstrance of the Judges protested a previous assembly's 
attempt to impose physical and procedural changes on the 
court of appeals, the efforts of the legislature eventually 
won out in the December Reform. 
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in order to "find a point of controversy." To make the 
process more expedient, Tyler proposed that attorneys should 
supply the court with briefs so that the points in the case 
"should appear naked and clearly stated before them [the 
judges], so that the law may be pronounced in a reasonable 
time.nll4 
Next, Tyler argued that the court should abandon its 
practice of hearing appeals as a matter of ri~ht. 
Accordingly, cases brought up on writs of error or 
supersedeas would only be heard by the judges' 
discretion.ll5 Such a measure would enhance judicial 
authority by giving the high court's judges sole discretion 
over deciding which cases merited appeal. Initially, Tyler 
intended this reform to quell the rising number of frivolous 
appeals; however, such an increase in the judges's 
discretionary prerogatives promised a significant inflation 
of the power of the judiciary branch. By giving appellate 
magistrates complete control over deciding which cases they 
would hear, Tyler offered them the power to decide which 
aspects of constitutional law would come under the court's 
scrutiny. Under such circumstances, the conception of 
judicial review could take on serious new political 
meanings. Not only could the supreme court rule on the 
constitutionality of various issues, it could also decide 
114rbid. 
115Tyler to the Speakers, 3 December 1810, Executive 
Letterbooks. 
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which issues it wanted to examine. Likewise, Tyler's 
proposal would allow the court to ignore matters it did not 
want to address.ll6 
Tyler further sought to diminish the instances of 
frivolous appeals by barring lawyers who sued on the county 
or district level from representing their clients during the 
appeal. In arguing this point, Tyler criticized the ethics 
of the Old Dominion's bar by suggesting that they were using 
appeals to pad their fees and comparing them to "Ravens 
follow[ing] the carcase." Thus Tyler propped up his 
argument with an attack on corrupt attorneys, a common 
practice of politicians in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century.ll7 
Day-to-day operations of the court also came under 
Tyler's attack. Essentially, Tyler accused the tribunal of 
becoming a "talking court" where judges and attorneys 
unnecessarily delayed cases with long speeches and 
cumbersome opinions. The judges, he argued, had fallen into 
a bad habit of quoting lengthy passages from British cases. 
Moreover, the judges had wasted precious time "reconciling 
absurd and contradictory opinions of foreign Judges, which 
certainly can be no part of an American judge's duty." For 
116The ability to decline to address the 
constitutionality of certain issues was of equal 
constitutional importance as the matter of judicial review. 
117Ibid. The conception of a graduated bar was not new 
to the Old Dominion. In fact, Tyler's proposition did not 
suggest anything new. He merely was trying to get the 
legislature to support legal conventions which had been 
ignored in recent years. 
--------
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a glaring example of these frivolities, Tyler invited the 
legislators to peruse Bustar v. Wallace where the attorneys 
cited no fewer than thirty-three cases, and he admonished 
them to survey "a still more enormous budget of cases" in 
Smith & Wife v. Chapman, tantamount to a "true case mania." 
Tyler asked "Is not this a waste of time for which no 
apology can be found? 11 118 
Tyler reserved his full scorn, however, for those who 
cited numerous precedents from the plethora of British 
inferior courts.119 
Some Gentlemen refer to the decisions of the inferior 
Courts of England, and yet, I am told, to mention a 
case which has been decided in any of our District 
courts, would be a subject of ridicule, it would want 
that genuine sterling constituent of being a British 
decision. Under these circumstances can America be 
Fairly said to be independent [of] England? 11 120 
Tyler's argument nicely summarized the ambivalence of 
Virginia's revolutionary settlement. Specifically, he 
illustrated how the over reliance on British tradition could 
grossly inhibit justice in the new republic. Although 
Virginia's revolutionary legislators had done their best to 
distinguish their government from what they perceived as 
118rbid.; Bustar v. Wallace, 4 H & M, 82; Smith & Wife 
v. Chapman, 1 H & M, 247. 
119A good example of how such arguments could waste 
precious time, see Pendleton's opinion in Thornton v. Smith 
where he not only had to deal with British precedents, but 
rendered a brief history and description of Britain's 
inferior courts as well. Thornton v. Smith 1 Wash., 83-84. 
120Tyler to the Speakers, 3 December 1810, Executive 
Letterbooks. 
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cv:L:Lupt British pract~ices, t~•-=i had also created a neff 
jurisdiction that both deviated from and depended on its 
British heritage. The Pendleton court had done a fine job 
of protecting the tenets of the Revolution. During the 
Roane period the increasingly [many said unnecessarily] 
erudite arguments of the Old Dominion's lawyers had forced 
the judges to become long-winded and overly dependent upon 
English jurisprudence. The inherent paradoxes of the 
209 
Revolutionary settlement sponsored cumbrous practices in the 
new judiciary. 
The advent of these cumbersome practices led Tyler to 
lament on the folly of the revolutionary legislature 
It is much to be lamented that in the commencement of 
our self-government, we had not selected a Code founded 
on the ancient maxims and principles as far as they 
applied to our government--this was certainly the 
object of the convention which adopted the Common Law; 
for it is so expressed--Yet are we going on looking for 
the principles and maxims, to see if those decisions 
W8re correct; for if this is necessary, we certainly 
should not attempt to prove the axiom by the 
proposition, but the very reverse: we should prove the 
proposition by the axiom--so would old Euclid have 
done. If a law is said to be unconstitutional, should 
we apply for any man's opinion, or go to the letter of 
the Constitution for its solution? I think the latter 
would be the choice. surely then where as course is to 
be determined on Common Law principles, ought we not to 
seek out for those principles by which it is to be 
governed? Why cannot those maxims and principles which 
form the Common Law; be selected for our purpose, and 
made the rules of decision in cases where they apply? 
As to the written or statute Law, no Judge can be 
fairly said to be independent or free who goes to a 
British Judge to see how his Lordship has been pleased 
to decide in a like case. Surely the Judges do not 
recollect that those who made the law understood it, 
and never expected that those who were to expand it 
possessed less wisdom. This course of legal procedure 
is too servile and humiliating for an American 
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Citizen.l21 
Until that point, Tyler had grounded his attack on the need 
for commonsensical, procedural reforms. With his attack on 
the judges' dependence on British jurisprudence, he shifted 
to a different combat arena. By questioning the wisdom of 
Virginia's revolutionaries in retaining their allegiance to 
British precedents, Tyler was asking for nothing less than a 
legal and judicial declaration of independence. Yes, Tyler 
argued, Americans owed allegiance to ancient British 
principles of liberty and justice. Commitment to English 
legal tenets~ however, did not necessarily equate with 
committment to British law. 
AGcording to Tyler, the Revolutionaries should have 
codified the British common law in the way that they 
redacted their revolutionary settlement in 1792. If the 
Revolutionaries had done so, American judges would have been 
free of their British masters. Instead, the Virginia 
convention had enslaved the Old Dominion's lawyers and 
judges to the entire corpus of British common law. 
Part of the guilt, Tyler argued, rested in the hands 
of Virginia's lawyers and judges themselves. The men who 
argued before and sat on the benches of the Old Dominion's 
tribunals had taken up a false notion that "the length of 
speeches and number of cases that are made and refered to" 
determined the reasonability and cogency of an argument or 
12lrbid. 
----·---
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
211 
judgment. Such a standard was tantamount to folly 
I well r~member a celebrated case which was tried in 
the General Court, where many cases were quoted from 
Dumford and East, and when a gentlemen, high in the 
profession proclaimed aloud that the court was bound by 
such cases, that our rights, liberty and lives rested 
on them--but presently an opposing case was adduced 
from East, in contradiction to himself and his firm--
but that professor replied, he was an unfledg'd 
reporter! But a Judge then sitting; very properly 
replied that they stood not upon the whim and caprice 
of British Judges, that we had long since emancipated 
ourselves from the shackles they imposed, and preferred 
to stand upon the Bill of Rights Constitution and Laws; 
principly to sacred to be shipwrecked on the British 
ocean of uncertainty. As to the supposed difficulty 
and labour of revising the Common Law, it is all a 
bubble; who could have supposed that after a free 
republican . • . government had been established, and 
so many laws that hung upon the ancient system were 
done away, viz:--the law of primogeniture, the law of 
descents, survivorship, &c. &c. with the complete 
change of the Criminal Code, so much would be left as 
to render it impossible for a few wise and willing men 
to accomplish the end proposed? After old Coka and 
Littleton shall have been stripped of their antiquated 
dress, what great matter would be left for us to do? 
shall we forever administer our free republican 
government on principles of a rigid and high ton'd 
monarchy? I almost blush for my country when I think 
of these things. 
Let a stranger go into our courts, and he would almost 
believe himself in the court of King's Bench. Can the 
Judicial department be free from their Chains, but by a 
revisal of the Common Law under Legislative authority? 
It may be asked where a committee of revisors be found; 
whose talents would be equal to the task? This is a 
mortifying question indeed--but I answer, that among 
the many wise and experienced Judges and Lawyers (some 
of whom have retired from the labors of their 
profession) two or three may be found, whom nature has 
blessed with sufficient talents to accomplish the work 
in as reasonable time, and with virtue and patriotism 
to insure its performance in a manner auspicious to the 
best interest of their country. Let us not therefore, 
sit down in despair, under a mistaken impression that 
this load of Common Law authorities cannot be shaken 
off but resolutely attack it as we did the statutory 
despotism, and no doubt but our endeavors will be 
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assumed with success.l22 
Tyler had brilliantly coupled his attack on legal delays 
with a forceful appeal for codification. Ironically, by 
couching his argument in stinging republican discourse, 
Tyler laid bare the paradoxes within the revolutionary 
settlement. At the same time, the governor's vitriolic 
denouncement proposed a practical remedy. 
212 
Tyler had effectively challenged the legislature to 
finish the Revolution in regard to the law. Preservation of 
British common law in the form that Jefferson and his fellow 
statesmen had attempted had been a mistake. True revolution 
required more stringent separation from English legal 
authorities. Indeed, Tyler argued that the safety of the 
republic depended on such a departure. So much for the 
Post-revolutionary reliance English common law. 
In his remarks, Tyler had identified major problems 
with the court and suggested possible remedies. 
Institutionally, Tyler suggested adding judges, a time-
honored reform, in order to relieve the burgeoning 
dockets.l23 Procedurally, Tyler provided a comprehensive 
plan to relieve the pressure on the bench. Adaptation of 
legal briefs, a practice that most American courts had yet 
to embrace, represented a useful, time-saving innovation. 
122Ibid. 
123This was a simple matter and had been utilized in 
the past, see Hening, statutes, " An Act for Establishing 
District courts and for Regulating the General Court," v. 
XII, 730-763. 
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Giving judges discretion over deciding which cases were 
worthy of appeal reflected a growing acceptance of the role 
of the independent judiciary in the new republic. Tyler's 
plea to the legislature to police the antics of an 
"unethical" bar echoed the sentiments of his fellow 
Virginians toward the state's lawyers. Labelling the bench 
a "talking court" served two purposes. First, the governor 
used the example of a "talking court" to reprimand the 
judges for their overzealous erudition. More important, 
Tyler remarks illustrated the type of cumbersome practices 
associated with the loose application of English common law 
and presented a forceful argument for codification. 
Tyler's attack on the judiciary vividly articulated the 
judicial problems that resulted from Virginia's ambivalent 
revolutionary settlement. Furthermore, Tyler effectively 
combined the growing disatisfaction with corrupt lawyers 
with his call for codification. By combining the two 
elements in one argument, Tyler made a forceful case for 
legal revolution--he demonstrated that the current system 
had become cumbersome and removed from social realities, and 
he challenged the elite (the legislature) to use its power 
to enact revolutionary change in the law. Tyler's criticism 
of the unnessary erudition of the legal profession, 
moreover, tapped into an argument that was gaining in 
popularity in the early decades of the nineteenth century, 
one that would surely win support for the governor's 
-------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
proposal.124 
In a further effort to promote large-scale reforms, 
Tyler went on to criticize the operation of ·the county 
courts. In doing so, he also solicited the support of the 
legal profession which had encouraged reform of the county 
court system since before the Revolution.125 
Tyler's argument for codification was successful. A 
nine-year quest for codification which culminated in the 
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Revised Code of 1819 had begun. Even though it took nearly 
a decade to complete the process, the legislature 
immediately began the arduous process of collecting and 
publishing Virginia's statutes in a more orderly fashion. 
Just one month after he addressed the speakers Tyler happily 
instructed William Waller Hening to begin his compilation of 
the Statutes at Large.126 
By the middle of the 1820s these suspicions combined 
with the new national trend toward codification and the 
reception of civilian forms of justice to invoke a call for 
a new constitution. If the Revised code of 1819 marked the 
succeszful completion of the first phase of the codification 
movement as it related to the drive for practical justice, 
the Constitution of 1831 represented the ultimate victory of 
124Roeber, Cook, et al. 
125Tyler to the Speakers, 3 December 1810, Executive 
Letterbooks; Roeber, et al. 
126John Tyler to William Waller Hening, esq., 2 January 
1811, Executive Letterbooks, 15 January 1810-24 August 1811. 
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the codifiers. Not only did the Old Dominion receive a new 
constitution in the arrangement, but it received a new 
supreme court as the judiciary article redefined the nature, 
character, and membership of that august tribunal. 1831 
thus marked the end of the era of republican justice in 
Virginia. 
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Chapter Five 
Louisiana's Supreme Court, 1813-1840 
Louisiana's early Supreme Court judges faced a more 
difficult task than their brethren in the Old Dominion. 
Unlike the Virginia court, Louisiana's high appellate 
tribunal started almost from scratch. Although the Superior 
Court for the Territory of Orleans had settled some basic 
organizational and jurisdictional problems, the supreme 
court drew its definition from a brand new state 
constitution that placed new restrictions on the judiciary. 
Moreover, the court's justices, while using the model of the 
Superior Court, still had to define the tribunal's role as 
the state's first Supreme Court of Appeals. Finally, the 
juQ~es had to wrestle with problems related to the 
codification movement as politicians and some members of the 
legal community sought not only to reinforce the civil law 
through the creation of a new civil code in the 1820s, but 
also to replace Anglo-American patterns of judicature with 
more restrictive civilian practices. Louisiana's 
Americanized bench triumphed over these challenges by using 
court rules and judicial decisions to adopt procedures which 
ensured the continuation of the Anglo-American brand of 
judicial administration, to emphasize the common law in the 
curriculum of the state's prospective lav~ers, and to reduce 
the power and influence of the Louisiana Code over judicial 
expression. By the 1840s, the judges of the Supreme Court 
216 
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of Louisiana had molded the state's judiciary into a 
thoroughly American tribunal. 
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When Wilkinson and Claiborne took control of Louisiana 
Territory in late 1803, they did so with the understanding 
that the region would gain statehood as soon as possible.l 
Congress, however, thwarted early petitions for statehood as 
they originated in territorial political squabbles, and 
because the governor, the president, and many congressmen 
doubted the ability of Louisianians to govern themselves 
within the American system.2 
In 1809, however, Louisiana's memorialists managed to 
convince the territorial legislature to renew their drive 
for statehood. Despite Governor Claiborne's opposition--
"the people are not yet prepared for self government, and to 
extend it to them would be a hazardous experiment" he 
declared3--the memorialists succeeded. By 1811, Claiborne 
too had moved into the pro-statehood camp, and President 
Madison signed legislation enabling Louisiana to enter the 
Union. In 1812 Louisianians held their first constitutional 
lTreaty of Cession, 30 April 1803, Francis Newton 
Thorpe, comp. The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial 
Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, 
and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of 
America, 7 vols., (Washington, D. c.: u. s. Government 
Printing Offices, 1909), art. iii, III, 1376. 
2For a good discussion of the political issues involved 
with the first statehood petition, see George Darga, 
Jefferson's Louisiana, 29; for congressional attitudes see 
Winthrop Jordan, White over Black, 389. 
3claiborne to Robert Smith, 18 May 1809, Rowland, OL, 
val. IV, 211. 
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convention.4 
Surprisingly, debates over the judiciary article went 
rather smoothly in the Louisiana constitutional convention. 
The so-called "creole-American" clash of legal traditions 
failed to present significant problems for the delegates. 
Although the initial draft of the judiciary article drew 
opposition from members of the committee of the whole for 
its lack of specificity and failure to protect the ancien 
population's traditional civilian legal customs, subsequent 
debates in the judiciary committee dealt with less volatile 
matters. 
The original judiciary article proposed a 
"hierarchical" judicial system based on American 
institutions. Insofar as the Supreme Court was concerned, 
the convention proposed a three-man court led by a chief 
judge. Seeking to restrict the tribunal to cases of 
financial significance, the committee proposed a monetary 
floor of $300.00 on prospective appeals. 
Actually, the proposal for the Supreme Court drew 
scant criticism from the members of the committee of the 
whole. The most vexing problem concerned the selection of 
judges. Originally, the article grant~d the legislature the 
right to appoint the judges; however, it provided no 
4For the best discussion of the process and politics 
involved in Louisiana's drive to statehood see Warren M. 
Billings, "From this Seed: The Louisiana Constitution of 
1812, 11 in Billings and Edward F. Haas eds., In Search of 
Fundamental Law: Louisiana's Constitutions 1812-1974, 
forthcoming. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
219 
guidance regarding qualifications, terms of service, or 
impeachment. Orleanais members of the convention worried 
that to include such vagaries would allow the American 
faction in the legislature to control appointments to the 
judiciary, thus negating civilian influence and threatening 
ancient custom. 
In order to smooth over the objections, the committee 
of the whole appointed a sub-committee to deal with the 
judicary article. The five-man judiciary committee 
consisted of prominent members of both factions--Allan B. 
Magruder and John Watkins from the American side, Bernard 
Marigny and Jean Noel Destrehan of the orleanais faction, 
and the Irishman Alexander Porter whose role was to serve as 
mediator and swing man. If the committee confronted heated 
debates over items in the judiciary act, both sides of the 
political arena would be well represented. No such tension, 
however, developed over the institutional structure of the 
Supreme Court.5 
Nonetheless, the judiciary committee did not pursue 
its task without some debate. In fact, some disagreements 
were so pronounced that when majority and minority reports 
were filed on 30 December 1812, Destrehan managed to have 
the majority recommendations tabled in order to allow the 
minority to present its opinions to the committee of the 
whole. Destrehan's objections, however, once again centered 
on apportionment rather than problems with the overall 
5Billings, "From this Seed," forthcoming. 
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construction and conception of the court. Thus the article 
passed rather easily with only minor amendations.6 
The court finally created by the judiciary article of 
the constitution represented a model of American judicial 
organization. The article vested judicial power in a three 
to five man supreme court and inferior courts.? It gave the 
supreme court appellate jurisdiction in civil disputes 
exceeding the sum of $300.00.8 Justices would receive a 
salary of $5,000.00 annually. As in Virginia, the 
legislature divided the state into judicial districts and 
required the judges to ride circuit. New Orleans, German 
Coast, Acadia, Lafourche, Iberville, and Point Coupee 
comprised the Eastern District. Attakapas, Opelousas, 
Rapides, concordia, Natchitoches, and oauchita made up the 
Western District.9 
Louisiana's convention mandated that for five years 
6Ibid. 
7The matter of which branch of government should grant 
judicial appointments proved to be a volatile issue within 
the convention. As a result, the committee left the matter 
unresolved. Governor Claiborne assumed the authority in 
1813, however, and the legislature acquiesed and approved 
his appointees with only minimum resistance. Pierre 
Derbigny's appointment, however, was held up for nearly a 
month. See "From this Seedn and The Historic Rules of the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1813-1879, (Lafayette: Center 
for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 
1985) xii. 
8Note that the monetary ceiling was the same as that of 
the Superior Court for the Territory of Orleans. 
9Francis Newton Thorpe, Federal and State 
Constitutions, 1386-1387. Note that the district 
organization roughly mirrored that of the superior Court for 
the Territory of Orleans, supra, ch. III. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
221 
the court hold eastern sessions in New Orleans from November 
to July; and western sessions from August to through 
October.lO Judges would hold office during good behavior 
with impeachment powers reserved for the governor with a 
three-fourths confirming vote of both houses. The 
convention also empowered the judges of the court of appeals 
to appoint and to remove clerks.ll 
In respect to the laws-in-force, the convention 
provided for the continuation of the system currently in 
place "Provided however, that the Legislature shall never 
adopt any system or code of laws, by a general reference to 
the said system or code, but in all cases, shall specify the 
several provisions of the laws it may enact." Finally, the 
judiciary article required all of the state's judges to 
refer to the particular authority cited in any definitive 
judgment and to adduce the reasons for the judgment in a 
formal, written decision.l2 
The convention had created a model American bench. As 
in Virginia, judges would meet at appropriate times and in 
regulated districts, they would hear major civil appeals, 
and regulate their own officers and administer justice. 
Moreover, the clause pertaining to the laws-in-force 
guaranteed that Louisiana would remain the mixed 
lOThe legislature witheld the right to change session 
sites every five years. 
llThorpe, Federal and State constitutions, 1388. 
12Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, 1388. 
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jurisdiction that had been fleshed out in the territorial 
period. 13 
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Even though Louisiana was a relative newcomer to the 
republican system, its first judiciary article proved to be 
an efficient, succinct, and representative example of 
American patterns of court construction. Unlike Virginia's 
first constitutional builders 1 Louisiana's delegates were 
able to borrow from the experience of other states. Two 
delegates, James Brown and Allan B. Macgruder, had even 
served in Kentucky's constitutional convention.l4 Moreover, 
American justice, in its appellate for1n, had been operating 
elsewhere steadily since the American Revolution. Thus 
Louisiana's judicary article and the subsequent legislative 
acts that followed were much less complicated than 
Jefferson's early court bills as all civil appellate 
litigation in Louisiana came under the ambit of one court 
rather than individual admiralty, chancery, and appellate 
benches.l5 Since Louisiana was smaller and less populous 
than the Old Dominion, session provisions were simpler. 
Furthermore, in the three decades since the Virginia 
Assembly created its courts of appeals, Americans had 
developed a stronger sense of their republican philosophy. 
13This may be taken as a reaffirmation that the so-
called "code of 1808 11 was never intended to be regarded as a 
comprehensive code. 
14Billings, "From this Seed," forthcoming. 
15Although unlike the Old Dominion, the Louisiana 
judicial system did not contain an equity court. 
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Thus the Louisiana convention, unlike Virginia's delegates 
earlier, placed little emphasis on oath-taking. Indeed, the 
simple oath for all of Louisiana's governmental officers--
legislative, executive, and judicial--was the same "I (A. 
B.) do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and 
impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent 
on me as--according to the best of my abilities and 
understanding, agreeably to the rules and regulation of the 
Constitution, and the laws of this state: so help me God!"l6 
One advantage Louisianians had over their counterparts 
in the Old Dominion stemmed from the fact that the Superior 
Court for the Territory of Orleans had already explored some 
of the legal landscape that would occupy the attention of 
the supreme court. Nonetheless, the superior court's 
explorations were fraught with jurisdictional obstacles--
issues which would continue to occupy the supreme court 
throughout its early history.l7 
Following the passage of the constitution in 1812, 
Louisianians moved swiftly to establish a government under 
its auspices. In early 1813, the legislature met to begin 
ordering the state's new government. One of the first 
orders of business before the legislature was the 
16Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, 1388. 
!?Although the compilation of the Digest of 1808 and 
and various judicial decisions had solved the major problems 
associated with interpreting the laws-in-force, the main 
jurisdictional issues which confronted the superior court 
were still pressing 'ivhen the supreme court assumed its 
operation. 
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organization and creation of the state's court system. In 
the Judiciary Act of 1813, Louisiana's legislature 
implemented the constitution by opting for ? three-man 
supreme court and erecting a rudimentary system of inferior 
courts. The act provided for monthly sessions of the 
supreme court. Between November and August, the court would 
convene at the seat of the eastern appellate district in New 
Orleans. For the rest of thG year, the court would reside 
at Opelousas, the seat of the western district.l8 
The Judiciary Act of 1813 vested the court with the 
right to "make and issue all mandates," to punish "all 
contempts," to preside over admissions to the bar, and to 
create "all needful rules.nl9 Although the constitution 
limited the judges's power to interpret their authority, the 
judiciary act granted them the necessary powers to organize 
the court and to regulate its proceedings.20 Power to "make 
and issue" mandates and to punish contempts allowed the 
court to act freely in the promulgation of its affairs. 
Rule making power had proved necessary in fleshing out the 
thorny jurisdiction of the superior Court, hence similar 
authority was granted to the supreme court. Admission of 
attorneys was a standard feature of most American high 
courts. In Louisiana as in the Old Dominion, consequently, 
18Acts, 1813, 18-34. 
19Acts, 1813, 18-34. 
20Thus the Judiciary Act lent a basic form to the 
court, one which would essentially remain in place until 
1879, see Billings, Historic Rules, xi. 
--------
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the justices of the Supreme Court controlled not only bar 
exams, but set the standards of admission. While those 
standards were relatively relaxed in the Old Dominion, 
Louisiana's judges wielded their authority over the bar 
admissions to inject an increasingly high level of common 
law into the state's legal order.21 
In reorganizing the Territory of Orleans into the 
State of Louisiana, the voters of the new state sought to 
attain a reasonable measure of stability. The first 
legislature drew most of its membership from the previous 
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territorial houses, and William c. c. Claiborne remained on 
as governor. Governor Claiborne possessed first hand 
knowledge of the difficulties that the new supreme court 
would likely face. As a judge in the Governor's Court, 
Claiborne had wrestled with the all too difficult nuances 
that comprised the territory's mixed jurisdiction. During 
his stint as territorial governor, Claiborne became 
intimately aware both of the need to attract competent 
judges and the difficulty of convincing qualified appointees 
21E. Lee Shepard has characterized the early Virginia 
bar requirements as almost non-existent. Although high 
court judges were required to examine applicants to the bar, 
usually only one judge tested the prospective lawyer and his 
fellow judges accepted his conclusions; conversations with 
E. Lee Shepard June 1989. In a letter to his son, one 
Virginia supreme court justice, William H. Cabell, mentioned 
that he planned to examine an aspirant to the bar if the 
stage stopped for fifteen minutes in Charlottesville during 
a trip to Lewisburg, William H. Cabell to Henry Coalter 
Cabell, 22 April 1838, Cabell Family Papers, Virginia 
Historical Society. 
-------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to accept seats on the bench.22 
Keenly aware of the difficulties facing the new 
supreme court, Claiborne sought to wield all of his 
influence to attract qualified judges to the tribunal. 
Accordingly, Claiborne's initial appointments to the bench 
reveal the thoughtful nature of his decisions. As 
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territorial governor Claiborne had earlier been unsuccessful 
in enticing prominent American legal figures to the Orleans 
court. Pierre Duponceau had declined his appointment, and 
Ephraim Kirby died en route to the Crescent City--only John 
Prevost of New York arrived to claim his commission. This 
outcome delayed the organization of the terrritorial court 
and forced Claiborne to draw upon the tiny pool of qualified 
jurists in Louisiana and Mississippi Territory to fill 
positions on the bench. When Claiborne faced the task of 
appointing judges to the supreme court, he avoided such 
delays by limiting his search to the small group of legal 
luminaries already residing in Louisiana. In 1813 Dominick 
A. Hall, George Mathews, and Pierre Derbigny emerged as the 
leading candidates.23 
Hall had served with distinction on the federal 
district court for the Territory of Orleans. Indeed, Hall 
was widely recognized as one of the leading jurists of the 
American southwest territory, a regard that led him to leave 
22claiborne's experiences in this regard are chronicled 
in Chapter Three above. 
23 Ibid. 
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the supreme bench only five months after his appointment for 
a second federal appointment.24 George Mathews had 
reluctantly accepted a seat on the superior Court for the 
Territory of Orleans, hoping to parley that position into a 
more lucrative judgeship in Mississippi territory. Mathews, 
however, became one of the more influential judges on the 
territorial court, writing some of the more important 
opinions after Prevost's resignation. During I<Iathews 1 
tenure on the territorial court, he participated in the 
landmark decisions which interpreted the meaning of the 
laws-in-force and the impact of the Digest of 1808.25 
Pierre Derbigny had been one of the territory's leading 
lawyers and legislators. A native of Laon, France, Derbigny 
had established himself as a successful lawyer and had 
served in various official capacities in the Territory of 
Orleans. Derbigny's civilian background indicated that 
Orleanais interests would be represented on the court. 
Moreover, Derbigny's expertise in French law and knowlege of 
the language stood to serve him well as a justice. 
Nonetheless, neither Derbigny nor any of the justices that 
sat on the early Louisiana supreme court were members of the 
ancienne population.26 
When the supreme court convened for the first time on 
24Billings, Historic Rules, xii, 45. 
25see Chapter Three above. 
26rn fact a member of the ancienne population did not 
sit on the court Zenon Lebauve assumed his seat in 1865, 
Billings, Historic Rules. 
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1 March 1813, only Hall and Mathews' appointments had been 
approved by the legislature (Derbigny's had been held up by 
American members of the legislature). The first session of 
the supreme court was merely ceremonial. Shortly 
thereafter, the court commenced its real work. On 3 March 
1813, Mathews and Hall asserted their rule-making power by 
commmissioning Francois X. Martin, Edward Livingston, 
Abraham Ellery, Etienne Mazureau, and Abner Duncan to a 
"Committee to draw up Rules & Regulations for the Government 
of the Court." Martin had distinguished himself on the the 
Superior Court for the Territory of Orleans; consequently, 
his practical knowledge of Louisiana's judicial system would 
serve him well in devising new rules. Mazureau, Livingston, 
Ellery, and Duncan represented the state's most able 
practitioners. These lawmakers were singularly well 
equipped to draft the court's rules. Unfortunately, no copy 
of their report survives.27 
Supreme court historian Warren M. Billings writes that 
"In all likelihood, Martin and his colleauges took as their 
guide an 1805 act of the territorial legislature that had 
established procedures for adjudicating causes in the 
superior court, which they modified to meet the new high 
court's needs." Billings' inference is supported by early 
case records which closely resembled forms prescribed by the 
1805 act.28 Billings is no doubt correct in this 
27Billings, Historic Rules, xiii. 
28Billings, Historic Rules, xiii. 
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assumption: however, apart from the 1805 act, each 
commissioner was intimately aware of the rules and practices 
of the Superior Court, which they all either served on or 
appeared before, and the various rules governing the 
function of the territory's other courts. Mazureau, for 
instance, worked as the clerk of the Court of Pleas and 
transcribed the rules governing its proceedings as 
prescribed by the judges in its first session.29 
Disappearance of the committee's report severely 
limits modern scholarly analysis of the court's initial 
exercise of its rulemaking discretion. Moreover, future 
rules were entered intermittantly only when need arose. A 
systematic rendition of the court's rules did not appear 
until after the tribunal was reorganized under the 1845 
state constitution.30 Nonetheless, an analysis of the 
surviving rules demonstrates a good deal about the issues 
concerning the court during its formative period.31 
The twenty-nine rules issued by the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana between 1813 and 1840 covered a variety of 
29"An Act regulating the practice of the superior court 
in civil causes," Acts, 1805, 219-260: see also chapter 
three above and appendix four. 
30For an analysis of the 1845 rev1s1on, see Mark F. 
Fernandez, "From Chaos to Continuity: The First Reform of 
the supreme Court of Louisiana, 1845-1852," Louisiana 
History, (Winter 1987), v. XXVIII, 19-36. 
31Another troubling aspect of the surviving rules of 
court is that they represent only those rules governing the 
Eastern District, therefore, there is no way to assess 
differences between procedure in the two judicial districts. 
--------
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practical and procedural matters. Two important issues 
which consistently cropped up, however, had an important 
effect on the development of Louisiana as a representative 
American jurisdiction--legal briefs and bar admissions. 
In its first rulemaking session following the 
committee's report on 13 May 1813, the court introduced a 
230 
requirement for counsel on both sides of an action to 
furnish the judges with a brief of the case at least one day 
in advance.32 Previous statute required parties to furnish 
the justices with copies of transcripts from the original 
cases.33 It is not clear whether the judges intended to 
release the parties from the responsibility of furnishing 
transcripts by requiring briefs, or whether the briefs were 
to be supplied in addition to those documents. Nonetheless, 
the court's order represents an early expression of the 
modern usage of the term "brief" and illustrates the 
advanced understanding of American innovations that 
Louisiana's justices brought to their tribunal.34 
Less than a year after the court ordered the briefs, 
it rescinded the regulation because it violated Section 18 
of the Judiciary Act of 1813 which required the parties to 
32Rule of court, 13 May 1813, Billings, Historic Rules, 
1; previous rules in the Superior Court for the Territory of 
Orleans required counsel to provide brief summaries of the 
points of interest of each hearing, however, the term 
"brief" had not yet crept into the discourse. 
33Acts, 1813, 28. 
34For an excellent analysis on the evolution of the 
term "brief" see Billings, Rules, ln. 
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present full transcripts of cases along with their requests 
for appeal. 35 Undaunted, the court in 1821 once again 
introduced briefs as part of the appellr.te process when it 
required an applicant for a hearing to file "a note of the 
points and authorities on which he intends to rely" with the 
clerk at least three days before the hearing. Opposing 
counsel was then required to submit a similar "note" raising 
the major point of its argument within three days of 
scheduling. 36 The purposes of this rule were twofold: the 
court wished tc impose some strict guidelines on 
applications for rehearings;37 and the judges hoped to speed 
up their preparation time by using the briefs as an 
introduction to, perhaps even a substitute for, the 
cumbersome lower court transcripts. This second attempt at 
introducing appellate briefs demonstrates both the 
predilection of the judges for such innovations as well as 
the fact that the court's average caseload per year had 
nearly doubled.38 
35Billings, Historic Rules, 2. 
36Rule of court, 23 April 1821, Billings Historic 
Rules, 5-6. 
37In its early years of operation the Louisiana court 
was not faced with an overwhelming caseload. But by the 
1820s, illness and resignations had encumbered the court's 
proceedings. One of the more cumbersome aspects of the 
appellate process are the frequent demands for rehearings. 
By restricting motions for rehearings to the points covered 
in the briefs, the court could limit the amount of motions 
filed. 
38This is demonstrated by a marked rise in the average 
number of case per year before the supreme court. In the 
six year period between 1813 and 1818, the court heard an 
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Louisiana's lawyers quickly took advantage of the 
loophole in the rehearing rule by arguing new points, not 
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mentioned in their briefs, during their hearings. In order 
to provide opposing counsel ample time to study such newly 
introduced authorities, the court soon drafted a rule 
allowing them four days to answer the new points in 
writing.39 
The institution of briefs represented a useful 
administrative reform for the Supreme Court. It also 
represented a major step toward shaping Louisiana into a 
distinctively American jurisdiction. Louisiana's judges 
introduced the state's bar to modern American practices of 
bringing appeals, thus reinforcing a style of procedure that 
was becoming a vital feature of the American appellate 
system. The rules relating to legal briefs in Louisiana 
illustrate how procedural reforms in the supreme court 
helped to facilitate the introduction of American judicial 
practices. 
Louisiana's judges employed a more direct method of 
introducing American practices and common law to Louisiana's 
judicial system in the rules governing bar admissions and 
legal education. Just as other state legislatures had done, 
average number of 53.1 cases per year. Between 1819 and 
1824, the court heard an average of 126.5 cases per year, 
see Mark F. Fernandez, "From Chaos to Continuity: Early 
Reforms of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1845-1852," 
Louisiana History, (Winter 1987), 19-36. 
39Rule of Court, 6 July, 1821, Billings, Historic 
Rules, 7. 
-------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
233 
Louisiana's assembly charged its supreme court justices with 
the duty of overseeing the training and admission of new 
attorneys into the state bar. Because the complicated 
origins of Louisiana's jurisdiction required intensive 
study, Louisiana's judges took their charge of overseeing 
legal education much more seriously than their brethren in 
other states. 40 In a series of court rules between 1813 and 
1839 the Supreme Court created, fine-tuned, and systematized 
the criteria for admission to the bar. The judges ensured 
that Louisiana's lawyers would be trained in American legal 
practices, guaranteeing the further development of those 
traditions in the Pelican State. 
In June of 1813 the court issued the first strictures 
governing the admission of lawyers to the state bar. The 
judges ruled that no one would be admitted as either 
counsellor or attorney unless he could certify that he had 
worked in the office of a practicing attorney for at least 
three years prior to the application, could produce a 
license to practice law from another American state or 
territory, or had been admitted to the bar of the Territory 
of orleans.41 Under this arrangement, the court not only 
provided strict guidelines for admission, but also it 
continued the graduated bar of the territorial period and 
40James A. Padgett, ed., "Letters of James Brown to 
Henry Clay, 1804-1835, 11 Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXIV 
(1941), 1152. 
41Rule of Court, 14 June 1813, Billings, Historic 
Rules, 2-3. 
-------
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allowed reciprocity for advocates from other states or 
territories.42 
Two years later, the judges amended the rules for 
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admission to include lawyers trained in American legal 
seminaries. Relaxing the requirements slightly to 
acknowledge the value of a formal education, the court 
required these prospective candidates to apprentice for only 
two years under the direction of a local attorney. In this 
vein, the court's provisions reflected the great strides in 
legal education that were being made around the nation in 
the early nineteenth century and ensured that attorneys 
trained in other jurisdictions received a thorough 
introduction to Louisiana's laws and practices.43 
In 1819, the court eased up further on its 
requirements by allowing applicants who could assure the 
court of a good classical education, even though they might 
not possess a college degree, to enter the bar after 
practicing for two years und~r the tutelage of a local 
attorney.44 Relaxation of the rules governing bar 
admissions suggests that the court had begun to feel 
comfortable that it had solved most of the complicated 
42see chapter three above. 
43Rule of court, Billings, Historic Rules, 3; an 
example of how legal education developed in Virginia during 
this time may be gleaned from the various entries in W. 
Hamilton Bryson, Legal Education in Virginia, 1779-1979: A 
Biographical Approach, (Charlotteville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1982). 
44Rule of Court, 27 February 1819, Billings, Historic 
Rules, 4-5. 
---------- -------
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problems related to its mixed jurisdiction and, more 
important, reflects the growing need for attorneys created 
by the litigiousness of the state's population. 
Two later rules governing bar admissions, however, 
sought to restrict unsavory characters and members of 
Louisiana's ancienne population from entering the state's 
legal community. In 1821, the court passed a requirment 
forbiding admission to candidates "not aquainted with the 
legal language [English] of the state." This stricture 
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mainly sought to eliminate French influence from the state's 
legal order. Also, until the 1820s the court had followed 
the costly practice of reporting cases in both English and 
French. With the judges moving more and more in the 
direction of American jurisprudence restricting court 
pleadings to English saved the state a good penny on 
publishing costs. Indirectly, ~he rule made it more 
difficult for members of the ancienne population to enter 
the bar as it prohibited the use of their native tongue.45 
These provisions were followed by an 1835 rule that 
restricted unsuitable individuals (as well as members of the 
Ancienne population), from entering the bar by providing for 
a brief waiting period between application and admission. 
The delay allowed publication of a list of candidates and 
enabled persons with objections to applicants to come 
45Rule of court, 7 r.fay 1821, Billings, Historic Rules, 
6-7, 6n. 
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forward and testify against their admission.46 
Finally, in 1840 the court issued its most 
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comprehensive ruling concerning admissions to the bar. The 
rules also had a profound effect in shaping the course of 
Louisiana legal education to favor the continued reception 
of American legal and juridical principles. The 1840 
regulation required all candidates for admission "Whether 
previously licensed in another state or not" to present 
evidence of United States citizenship, good moral character, 
and one year's residence in Louisiana.47 This portion of 
the rule merely refined the requirements that had been 
promulgated in previous regulations.48 
A second section of the 1840 ruling, however, 
represented a landmark in the history of legal education in 
Louisiana as the court presented a syllabus for prospective 
applicants and provided for an examination on the material. 
The books contained in the syllabus demonstrate an effort to 
bring Louisiana's brand of legal instruction in line with 
those of other states. Accordingly, the judges required 
would-be attorneys to familiarize themselves with standard 
works of civil law (authorities that were new gaining use in 
other American jurisdictions), English common law, and 
46Rule of Court, 8 December 1835, Billings, Historic 
Rules, 7-Bn. 
47An exception was made on the residency requirement 
for attorney's licensed in other states. 
48Rule of Court, 24 November 1840, Billings, Historic 
Rules, 9-11. 
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American treatises. What is most striking about the 
inclusion of civilian treatises in the syllabus is that the 
titles are so few. Conspicuously absent are references to 
the Siete Partidas, Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis, the 
Code Nair, the Code Napoleon, the Coutume de Paris, the 
projets of Post-Revolutionary France, the Compil~tion of 
Castille, the Febrero Adicionado, the Curia Philipica, royal 
ordinances, and the Fuero Real, all traditionally considered 
cornerstones of Louisiana's jurisdiction. One might argue, 
although no contemporary commentators did, that these 
sources were included both in the Digest of 1808, and in the 
Civil Code, but so were British treatises. The meaning here 
is implicitly clear--English and American authorities were 
becoming more important to Louisiana's legal traditions than 
civilian sources. Thus in their "Course of studies" the 
judges required prospective applicants, as a minimum 
requirement, to familiarize themselves with the following 
works: 
Story on the constitution,49 The general laws of the 
United States, Vattel's law of Nations,50 The Louisiana 
Code,51 The Code of Practice,52 The Statutes of the 
State, of a general nature, The Institutes of 
49Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States, (Boston: 1833). 
50Emmerich Vattel, The Law of Nations, or Principles of 
the Law of Nature. Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of 
Nations and Sovereigns, (London 1793). 
51civil Code of The state of Louisiana, (New Orleans: 
1825). 
52wheelock s. Upton, The Code of Practice in Civil 
Cases for the State of Louisiana, (New Orleans 1839). 
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Justinian,53 Domat's Civil laws,54 Pothier's Treatise 
on Obligations7ss Blackstone's Commentaries,56 Kent's Commentaries,5 Chitt¥58 or Bayley59 on Bills, 
Starkie60 or Phillips 1 on evidence, Russel [sic)62 on 
crimes, and the Jurisprudence of Louisiana as Settled 
53The most common translation available was Thomas 
Cooper, trans., The Institutes of Justinian, (Philadelphia, 
1812) • 
54Jean Domat, The Civil Laws in the Natural Order . . 
~' (Paris: 1689, London: 1722). 
55Robert Joseph Potier, A Treatise on Obligations 
Considered from a Moral and Legal View, (Paris: 1722, 
London: 1801, New Bern, North Carolina 1802). Most 
candidates would have purchased Judge Martin's 1802, New 
Bern, translation. But Martin's association with the 
publication was not the sole criterion for its inclusion in 
the syllabus. In fact, the entire area of obligations was 
an element of civil law which greatly influenced American 
jurists in the nineteenth century, thus copies of Pothier, 
particularly the 1801 London version, circulated widely 
throughout the American south and West, for a good example 
of this, see Sandra K. VanBurkleo unpublished Ph.d. diss. 
University of Minnesota, (1988). Therefore, the inclusion 
of these civil law authorities in the syllabus ironically 
assisted in the Americanization of the legal system by 
reinforcing civilian works that had become influential in 
American jurisdictions. 
56sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, (Oxford, 1765-1769). 
57James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 
(Philadelphia, 1826). 
58Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on Bills of 
Exchange. Checks on Banks. Promissory Notes, Bankers Cash 
Notes and Bank Notes, 1st American ed., (Philadelphia 1809} 
59sir John Bayley, summary of the Law of Bills of 
Exchange, Cash Bills and Promissory Notes, (London: 1789). 
60Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise on the Law of 
Evidence and Digest in Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 
(London: 1824). 
6lsamuel March Philipps, A Treatise of the Law of 
Evidence, (London: 1814). 
62william Oldnall Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and 
Misdemeanors, (London: 1819). 
-------
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by the decisions of the Supreme Court.63 
The import of the syllabus is obvious. The court greatly 
extended its prerogative to govern legal education by 
specifying the authorities the states' aspiring lawyers 
needed to master. Moreover, the high number of common law 
authorities included in the syllabus ensured consistent 
intrusion of Anglo-American traditions of law into the 
state's legal heritage by giving English and American 
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sources prominence over all other studies. Inclusion of the 
Louisiana Code, the state's statutes, and the jurisprudence 
of the Supreme Court simply provided for the instruction of 
prospective attorneys in legal areas peculiar to the state 
of Louisiana. Similar provisions could be found in many 
other American states. Emerich Vattel's Laws of Nations 
played a fundamental role in influencing the revolutionaries 
who created the nation, therefore, it too frequently entered 
into legal syllabi around the nation. Attention to 
Justinian, Domat, and Pothier was needed because in the area 
of property law--these civilian treatises were informing not 
only Louisiana's law, but that of most jurisdictions around 
the nation.64 In Louisiana, these works marked special 
contributions since they formed the basis of the state's 
land law as provided for in the territorial settlement, but 
63The list is cited in Rule of Court, 24 November 1840, 
Billings, Historic Rules, 10-11. 
64sandra F, Van Burkleo, "'That our Pure Republican 
Principles Might Not Whither•: Kentucky's Relief Crisis and 
the Pursuit of Moral Justice," 1818-1826," Unpublished Ph. 
D. diss. University of Minnesota, 1988. 
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their inclusion in the syllabus in no way suggests that 
Louisiana was a civil law jurisdiction.65 Indeed, the 
exclusion of many important civilian authorities 
demonstrates a conscious movement away from civil law 
principles. 
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Inclusion of so many English and American treatises is 
as significant as the decision to minimize the impact of 
Civilian authorities. Although any nineteenth-century 
American jurisdiction would require its lawyers to master 
such influential works as Story on the Constitution, 
Blackstone, and Kent; the Louisiana judges' decision to 
include Chitty, Bayley, starkie, Phillips, and Russel 
represents a deliberate effort on the part of the justices 
to institute Anglo-American legal forms regarding bank 
notes, bills of exchange, and promissory notes; rules of 
evidence; and criminal strictures as part of the court's 
operations. 66 The syllabus closely resembled the type of 
reading list that judges in other American jurisdictions 
provided for their prospective lawyers. In fact, the 
syllabus is so similar to David Hoffman's 1805 "Course of 
Studies" for Maryland attornies that it is quite possible 
65see Chapter Three above. 
66Although the court had no direct original or 
appellate jurisdiction in criminal causes, criminal cases 
could find themselves on the supreme court docket if the 
ruling of the criminal court was challenged on 
constitutional grounds. 
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that the Louisiana judges simply copied his list.67 
Finally, the judges provided for stringent quarterly 
bar examinations and a board of seven examiners. The 
examiners--Etienne Mazureau, George Eustis, George 
Strawbridge, Pierre Rost-Denis, John Grymes, and Levi 
Pierce--all were leading members of the Louisiana bar. 
Significantly, none of these examiners represented the 
state's ~ncienne population. Eustis, Strawbridge, Grymes, 
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and Pierce were all Americans; Rost-Denis and Mazureau were 
from France.68 Thus the judges ruled out the participation 
of the ancienne population--the portion of the population 
most strongly concerned with preserving the state's civilian 
heritage--from the training and testing of applicants to the 
state's bar.69 
Other rules passed during this period governed such 
diverse topics as return days, opening and closing 
arguments, rehearings, filing costs, ex parte hearings, 
assignments of error, meeting dates, trial regulations, 
record management, and country dockets.70 Most of these 
67warren M. Billings, "A 'Course of Studies•: Books 
that Shaped Louisiana Law," unpublished typescript. 
68The foreign French were frequently at odds with 
Louisiana's creole French and Spanish citizens. 
69Rule of court, 24 November 1840, Billings, Historic 
Rules, 11. 
70Rule of court, November 1813; Rule of Court, 18 
January 1814; Rule of Court, 8 March 1814; Rule of Court, 11 
April 1814; Rule of Court, 28 March 1816; Rule of Court, 17 
February 1817; Rule of Court, 9 December 1817; Rule of 
Court, December 1817; Rule of court, 11 May 1818; Rule of 
Court, 5 July 1821; Rule of Court, 16 January 1822; Rule of 
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were routine in nature; nonetheless, their cumulative effect 
reinforced the Anglo-American predisposition to the court's 
proceedings. 
Although the court's rules represent an important 
technical aspect of its judicial development, their 
contribution to the creation of a representative American 
jurisdiction pales in comparison to the role of individual 
judges and their decisions. Basically, between 1813 and 
1846, two senior judges dominated the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana.71 From 1813 to 1836, George Mathews served as 
senior judge and from 1836 to 1846, Francois x. Martin held 
the position. Both the Mathews court and the Martin court 
reflected the personalities and spirit of their senior 
judges. 
Under George Mathews, the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
enjoyed a large measure of stability in personnel. Pierre 
Derbigny left the court in 1820 and was replaced by 
Alexander Porter who served until 1834. Upon Porter's 
resignation in 1834, Henry Adams Bullard accepted a position 
on the bench. 
The Matthews' court grappled with the same 
jurisdictional problems that plagued the Superior Court for 
Court, 16 March 1836; Rule of Court, 11 April 1836; Rule of 
court, 4 January 1837; Rule of Court, 16 January 1839; Rule 
of Court, 11 March 1839; Rule of court, 23 December 1839; 
Billings, Historic Rules, 1-9. 
71The Supreme Court of Louisiana did not have an 
official "Chief Justice" until after the constitutional 
reorganization of 1845 when George Eustis was appointed to 
the bench. 
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the Territory of Orleans. Although the Superior Court had 
worked out a practical settlement to the problem of 
interpreting Louisiana's laws in force within the context of 
a mixed jurisdiction, many areas of uncertainty remained. 
After publication of the Digest of 1808, the judges rendered 
their decisions more efficiently. Nonetheless, by the end 
of the territorial period, Louisiana still hovered in a 
jurisdictional limbo--it was not definitively a common law 
or a civil law jurisdiction. Such confusion confounded 
efforts to render justice to a complicated and litigious 
citizenry. But in form, style, and the decision to embrace 
stare decisis, Louisiana's supreme court judges ensured that 
the state would move ever closer to American patterns of 
justice. 
Nonetheless, Louisiana's jurisdictional settlement was 
incomplete, and the lack of definition raised problems for 
Louisiana's supreme court in the ensuing decades. As the 
nation embraced an "Era of Good Feelings," Louisiana's 
statesmen became embroiled in a parochial squabble for 
political hegemony. Edward Livingston, an ambitious lawyer 
with ties to the corrupt New York political machine, sought 
to insinuate himself into the inner corridors of power in 
Louisiana. Although Livingston had developed one of the 
state's largest law practices and had served with 
distinction in the assembly, he had failed to assume a 
dominant position as a politician--a position he richly 
desired. Perpetually a political outsider, Livingston 
-------
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allied himself with representatives of the ancienne 
population hoping to create a strong coalition of Orleanais 
politicians that could dominate state politics. Livingston 
used the jurisdictional uncertainty of the region as his 
chief weapon against the Claiborne administration. By 
portraying himself as the guardian of the civilian 
tradition, Livingston sought to win votes from the Orleanais 
population and to whip up a controversy which would lead 
Claiborne and all of his allies and appointees to their 
downfall.72 
Before the War of 1812, Livingston had achieved mild 
success in realizing his goals. He was instrumental in 
getting the jurisconsults appointed to redact the Digest and 
he succeeded in winning the spectacular batture case against 
the federal government--a case which firmly entrenched 
civilian traditions as the basis for the territory's 
property law.73 But these were qualified successes. The 
Digest failed to redact Louisiana's law into a comprehensive 
civil code, and the batture controversy, while a great 
personal victory for Livingston, merely reinforc~d already 
accepted theories on the matter of property rights in 
Louisiana and failed to have a lasting influence on the 
72George Darga, Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and the 
plash of Legal Traditions, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1975), passim. 
73Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana, passim. 
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territory's judicial settlement.74 Accordingly, by the time 
the Digest had been accepted, most of the ancienne 
population were satisfied that their ancient property rights 
would be respected.75 Any further animousity between 
Americans and the ancienne population dissipated during the 
war. 
The breakdown of local hostility in Louisiana during 
the war of 1812 stemmed from two sources. Threat of enemy 
invasion and the spectacular defeat of Pakenham's invading 
army (a direct result of Orleanais and American cooperation) 
presented the inhabitants of Louisiana with a wealth of 
common interest and an opportunity for collaboration. 
More important, in terms of the legal community, was 
the public demonstration that Louisiana's American judges, 
if pressed, would fight to protect the constitutional 
interests of both their American and Orleanais constituents 
against the arbitrary oppression of the United States Army. 
In 1815, when Andrew Jackson arrived to defend New Orleans 
from the threat of British invasion, he antagonized the 
native population by arresting certain residents for fear 
that they might betray the city to the enemy. Jackson's 
move outraged the citizens of New Orleans. Old Hickory's 
policies demonstrated a genuine distrust of Louisianians and 
74rn its original organization of the territories, 
congress guaranteed the anciene population the rights to 
their properties and successions, see Chapter Three above. 
75rbid., see above Chapter Three for a discussion of 
the work of the jurisconsults and its relation to 
Louisiana's judicial system. 
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a profound disregard of their constitutional guarantees 
against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. The Tennessean's 
actions might have done irreparable damage to delicate 
ethnic relationships within the state had it not been for 
the direct intervention of Dominick A. Hall, then presiding 
judge of the Federal District court.76 Hall had lived 
among the Louisianians since his emigration to New Orleans 
in the territorial period. Unlike Jackson, Hall knew that 
the Orleanais could be reli~d upon during a foreign attack--
after all, it was England, not France or Spain, that 
threatened the port. Shortly after Jackson ordered the 
arrests, Hall issued writs of habeas corpus for the release 
of the prisoners.77 
Dominick Hall's allegiance to the Orleanais brought 
the full weight of Jackson's wrath down upon the judge. 
Jackson quickly refused to release the prisoners and 
arrested Judge Hall.78 Although Hall had failed to secure 
the release of the prisoners and the protection of their 
constitutional rights, his actions did much to conciliate 
relations between the Americans and their Orleanais 
neighbors. Generals could easily trample upon 
constitutional and human rights; in fact, such actions had 
foundations in ancient military traditions. Hall's attempt 
76Robert v. Remini, Andrew Jackson, (New York: Harper 
and Row, Perennial Library, 1969), 76. 
77rbid, 76. 
7Srbid., 76. 
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to protect his charges and his willingness to face Jackson's 
persecution for doing so went a long way in winning the 
ancienne population over to the belief that the judicial 
process of the United States of America could and would 
protect their interests in normal situations. Judge Hall's 
courageous actions and the triumphant victory over the 
British at Chalmette Battlefield did much to soothe the 
fears of native Louisianians that the American residents of 
the state conspired to dispossess them of their land, 
tradition, and creole way of life. 
In the aftermath of the war, then, Livingston's 
primary base of power had been lost. To resurrect his 
political ambitions, Livingston focused on the few remaining 
residents who were disatisfied with the legal system once 
again as a font of support. During the 1820s, Louisiana, as 
most jurisdictions around the nation, was swept up in a 
billowy tide of litigiousness. As in Virginia, lawyers, 
jurists, and lawmakers puzzled over means to make the 
judicial process more efficient. By the 1820s, too, the 
codification movement gained momentum around the nation. 
Logically, Louisiana, as a bastion of civilian authority, 
became caught up in the movement to codify state laws.79 
The movement to redact a code in the early 1800s, 
79cook, Codification; for a discussion of how Virginia 
responded to the codification movement see above Chapter 
Four; Richard Holcombe Kilbourne, Jr., A History of the 
Louisiana Civil Code: The Formative Years, 1803-1839, (Baton 
Rouge: Center of Civil Law studies, the Publications 
Institute, Paul M. Hebert Law center, Louisiana state 
University, 1987), passim. 
-------- -------- --- ------
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however, had steeled most of Louisiana's judges against 
strict codification. If the experience of the superior 
Court of the Territory of Orleans taught the judges 
anything, it instructed them that in such a complicated 
jurisdiction, judicial discretion was crucial to their 
ability to render justice. An inflexible code, while 
embodying logic and efficiency, simply could not provide for 
the plethora of thorny questions that often arose before the 
bench. Thus even after the Digest had been presented to 
them, neither Louisiana' judges nor the territory's 
legislators invested it with the full authority of a formal 
code. By embracing the common law notion of stare decisis 
as the basis for their decisions, Louisiana's judges 
referred to the Digest, the 1806 ~xposition of the Criminal 
Laws, various acts of the legislature, and traditional 
common law and civil law authorities in the same manner in 
which judges in other jurisdictions adhered to their own 
local and traditional resources in rendering their 
decisions. SO 
Livingston's primary tactic was to renew a drive for a 
Louisiana civil code. In his quest, Livingston found many 
willing allies. The judges' lack of allegiance. to the 
Digest was profound. For the most part, Louisiana's jurists 
referred to the Digest in the same fashion they would any 
other law book. One of the reasons for this lack cf 
acceptance was that the redactors of the Digest failed to 
BOsee Chapter Three above and Ap)Jendix I. 
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collect all of Louisiana's laws in force. The Digest was 
incomplete. The incomprehensive nature of the Digest raised 
problems as Louisiana's judges could not rely on it as an 
authoritative collection of the state's private laws. As 
most cases before any non-criminal tribunal deal with 
property disputes, the deficiencies of the Digest created 
significant problems for Louisiana's judges. Magistrates 
all too frequently cast aside the inefficient Digest in 
favor of more complete Spanish authorities. In a whole 
series of cases, the judges disregarded the Digest in favor 
of Spanish sources.81 
Livingston pointed to the prevalent disregard of the 
1808 Digest as a dangerous practice; he whipped up distrust 
among the ancienne population over the regulations requiring 
court proceedings to be conducted in English; and he 
8lon the role of the judiciary in this matter, see 
Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code, passim.; 
Deshan v. Jennings, 5 Mart. (0. S.) 642 (1818); Grey v. 
Laverty, 4 Mart. (0. s.) 464-468 (1816); Blangue v. 
Peytavin, 4 Mart. (0. S.) 458 (1816); Bourcier v. Lanusse, 3 
Mart. (0. S.) 461-463 (1815); Lebreton v. Nouchet, 3 Mart. 
(0. S.) 159-163 (1813). For additional consideration of the 
problem see Blake v. Morgan 3 Mart. (0. S.) 375-379 (1814); 
Harrad v. Lewis, 3 Mart. (0. S.) 311 (1814); Lanusse v. 
Massicot, 3 Mart. (0. S.) 261 (1814); Roussel v. DuKeylus, 4 
Mart. (0. S.) 218 (1816); Enet v. His Creditors, 4 Mart. (0. 
S.) 401-403 (1816-1817); Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart. (0. S.) 
93 (1817); Whitsonv. Stodder, 8 Mart. (0. S.)?? (1820); 
smith v. Kemper, 4 Mart. (0. S.) 409-419 (1816); Roper's 
Heirs v. Yokum, 3 Mart. (0. S.) 424-441 (1814); Williamson 
et al. v. Their creditors, 6 Mart. (0. S.) 431-441 (1819); 
Zanico v. Habine, 5 Mart (0. S.) 372-375 (1818); Knight v. 
Smith , 3 Mart. (0. S.) 156 (1813); Gardner v. Harbour, 5 
Mart. (0. S.) 408 (1818); LeCesne v. Cottin, 2 Mart. (N. S.) 
475 (1824); Syndics of Bermudez v. Ibanez & Milne, 3 Mart. 
(0. S.) 17 (1813); Morgan's Admins. v. Voorhies, 3 Mart. (0. 
s.) 462 (1814). 
~------ -------
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enlisted the aid of other members of the legal community 
such as his law partner John Grymes and legislator 
Christobal De Armas to stir up criticism against the supreme 
court and its current U"'t?. of both Louisiana and foreign 
authorities. In the early 1820s, Livingston managed to 
convince the Louisiana legislature that the problems could 
only be resolved by the creation of a new civil code. In 
this regard, Livingston's actions mirrored those of 
lawmakers in other American states who were trying to limit 
the discretion of judges and to bring a higher measure of 
order to the law.82 
In 1822, the Louisiana legislature responded to 
Livingston's critism and adopted a resolution to revise the 
Digest and created a panel of three jurisconsults.83 By 
February 1823, the jurisconsults, Edward Livingston, Louis 
Moreau-Lislet, and Peirre Derbigny, reported to the 
legislature that a revision, indeed, was in order and 
proposed a series of amendments to the 1808 Digest and 
related repealing legislation to remedy the evils they found 
in the existing system. Substantively, the redactors relied 
heavily on Spanish precepts for the bulk of Louisiana's 
private laws. The redactors• recommendations easily swayed 
the legislature and their proposed amendments were adapted 
hastily and with little debate. It is important to note 
82cook, American Codification Movement, passim; 
Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code, 96-99. 
83Louisiana Acts, 20, 1822., cf. Kilbourne, A History 
of the Louisiana Civil Code, 108. 
-------
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that American members of the Louisiana assembly supported 
the revisal as a routine process similar to the type of 
practices that had been taking place in other American 
states. Alexander Porter pointed out that the revision 
closely resembled the strictures passed by the Kentucky 
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legislature. For the most part, the assembly accepted the 
work of the redactors. The only legislative addition to the 
redactors' recommendations was an amendment repealing the 
Spanish, Roman, and French laws that had been in force when 
France transferred Louisiana to the United States. The 
legislature also repealed the acts of the Legislative 
Council, the Orleans territorial legislature, and the 
Louisiana state assembly that were expressly revised in the 
report. Finally, the legislature provided for the 
publication of the emendations as the Louisiana Code of 
1825.84 
For Livingston and his supporters the revision seemed 
a great success. With a comprehensive code in place the 
Louisiana Assembly sent a strong message to the judiciary--
the practice of consulting outside authorities was at an 
end. In essence, it appeared as if Livingston had succeeded 
in pulling off a major feat--the redefinition of judicial 
practice from an Anglo-American common law style of decision 
84Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code, 
124-125-130; for a detailed analysis of Kentucky's 
codification movement, see VanBurkleo, "'That Our Pure 
Republican Principles might not Whither'," the repealing act 
became Article 3521 of the Louisiana Code. 
--------- -------
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making to a less creative civil law type of judicature.85 
But neither Livingston nor his contemporaries nor modern day 
critics and historians understood the power, determination, 
independence, and resiliency of the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana to establish and to maintain Anglo-American 
patterns of justice. 
Almost immediately, the supreme court began to reduce 
the Louisiana Code to the less authoritative stance of a 
digest of the laws. In a series of cases the court 
redefined the role of the code and attacked article 3521 
(the repealing amendment) by pointing out defects in the 
code and employing remedies that had been worked out prior 
to 1825--remedies that often relied on foreign sources.86 
In response, the legislature sought to maintain the 
supremacy of the code with a new repealing statute in 1828. 
Again the statute repealed all foreign laws in force at the 
time of cession and the acts of the Legislative Council, the 
territorial legislature, and the state assembly.87 
Although the 1825 code and its repealing legislation 
85Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code, 
129-130. 
86Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code, 
136-139; Erwin v. Fenwick, 6 Mart. N. s., 229-232 (1827); 
Pignatel v. Drouet, 6 Mart. N. s., 432, (1828); Cole's Widow 
v. His Executors, 7 Mart., N. s., 41, (1828). 
87Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code, 
131-144. Kilbourne points out that some legislators felt 
that the 1828 statute was defective, but attempts to draft 
additional legislation failed. Unfortunately, the 
legislative journals and other historical sources for this 
period are too sketchy to provide a thorough analysis of the 
reasons behind these failures. 
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attempted to clarify what the legislature understood to be 
the laws comprising the jurisdiction, the Matthews court 
continued to peck at the legislature's accomplishments. In 
a series of cases the court questioned both the validity of 
the repealing statute and the authority of the code. On the 
whole, the court managed to inflict minor damage on the code 
and the repealing statute, but for the most part, the 
legislation remained intact. But the battle continued.88 
By the time George Mathews died in 1836, battles over 
the the manner in which the judges referred to the code and 
civilian authorities remained unresolved. Francois Martin, 
a much more dominant personality than Mathews, assumed the 
mantle of senior justice. The Martin court continued the 
battles and confronted other difficulties which made 
Martin's time as senior judge one of the most intriguing and 
important phases of the court's development. 
When Martin took over the court in 1836, America had 
already begun to feel the strain of President Jackson's 
attack on the Second Bank of the United States. By 1837, as 
Jackson systematically withdrew federal support from the 
bank, the nation's financial situation was in peril. 
creditors called in notes, mortgages lapsed, wildcat banks 
88saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. N. s., 569, (1828); 
Heirs of Cole v. Cole's Executors, 7 Mart., N. s., 414, 
(1829); State v. Wright's Administrators, 8 Mart. N. s., 
316, (1829); Williams v. Barrow, 3 La. Ann. 57, (1831); 
Borie v. Borie, 5 La. Ann. 90, (1833); Duplessis v. Kennedy, 
6 La. Ann., 231 (1834); Joyce v. Poydras De La Lande, 6 La. 
Ann., 277, (1834); Psyche v. Paradol, 6 La. Ann. 366, 
(1834). 
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and fledgling businesses closed, and thousands of Americans 
faced financial ruin.89 The economic chaos of the Panic of 
1837 had an important side-effect--a wave of lawsuits. 
Increased litigation paralyzed most state courts and 
Louisiana's were no exception.90 
Just as the Louisiana supreme court began operation 
under Martin, the increased demands of a panic-sticken 
populace created a docket crisis for the high court. In the 
midst of the docket crisis, illness and personnel 
instability combined to complicate the court's proceedings. 
Although hobbled by these hardships, the Martin court boldly 
kept up the fight to ensure the continuation of Anglo-
American practices and procedures. 
After Mathews' death, Henry carleton was appointed to 
join Martin and Henry Adams Bullard on the supreme bench. A 
native of the Old Dominion and a former attorney general, 
Carleton seemed particulary well-suited to sit on the 
Louisiana court. Shortly after his appointment to the 
tribunal in 1837, however, Carleton fell ill. His poor 
health frequently kept him away from the court, and he was 
forced to resign in 1839.91 Although Henry Adams Bullard 
possessed excellent credentials and had served the court 
with distinction, he spent most of his time in the late 
89Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, 1828-1848, 
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, The New American Nation 
Series, 1959), 70-132. 
90Fernandez, "From Chaos to Continuity," 19-36. 
91Ibid. 
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1830s pursuing a position in ·the United States Senate. Thus 
the inattention of Carleton and Bullard combined with 
increased demands on the court's time to create a docket 
crisis.92 
Even more stifling to the court's ability to render 
justice, however, were the personal styles of the jurists in 
question. Martin, Bullard, and Carleton each possessed 
stong wills and well-defined legal opinions and like most 
lawyers and judges of their day, were given to pompous 
displays of their own legal abilities, a trend initiated 
during Mathews• tenure as presiding judge. Each of the 
judges engaged in a common practice of the time--using their 
decision-making prerogative and their bench as a forum for 
showing off their own intimate knowledge of the law and for 
publicly chastizing attorneys who did not share their 
propensity. As in John Tyler's Virginia, local critics 
denounced these practices. In Louisiana such criticism 
surfaced in the Louisiana Law Journal when its editor, 
Gustavus Schmidt, condemned the practice and labelled the 
supreme court a "talking court." If such public 
condemnations were not enough, Bullard and carleton's 
frequent absences forced Judge Martin, now quite blind, to 
conduct the court's business by himself. Consequently, 
relatively few cases from the burgeoning dockets were 
92Ibid. 
-------
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settled during the closing years of the 1830s.93 
Judge Martin's irrascible nature compounded these 
problems. When Bullard finally won his long desired 
senatorial seat and Carleton's failing health caught up with 
him, they resigned from the bench. In order to fill their 
positions, the governor appointed two talented local 
attorneys, George Eustis and Pierre Rost-Denis, to the 
bench. Eustis and Rost-Denis came to the bench wide-eyed, 
naive, and eager to clear the docket. Of a younger 
generation and more reform minded than Martin, they explored 
new juridical techniques and a more efficient docketing 
system in hopes of clearing the court's crowded agenda. But 
Martin did everything in his power as presiding judge to 
resist their changes. Exasperated, the two young judges 
gave up and resigned after serving only four short months; 
although both were again appointed to the court after the 
constitutional reorganization of 1846 (also after Martin's 
death). They then served admirably and instituted an 
efficient system of judicial reform which cleared the docket 
in only a few months.94 
After Martin shooed Eustis and Rost-Denis away in the 
1830s, George Strawbridge and Alonzo Morphy received 
appointments to the bench. Strawbridge quickly wearied of 
93Ibid.; Gustavus Schmidt, "On the Administration of 
Justice in Louisiana," The Louisiana Law Journal, I (1842), 
151; above Chapter Four. 
94For a detailed analysis of the contributions of both 
Eustis and Rost-Denis see Fernandez, "From Chaos to 
Continuity: 11 ),nni c::i:::~na History, 19-36. 
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his post and, like Rost-Denis and Eustis, resigned after 
only four months on the high court. Morphy, however, 
adjusted to Martin's demanding style of leadership and sat 
on the court for over five years.95 
In a last ditch effort to stablize the bench, the 
governor appointed Rice Garland and Edward Simon in 184C. 
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By adding an extra judge, the governor acquiesced in 
Martin's style of leadership, hoping that increased manpower 
could serve the same purpose as docket clearing reforms. 
Finally, the court's personnel stabilized, but Martin's 
inefficent style of leadership, and his failing eyesight 
limited the effectiveness of the court under his direction. 
Although the number of cases decided by the court rose 
slightly in the last five years of Martin's tenure, the 
level of litigation also rose and the docket crisis 
intensified. The court stumbled through its tasks at a 
snail's pace until the constitutional reorganization of 1846 
which reinstated Eustis and Rost-Denis who streamlined the 
court's operation with a new series of rules, set new 
criteria for prospective members of the bar, and devised new 
administrative techniques related to docketing, scheduling, 
and trial procedure. 
Despite these problems, the Martin court continued to 
grapple with important issues related to the definition of 
judicial power in Louisiana, especially in regard to the 
95Fernandez, "From Chaos to Continuity," Louisiana 
History, 19-36. 
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role of the 1825 Louisiana Code and the 1828 repealing 
statutes.96 In defining the role of the judiciary in 
Louisiana's jurisprudence, no matter that came before the 
Martin court is of more importance than the 1839 case of 
Reynolds v. Swain et al. 
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In 1836, Reynolds rented a tenement on the corner of 
Poydras and Magazine streets to w. w. and T. swain for the 
purposes of starting an apothecary shop. The terms of the 
arrangement were negotiated verbally between Reynolds's 
agent and W. w. swain who agreed to lease the building for 
$1500.00 per year payable in twelve monthly installments of 
$125.00 beginning 1 Nov~mber 1836. About two weeks after 
Swain & Co. occupied the property, Reynold's agent presented 
the swains with a written lease. When swain and his partner 
refused to sign the lease, the agent informed them that he 
intended to hold Swain & Co. to the terms of the verbal 
agreement. At the end of December Swain & Co. vacated the 
premises without giving either Reynolds or his agent an 
explanation and refused to pay the remaining ten months 
rent. The agent protested and would not receive the keys to 
the property from swain. Following their discussion, the 
agent wrote a note to swain & Co. indicating that he still 
intended to hold the apothecaries to the terms of the 
lease. 97 
on 26 April 1837, seven months before the terms of the 
96see Gasguet v. Dimitry, 9 La. Ann., 592, (1836). 
97Reynolds v. Swain et al., 13 La. Ann. 193. 
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lease would have expired, Reynolds sued swain & Co. in the 
First Judicial District of Louisiana for the rental payments 
that the firm had failed to pay for the period between 
January and April as well as the remaining rent due between 
1 May and 1 October 1837. Reynolds' agent testified in the 
case and his testimony was corroborated by a witness and the 
unsigned lease. The district court judge ruled in favor of 
Reynolds and rendered judgment for $875, the amount due on 1 
June 1837 with an additional obligation of $125.00 per month 
until the lease expired the following October. 
The district judge's opinion rested upon a previous 
decision in the supreme Court of Louisiana, Christy v. 
Casanave (1824) which invoked a Roman convention that 
required tenents who abandoned a property to pay the rent 
for the entire term, even if the term of the lease had not 
yet expired.98 Although such Roman laws had no force in 
Louisiana, the supreme court held in Christy v. casanave 
that such devices could be adapted to resolve analogous 
cases. The Swains nontheless appealed the decision in their 
case to the state supreme court.99 
In appealing the decision, the Swains engaged one of 
Louisiana's most promising young attorneys and resident 
98Thus even though the rent for the rema1n1ng months 
was not yet due, the tenants would be forced to pay the rent 
for the entire term. See Christy v. Casanave 2 Mart. N. s., 
451. 
99Reynolds v. Swain et al. 
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expert in partnership law, Thomas Slidell.lOO Slidell 
argued two points: that neither a partnership nor its assets 
could be held liable for a debt or contract incurred 
separately on the responsibility of one of the partners; and 
that the suit was brought prematurely since part of the rent 
was not due at the time of the action. on the second point 
Slidell sought a reversal of the district court judgment for 
the $375 due between August and September 1837. Slidell's 
second argument brought up a crucial issue--that Christy v. 
CasanavG had been decided in 1824, before either the 
adoption of the 1825 Louisiana Code or the 1828 act that 
repealled all civil laws not contained in the code. Since 
the Roman remedy utilized in Christy v. Casanave was not 
included in the 1825 code, Slidell contended that the 
repealing act of 1828 precluded its use in Reynolds v. 
Swain. 
Slidell's argument raised a tricky point. Since its 
inception in 1825 the Louisiana Code had not functioned as a 
binding code in traditional civil law fashion. Rather, the 
judges of the supreme court had used the Louisiana Code in 
the same manner as they had utilized the Digest of 1808, as 
a basic reference that could be supported or challenged by 
other classic authorities and judicial decisions. By 
viewing the code in this manner, Louisiana's judges had 
strengthened their judicial independence by functioning 
lOOslidell would later become a justice of the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana and pen all majority opinions involving 
the laws of partnership. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
261 
according to the practices and procedures of American courts 
rather than as a civil law tribunal. In this vein, 
Louisiana's justices decided cases according to the common 
law doctrine of stare decisis. Moreover, their 
interpretation of the code as a basic authority differed 
drastically from the manner in which civil law judges refer 
to their codes--the process that Livingston and the 
legislature had attempted to inflict on the court in 
1825.101 Thus the method of referring to code citations 
that Louisiana's judges used closely paralleled the way 
Virginia's justices employed foreign citations along with 
the 1792 code, statutes of the General Assembly, and 
judicial decisions.l02 
Slidell's insistence that the Louisiana Code and the 
1828 repea!ling act prohibited the judges from consulting 
the Roman law challenged those judicial practices directly. 
Essentially, Slidell reasoned that the passage of the 1825 
code and the repealing act meant that Louisiana's judges 
must adhere to the provisions of the Louisiana Code 
exclusively, and that all other authorities had no force in 
the state. In other words, Slidell challenged the very role 
of the judge in the state's judicial system--a process that 
had not been addressed in any of the previous cases 
regarding the 1825 code and its repealing statute. If the 
lOlsee Appendix I. 
102see Chapter Four, especially the analyses of 
Thornton v. Smith, Browne et al. v. Turberville et al., 
Baring v. Reeder, and Coleman v. Moody. 
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court accepted Slidell's interpretation, it would cease to 
function as a creative American court; judges would loose 
much of their intellectual indep~ndence as finite codes 
would replace judicial decisions and foreign authorities as 
the sources of their opinions.l03 
Thus the very foundations of Louisiana's judicial 
system were at stake in Reynolds v. Swain et al .• The 
supreme court itself had to decide whether or not to 
continue to render justice according to Anglo-American 
patterns of justice or to revert to the type of civil law 
court that characterized Louisiana's colonial era. If the 
court cast aside Slidell's argument, the decision would 
represent a firm commitment to American judicial traditions; 
if not, the judiciary would reject American juridical 
patterns in favor of civilian practices. 
In terms of defining the role of the judiciary in the 
state, Reynolds v. swain et al. represented the single-most 
important issue that ever came before the Martin court. And 
since the case appeared on the docket during one of Bullard 
and Carleton's frequent absences, the decision in the case 
was Martin's alone. Martin met the challenge boldly. 
l03It is ironic that Slidell took this approach as he 
himself was an avid common lawyer and a staunch promoter of 
the reception of common law in Louisiana. In later years as 
a jurist, Slidell would set the standards for Louisiana's 
jurisprudence in the area of partnership law--the aspect of 
Louisiana's private law that completely eschews civil law in 
favor of common law remedies, see F. Hodge O'Neal, "An 
Appraisal of the Louisiana Law of Partnership," Louisiana 
Law Review, IX (1949), 326-327; cf. Fernandez, "From Chaos 
to Continuity," Louisiana History, 30. 
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Indeed, Reynolds v. Swain et al. represents Martin's most 
influential contribution to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. 
Martin understood \'That was at stake in Reynolds v. 
swain et al. and he crafted his opinion carefully and 
succinctly. He easily dismissed Slidell's first argument, 
that the agreement of one partner could not bind the other, 
by pointing out that the partnership had inhabited the 
building for two months. Citing section 2845 of the 
Louisiana Code Martin opined that even if the contracts were 
negotiated without the authority of the other partners, they 
could be considered binding if the partnership had 
benefitted from the arrangement. As far as Martin was 
concerned, the fact that the firm occupjed the premises for 
two months provided sufficient proof that Swain's partners 
had accepted and profitted from the agreement.104 
Slidell's second point, that the case was brought 
prematurely and that neither Christy v. Casanave nor the 
Roman law that it relied on could no longer apply after 
1828, occupied the major portion of Martin's decision. In 
addressing this issue, Martin proceeded cautiously. He 
pointed out that the Louisiana Code and its accompanying 
repealing legislation indeed nullified the "Spanish, Roman, 
and French laws, which were in force in this state when 
Louisiana was ceded to the United states." Martin also 
cited section 3521 of the Louisiana Code which noted that 
the acts of the Legislative Council, the former territorial 
104Reynolds v. Swain et al. 
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legislature, and the present state assembly had also been 
repealed "in every case, which are specifically provided for 
by that code." But Martin went on to conclude that "the 
repeal spoken of in the code and the act of 1828, cannot 
extend beyond the laws which the legislature itself had 
enacted [i. e., the laws in the 1825 Louisiana Code]; for it 
is they alone which it may repeal." Thus Martin concluded 
that the 1825 code and the repealing legislation only 
invalidated those older laws which it specifically 
addressed. 
Furthermore, in regard to the influence of foreign 
laws on Louisiana's jurisprudence, Martin followed the 
interpretation of the great English commentator Sir William 
Blackstone in pointing out that "the civil or municipal law, 
that is, the rule by which particular districts, 
communities, or nations are governed" could only be confined 
to positive or written lawl05 and that it could not be 
extended to 
those unwritten laws which do not derive their 
authority from the positive institution of any people, 
as the revealed law, the natural law, the law of 
nations, the laws of peace and war, and those laws 
which are founded in those relations of justice that 
existed in the nature of things, antecedent to any 
positive precept. 
we, therefore, conclude, that the Spanish, Roman, and 
French civil laws, which the legislature repealed, are 
the positive, written or statute laws of those nations, 
and of this state; and only such as were introductory 
of a new rule, and not those which were merely 
declaratory--that the legislature did not intend to 
1051 Blackstone, 44. 
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abrogate those principles of law which had been 
established or settled by the decisions of courts of justice.106 
Thus Martin argued that the repealing act voided only the 
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positive, written laws that were in force in Louisiana prior 
to 1828. Judicial decisions, however, could not be repealed 
by the 1828 act. The judge agreed that the decision in 
Christy v. Casanave was not grounded in Spanish or Louisiana 
statutes. Martin conceded that he knew of no Roman or 
French statute that could have been considered in force in 
Louisiana at the time ·of cession to which the repealing 
measure of either the code or the 1828 act could extend. 
Despite these facts, Martin went on to argue that 
.•. it is the daily practice in our courts to resort 
to the laws of Rome and France, and the commentaries on 
those laws, for the elucidation of principles 
applicable to analagous cases. Although the Roman law, 
on which the case of Christy v. Cazanave was 
determined, had no intrinsic authority here~ the reason 
that dictated that law has great cogency.lOt 
such cogency, according to Martin, in tandem with the daily 
practice in Louisiana to resort to foreign authorities, 
simply meant that the remedy provided by the district court 
judge was sound. Accordingly, Martin upheld the decision of 
the district court. 
Slidell's second argument failed and swain & Co. lost 
their appeal. But Slidell's contentions forced the supreme 
Court of Louisiana to define its procedures in regard to 
l06Reynolds v. swain et al. 
l07rbid. 
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foreign laws and the role of jurisprudence in Louisiana's 
judicial system. Speaking for the court, Francois Martin 
rejected the civilian approach to judicial proceedings in 
favor of the Anglo-American style of judicature. Law cedes 
and legislative statutes made up an important part of 
Louisiana's legal heritage, but according to Martin the 
rights of independent judges to consult precedent and 
foreign authorities played an equally important role in the 
deliberations of Louisiana's judges. Thus Martin affirmed 
the practices that had informed Louisiana's courts since the 
territorial period and put to rest the notion that 
Louisiana's high courts should function as civilian 
tribunals--as slaves to an inflexible series of codes.lOS 
Martin's decision meant that Louisiana's supreme court 
could continue functioning in the manner it always had. In 
that regard, the judges of the Supreme court of Louisiana 
worked in exactly the same fashion as their brethren on 
Virginia's Supreme Court of Appeals. Louisiana's supreme 
court could employ judicial decisions and consult foreign 
authorities just as any other American tribunal.l09 
Reynolds v. Swain et al. ensured that the Anglo-
American judicial style that Louisiana adopted in the 
territorial period would continue to define the role of the 
judiciary for the rest of the century. Civil law remaint:!d 
108Reynolds v. Swain et al. 
109see Chapter Four for an analysis of how Virginia's 
supreme court justices provided for the same procedures in 
the Old Dominion. 
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important to Louisiana's jurisprudence, indeed, civilian 
doctrines were becoming important to many American 
jurisdictions in the nineteenth century. The judicial style 
that Reynolds v. Swain et al. reaffirmed for Louisiana 
ensured that the state's judges could continue to consult 
and employ remedies other than the state's codes. In that 
regard foreign precepts as well as common law precepts 
continued to invade Louisiana's legal discourse regularly 
after 1839.110 
As important as Martin's decision in Reynolds v. swain 
et al .. was, however, the implications of the case evaded the 
understanding of most Louisianians in the mid-nineteenth 
century. If the supreme court received any notice at all, 
it came in the form of criticism about the long delays that 
resulted from the docket crisis and in the cries for reform 
that punctuated the drive for a new state constitutional 
convention in the 1840s. Critics, both in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, have focused on the impotency of 
the Martin court as an expression of the difficulty related 
to the interpretation of civilian traditions in the state's 
legal system by a poorly-trained judiciary and bar. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. Under both Mathews and 
Martin, Louisiana attracted a competent pool of jurists 
110on the matter of common law precepts invading 
Lousiana•s jurisprudence, the evidence is profound. The 
nu~ber of cases that were decided on the basis of English 
and American common law authorities is so prominent that it 
is impossible to display them here. Moreover, by mid-
century entire areas of the law such as criminal law and 
partnership law had become thoroughly Americanized. 
----·- --- ····--
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
268 
trained in both the Anglo-American and civilian traditions. 
Far from being well-intentioned boobs who mingled traditions 
arbitrarily in order to do the "best they could for their 
day," Louisiana's judges and lawyers moved easily within 
both systems and adopted such measures from each which 
insured the traditions most important to the state's 
residents and most applicable to the American tradition of 
justice. Indeed the features of privc.t:e law which were 
preserved in Louisiana became the model for similar code-
sponsored legislation thoughout the American south and West. 
In all other matters and in terms of judicial 
behavior, Louisiana's legal system exhibited the same 
traditions and trends related to other American 
jurisdictions. The role of the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
in dictating this style and policing its continuation by 
establishing precise rules of procedure, interpreting both 
the Digest and the 1825 code (especially in Reynolds v. 
swain et al.) as foundations for stare decisis, and by 
setting the standard's for the state's bar, played a 
fundamental role in this development. 
The streamlined reforms which bolstered the court 
after Martin's death did nothing to alter the basic 
jurisdictional orientation of the state's judicial system 
which was established in the territorial period and matured 
under the direction of Mathews and Martin.111 They merely 
111For an analysis of those reforms see Fernandez, 
"From Chaos to Continuity," Louisiana History, 19-36. 
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strengthened the efficiency of the jurisdiction by 
introducing more modern aspects of judicial administration 
and by freeing the state's judges to pursue the creative, 
Anglo-American style of rendering justice. 
269 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter six 
Conclusion: 
Interpreting the Dance 
If historical investigation is at all capable of 
interpreting the dance between law and society, discussion 
of the rise of high appellate courts in Virginia and 
Louisiana can only provide a summary of the opening 
movements of a complicated ballet. such an introduction, 
however, sets the mood for the performance and forecasts its 
outcome. Thus the judicial history of both states 
represents a major aspect of the legal and political culture 
of the American South. 
Although traditional interpretations suggest that the 
two jurisdictions are vastly different, in-depth 
investigation demonstrates that both Virginia and Louisiana 
shared remarkably similar experiences in their quests to 
create their supreme courts. Study of those experiences 
reveals a great deal not only about the individual issues 
that informed the judicial history of both states, but also 
about the origin and development of the American court 
system in general. An analysis of the historical and 
procedural development of the two courts reveals striking 
similarities. Both tribunals relied heavily on colonial 
antecedents to define their jurisdiction. Both tribunals 
eschewed aspects of their colonial antecedents when better 
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remedies presented themselves. Both tribunals embraced the 
American doctrine of judicial independence to take an active 
role in fleshing out their position in their respective 
state governments. And both tribunals participated in, and 
perhaps led, a legal revolution that transformed the 
judiciary of the early American nation from dependent 
colonial bodies into independent Areerican tribunals. 
From 1776 to 1792, Virginia's law revisors borrowed 
heavily from traditional English practices and newfound 
American liberties to create an ambivalent republic. The 
supreme court that owed its origins to the law revisal often 
dealt with the paradoxes that informed the state's 
revolutionary settlement, particularly those that arose from 
the reception of the pre-1607 English common law and 
exclusion of post-1607 statutes and decisions. At first, 
the Old Dominion's supreme bench took great pains to adhere 
to the guidelines set down by the revolutionary conventions, 
but by the end of the eighteenth century, legal innovations, 
a more activist judiciary, and common sense led the court to 
abandon its traditionalism in favor of more practical and 
more efficient patterns of justice. 
Louisiana's supreme court went through a similar 
transformation. Despite unprecedented jurisdictional 
confusion at the time of the territory's cession to the 
United states, Louisiana's appellate judges in the Superior 
Court for the Territory of Orleans and later on the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana fused the legal traditions of both the 
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ancienne population and the state's new American residents 
into a representative model of American justice. 
272 
For the judges of both courts, the ability to define 
their jurisdictions depended on the emerging American 
conception of judicial independence. During the 
Revolutionary period, such independence simply signified the 
concern of the patriots to divorce judicial power from 
executive prerogative. But when individual states created 
independent courts, the judges of those tribunals began to 
act independently as well, something that even the most 
committed republican at the time of the Revolution could not 
have foreseen. Virginia's judges first tested their 
independence in Caton v. Commonwealth when they articulated 
their powers of judicial review. But Caton v. Commonwealth 
marked only a tentative first step toward true judicial 
independence. Gradually, the Old Dominion's justices grew 
bolder. In the Remonstrance of the Judges (1788) the court 
dictated the conditions for the legislative reform of the 
court system. And the procedural rules and jurisprudence of 
the Pendleton Court and during the Roane era illustrated an 
increasingly independent and activist style of judicature. 
Evolution of an independent judiciary in Louisiana 
followed a more intennittent, but equally effective, course 
than in the Old Dominion. Although the courts created 
during the territorial period had to ensure the protection 
of American constitutional guarantees, congress did not 
expressly endorse the notion of an independent judiciary. 
------
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Two basic choices, then, presented themselves to governor 
Claiborne and his officers: they could establish a court 
system based on the more restrictive civil law tribunals 
that had served Louisiana in the colonial period, or they 
could erect courts that adhered to the more creative Angle-
American model. Jefferson and Claiborne's own prefcreiice 
for the American brand of justice and the domination of 
Louisiana's bench and bar by Americans ensured that the 
territory's courts (and the state courts that they 
influenced) would follow the latter of the two options. 
Nonetheless, on two significant occasions during their early 
history, Louisiana's tribunals faced challenges from 
citizens who demanded the implementation of restrictive 
codes, a measure that would force the courts revert to a 
civil law oriented pattern of judicature. Ironically, both 
threats we~e masterminded by an American--Edward Livingston-
-to forward his own political ambitions. In both instances 
the thoroughly Americanized and independent Louisiana 
judiciary utilized its control over the court's practices, 
procedures, legal education, and jurisprudence to quash the 
power and influence of the codes. Although Livingston's 
maneuverings have historically been interpreted as a "clash 
of legal traditions," the relative ease in which the 
American elements that controlled the bench and bar cast 
aside the codes (something they could not have done without 
significant social turmoil had the ancienne population not 
accepted the Anglo-American form of justice) suggests that 
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the "clash" represented little more than a case of hiccups. 
Such encounters certainly bothered Louisiana's judges, but 
the problems resolved themselves naturally as the Anglo-
American committment to stare decisis and the predisposition 
of the independent judiciary to regard the codes as nothing 
more than guides that could be supported, contradicted, and 
assisted by outside authorities, prevailed over Livingston's 
political tricks. By using rules of procedure, 
jurisprudence, and education to make Anglo-American judicial 
practices systemic to Louisiana's legal culture, its judges 
guaranteed the continuation of the American form of judicial 
procedure. 
In both jurisdictions the independence of the 
judiciary owed its origins to legislative innovation, 
strong-minded judges, the courts' ability to manipulate 
their practices and procedures via court rules, and the 
peculiarly Anglo-American prerogatives of judge-made law. 
Virginia's constitutional conventions and subsequent 
judiciary acts of the General Assembly separated the 
judicial system from the legislative and executive branches 
of government. The separation proved to be a truly 
revolutionary innovation on judicial procedure as the judges 
of Virginia's Court of Appeals and later the Supreme Court 
of Appeals took on an activism that the legislators had not 
envisioned.l Once the court established an independent and 
lsee Caton v. commonwealth and the "Remonstrance of the 
Judges" for early expressions of judicial independence. 
---------
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activist stance, the trend toward true separation of powers 
gained momentum. The judges utilized their legislatively 
granted rights to set up their own rules to streamline and 
to reform procedure and to regulate practices in the state's 
inferior courts. Moreover, through a series of decisions, 
beginning with the articulation of judicial review in Caton 
v. Commonwealth, the court assumed a greater measure of 
control over defining its own prerogatives and its role in 
the new state government. Once the court established its 
positio11, practical concerns related to the efficient and 
equitable administration of justice forced it to eschew the 
republican regard for the legislative will in favor of 
judicial innovation. With Thornton v. Smith the court 
tentatively challenged legislative prohibitions on its 
ability to apply post-1607 English decisions to resolve 
cases. By the end of the Pendleton era, the challenge was 
restated in bolder terms in Browne et al. v. Turberville et 
al. After Pendleton's death, despite st. GP.orge Tucker's 
traditionalism, the court embraced the liberal leadership of 
Spencer Roane. In Baring v. Reeo~r, Coleman v. Moody, and 
Findlay v. Smith, Virginia's supreme court, at Roane's 
insistance, systematically destroyed the prohibitions on 
post-1607 English precedent and legitimated the practice of 
consulting foreign decisions once and for all.2 Thus by 
2caton v. Commonwealth, ;Thornton v.Smith, 1 Wash. 83-
84; Browne et al. v. Turberville et al., 2 Call 390-409; 
Baring v. Reeder, 1 H&M, 154-176; Coleman v. Moody, 4 H&M, 
1-23; Findlay v. Smith et ux. et al., 6 Munf., 148. 
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combining legislative prescriptions for separation of powers 
and rulemaking descretion with an Anglo-American 
predisposition to consult English precedent, the Supreme 
court of Appeals for Virginia emerg~d as a truly independent 
and creative tribunal. 
Louisiana's judges employed the same tools as 
Virginia's justices to establish and to solidify their 
judicial independence. With the blessing of the territorial 
legislature, American judges mingled Roman, French, Spanish, 
English, and American private law with Anglo-American 
criminal law and judicial practice to create a mixed 
jurisdiction that was overseen by a thoroughly American 
judiciary. After Louisiana became a state, the supreme 
court continued the trend by adopting court rules, 
regulations for bar membership, and Anglo-American legal 
procedures such as briefs and common law writs. A healthy 
dose of creative jurisprudence allowed for the continuation 
of the trend toward Americanization. Livingston's 
machinations only strengthened the resolve of the court to 
preserve its Anglo-American flavor via judicial decisions 
and rules related to legal educa~ion. The preservation 
attempt climaxed in 1839 and 1840 with the decision in 
Reynolds v. Swain et al. and in the syllabus passed for 
prospective applicants to the state bar.3 
Thus in both Virginia and Louisiana, the independent 
judiciaries seized upon the authority their legislatures 
3see Chapters Three and Five above. 
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granted them and increased their prerogatives to ensure 
their continued independence and to define their role within 
the governmental power structure. In doing so, both states 
flirted with legal revolution. Such innovation, however, 
should not be surprising since the four classic 
preconditions for legal revolution--that the law had become 
"cumbrous and remote from social realities," that "realistic 
borrowing" from foreign jurisdictions had become possible, 
that a climate of "political and social revolution" existed, 
and that "a forceful ruling elite" was willing to use law to 
as the instrument for the revolutionary reshaping of 
society--wer~ present in both jurisdictions at their 
inception. 4 A look at how each jurisdiction responded to 
those preconditions is illustrative. 
In Virginia the law had become "cumbrous and remote 
from social realities" shortly after the Revolution. The 
reception statute that Virginia's Revolutionary convention 
passed meshed well with the whig ideology that informed the 
war for independence as it prohibited the use of "corrupt," 
recent English decisions. But the Virginian's traditional 
reliance on English guidance in things legal created a 
difficult paradox--some dependence on English tradition was 
invaluable while more current, and sometimes more 
commonsensical, British innovations were taboo. By the mid-
1790s, those paradoxes created such problems for the supreme 
4Alan Watson, The Evolution of Law, (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) see especially, 
110-114. 
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court that it began to attack the Revolutionary prohibition 
on consulting modern English sources in favor of the more 
expedient legal remedies that ·the contemporary decisions 
provided. Beginning with Thornton v. Smith and culminating 
in Findlay v. Smith, Virginia's supreme court judges made 
laws that circumscribed the restrictions of the 
Revolutionary convention. Furthermore, when the court's own 
practices of overly lengthy and erudite consultations of 
British cases encumbered the docket and paralyzed justice in 
the first decade of the nineteenth-century, governor John 
Tyler stepped in with an eloquent plea for codification--a 
measure that further revolutionized the Old Dominion's legal 
system. 
Louisiana's laws proved "cumbersome and remote from 
social realities'' from the beginning of the territorial era. 
Laussat's suspension of the Cabildo threw any assessment of 
the laws in force into hopeless confusion. The Prevost 
court put some order to the law in a revolutionary fashion 
as it employed both civilian and common law remedies in 
common sensical fashion and as it e~braced Anglo-American 
court procedures to govern its daily business. From 1806 to 
1808, the legislature assisted the court in defining the 
limits of the jurisdiction by commissioning Lewis Kerr's 
Exposition of the Criminal Laws and James Brown and Moreau-
Lilset's Digest of 1808. Those authorities endorsed the 
commonsensical borrowing from outside civil law and common 
law sources and formed the core of the mixed jurisdiction 
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until the legislature sought to replace them with a new code 
in the 1820s. But the legislative attempt at codification 
ultimately reaffirmed the revolution that brought Anglo-
American law and court procedures to Louisiana when Thomas 
Slidell forced judge Martin to reconsider the role of the 
court in Reynolds v. swain et al. 
The long colonial heritage shared by both states 
facilitated the "realistic borrowing" from foreign systems. 
Virginia's long association with England provided the most 
obvious possibility for such borrowing, and the task was 
concluded when the state's judiciary began to reconsider the 
1776 reception statute. In the jurisprudence that followed, 
the judges' also asserted their rights to consult other 
foreign, and non-British, sources as well. Finally, the 
codification movement, a national trend that included a 
romance with civilian authorities on matters of land law 6 
offered another possibility for the state's judges and 
legislators to borrow ideas from alien sources. "Realistic 
borrowing," was a simple fact of life in Louisiana as 
jurisdictional uncertainty coincided with the rise of a 
multi-ethnic legal culture. 
In an indirect sense, both states were informed by 
political and social revolution. The American Revolution 
provided that opportunity for the Old Dominion as patriots 
sloughed off British rule and created a new political and 
social order for themselves. Louisiana;s flirtation with 
political and social revolution was less spectacular, yet 
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nonetheless profound. When Laussat suspended the Cabildo, 
he threw the state into legal and political chaos. Thus the 
cession and the creation of an American government in 
Louisiana signifies nothing short of a political revolution. 
Moreover, the Louisiana Purchase touched off a wave of 
American immigration that influenced great changes in the 
social order, particularly in regard to American domination 
of the legal community.5 
Finally, each state possessed a ''forceful ruling 
elite" that was willing to use the law as its instrument for 
the revolutionary reshaping of society. The work of that 
ruling elite is evident both in Virginia's law revisal and 
in the later operations and jurisprudence of the independent 
judiciary. In Louisiana, the legal community was dominated 
by American lawyers and judges who created a representative 
American court system to oversee their hybrid jurisdiction. 
Thus in both states, judicial independence combined and 
interacted with opportunities for legal revolution to 
transform the court systems of the early national era from 
models of colonial justice to American courts that followed 
a basic co~~on law pattern, but allowed for a good deal of 
borrowing from foreign systems and judicial innovation. By 
the middle of the nineteenth century, the supreme courts of 
both systems had evolved into remarkably similar tribunals 
in terms of judicial practice and procedure as well as in 
5oargo, Jefferson's Louisiana; Newton, The 
Americanization of Louisiana. 
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regard to the diversity which marked American justice in the 
antebellum period. Although the dance between law and 
society in each jurisdiction moved to slightly different 
rhythms, it embraced a common melody to provide continuity 
to its opening movement. 
-----------
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Appendix I 
Civil Law and Common Law 
A central point of this dissertation is that Louisiana 
under American rule, because of the background of its judges 
and lawyers, developed an important common law tradition to 
accompany its civilian heritage in the creation of a mixed 
jurisdiction and is not so alien to the American system of 
justice as has been previously suggested. In order to 
understand the implications of the interaction between civil 
law and common law in such a mixed jurisdiction, it is 
necessary to define each term, and to discuss what the 
intermingling of the two systems means in regard to legal 
change and development. 
Civil law has two precise definitions. The first 
distinguishes the "municipal law" of a given community, that 
is, its "civil or private rights and remedies as contrasted 
with criminal laws" which derive from the "Laws of Nature" 
or "International Law."l This definition applies to all 
modern jurisdictions, and does not concern this study. 
The second definition of civil law refers to a system of 
law pioneered by the Romans. Written codes represent the 
most important authorities of the civil law; however, 
judicial decisions sometimes play a minor role in resolving 
civil law disputes. civil law judges are rigidly restricted 
to apply appropriate code citations in order to arrive at 
lBlack's Law Dictionary, 223. 
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their decisions. Accordingly, the duties of the civil law 
judge leave little room for judicial interpretation of 
precedent, and the concept of "judge-made" law is alien to 
the bystem. After the fall of the Roman empire, civil law 
remained a popular tool for conflict resolution in Europe 
and became the backbone of the legal systems of many 
European countries including France and Spain.2 Since both 
France and Spain once controlled colonial Louisiana, the 
colony developed a strong civilian heritage by the time 
Thomas Jefferson purchased it for the United States in 1803. 
Common law found its most profound expression in 
England and its colonies. The common law is comprised of an 
infinite number of principles and social rules that have 
developed from time-honored customs and usages, judicial 
decisions that are based on those customs, all statutory and 
case law made in England and pre-Revolutionary America, and 
the positive law and juristic theory of any country of a 
general and universal nature.3 In common law jurisdictions, 
emphasis on custom and usage and judicial decisions 
distinguishes common law judges from their civilian brethren 
as the ability to interpret those decisions and customs 
allows them greater flexibility. Moreover, once a common 
law judge renders a decision, his or her judgment becomes a 
part of the common law as well. Rather than functioning as 
a mere technician, the common law judge actually "makes law" 
2rbid. 
3rbid., 251. 
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every time he or she decides a case. 
Since civil law and common law developed in different 
regions under varied circumstances, they occasionally differ 
greatly over certain substantive issues. For instance, in 
regard to the laws of descents the English showed a strong 
preference for the convention of primogeniture. Under civil 
law, descents were settled by a policy of "forced heirship" 
which simply meant that a man's estate was divided equally 
among all of his survivors. Another distinction may be seen 
in the realm of criminal law. In common law jurisdictions, 
municipal statutes as well as an infinite variety of 
customs, usages, theories, and precedent all figure into a 
judge's decision. In civil law jurisdictions, municipal 
regulations alone offer remedies to the judge. Moreover, in 
common law the accused in a criminal case is presumed 
innocent and the burden to prove guilt falls on the state. 
Criminal defendants in civilian jurisdictions are considered 
guilty and must prove their innocence beyond a shadow of a 
doubt. 
Neither Virginia nor Louisiana represents a purely 
common law or purely civil law jurisdiction.4 Louisiana 
4one further distinction must be :Jade he:re--"English 
law" does not necessarily mean "common law." Although 
common law in the form of statutes and judicial decisions 
formed the foundation of the British legal system, other 
forms of law, for instance equity, as seen in the Court of 
Chancery, combined with the common law to comprise the 
British judicial system. Thus when the term common law is 
used to describe English or American judicial practices, it 
is done so in a general and imprecise fashion, referring to 
a general acceptance of precedent in the absence of statutes 
as a basis for legal decisions and to the binding nature of 
-----·---
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
adopted the common law, both the Anglo-American and the 
theoretical versions as well as French and Spanish civil 
laws, at an early period in its judicial development under 
American rule. This may be seen in the procedural 
discussion of the Superior Court for the Territory of 
Orleans in Chapter III. Virginia's lawmakers flirted with 
civil law theory in the early phases of their post-
Revolutionary reorganization. The revisal of the laws, 
sought to establish a comprehensive code for the Old 
Dominion while at the same time preserving pre-1607 common 
285 
law. Although this early example of codification failed to 
provide the state with a comprehensive code, it does 
demonstrate an appreciation of the civil law on the part of 
the revolutionaries. Moreover, Jefferson's attack on 
primogeniture and entail in the law revisal reflected a 
general American movement away from primogeniture. Thus 
both Virginia and Louisiana may be viewed as mixed 
jurisdictions in their early stages of statehood. 
But to state that each jurisdiction shared certain 
common features hardly scratches the surface of the 
importance of Louisiana's common law tradition to its legal 
development. The real question is to what extent did common 
law inform the discourse of Louisiana's legal system? The 
answer is quite simple: common law traditions entered 
those decisions. Judicial decisions are not nearly as 
binding in civil law jurisdictions where judges act merely 
as technicians in applying code citations and where judicial 
decisions are only rarely invoked to resolve disputes. 
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Louisiana's judicial discourse in three ways--through 
legislation, court rules, and judicial decisions. 
The legislation which regulated judicial procedure and 
empowered the court to make its own rules in the territorial 
period continued in effect in Louisiana after it entered the 
Union. Subsequently, the writs that were established under 
these auspices bore the prescription that they be employed 
"according to the common law." Moreover, both the Digest of 
1808 and the 1825 Civil Code contained sections gleaned from 
the work of English authorities such as sir Edward Coke's 
Institutes and Sir William Blackstone's commentaries. 
Finally, Kerr's Exposition of the Criminal Laws originated 
in the works of English commentators, particularly 
Blackstone and Sir Matthew Hale. Thus the common law 
entered Louisiana via legislation and the redaction of the 
state's various digests, expositions, and codes.5 
5"An Act Regulating the Practice of the Superior Court 
in Civil Causes," Orleans Acts, 10 April 1805. A brief 
historiographi~al explanation must be considered here in 
regard to the contribution of Louisiana's redactors. The 
main redactor of both the Digest and the 1825 Civil Code was 
Louis Moreau Lislet, a French resident of New Orleans and 
one of the period's most prominent attorneys. Contemporary 
legal scholarship in Louisiana regards the 1808 Digest as 
the sole contribution of Moreau Lislet, offering no credit 
to Lislet's fellow jurisconsult, James Brown. Thus 
Louisiana's legal scholars often react with surprise when 
citations from English commentators (Blackstone is by far 
the most common) are noted in studies of Louisiana's civil 
law. In order to understand why these references should not 
be surprising, it is necessary to probe the origins of the 
historiographical tradition that excludes common law as an 
element in Louisiana's legal settlement. These origins may 
be traced to a single source--see Rodolfo Batiza, "Crigins 
of Modern Codification of the Civil Law: The French 
Experience and Its Implications for Louisiana Law," Tulane 
Law Review 56 (February 1982), 583. Batiza, in the midst of 
--- . ----- --------
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a v~c~ous historiographical debate over the origins of 
Louisiana's civil code with Robert A. Paschal, was seeking 
to uncover the French sources of Louisiana's early codes. 
For the most part, Batiza•s essay depends on a masterfully 
executed comparison of the Digest with various French and 
Spanish sources. As evidence for the importance of French 
sources, Batiza sought to emphasize Moreau Lislet's 
influence on the development of the Digest. Here Batiza 
argued that James Brown had nothing to do with the drafting 
of the Digest, basing his argument on an 1823 report to the 
Louisiana legislature that was designed to engineer a new 
compilation of the state's law. In the report, Moreau 
Lislet stated that he alone drafted the 1808 Digest. But 
this evidence is flimsy, and at best, specious. In the 
first place, Moreau Lislet never protested the inclusion of 
James Brown's name on the published Digest. Certainly, if 
Moreau Lislet had done all of the work on the compilation, 
he would have coi.tplained to the legislature when Brown 
received half of the credit. Second, Moreau Lislet's 
statement is not substantiated in any way. Moreover, James 
Brown was never given an opportunity to respond to the 
claim. Finally, there is enough evidence to suggest that 
Moreau Lislet's claim may have been politically motivated. 
In the early 1820s Louisiana, like many American states 1 was: 
swept by a codification movement. Not only was the 1808 
Digest inadequate for the state's legal needs, but it lacked 
the authority of an official code. As preparations to 
draft a new code began in the legislature, partisan 
political divisions crept up as they did over any piece of 
legislation. When the legislature assigned a committee to 
study the possibilities of preparing a new code, a group of 
legislators identified with the 'creole faction' of the 
legislature seized control of the committee. In the first 
place, this cabal was not solely comprised of members of 
Louisiana's ancienne pop~lation. In fact, the leading 
figure of the interest group was Edward Livingston, an 
aggressive New York lawyer and entrepreneur. Livingston had 
long utilized the problem of integrating civil law and 
common law in Louisiana to his personal advantage. In the 
territorial period Livingston led the forces in favor of 
civilian reception and the drive for statehood. In both 
cases, he did so in order to oppose the forces loyal to 
Governor Claiborne, a group which often opposed Livingston's 
aggressive entrepreneurial schemes. A political outsider, 
Livingston tied his fortune to the so-called civilian 
faction of the legislature in order to ensure a measure of 
political prominence. For the most part he succeeded. As 
his junto postured to control the codification bill, 
Livingston managed to get himself appointed to the committee 
along with Moreau Lislet and another prominent Frenchman, 
Pierre Derbigny. Accordingly, the unsubstantiated statement 
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Court rules likewise allowed for common law reception 
as judges regulated their tribunal's proceedings under the 
guidelines laid out in enabling legislation. Attending to 
the various fOLmS of writs and summonses issued by the 
judges was by far the most common way in which court rules 
allowed for common law reception. Jury trials, provided for 
in the Practice Act of 1805, also forced the judges to 
devise their rules witcin the limits of common law practice. 
Finally, the responsibility of regulating a bar that relied 
on such common law devices allowed for further reception.6 
As a matter of juristic theory, common law application 
in Louisiana has a more complicated background. In order to 
understand the implications of judicial contributions, it is 
first necessary to distinguish between the role of judges in 
civilian courts and in common law courts. 
In the British and American traditions of common law 
judges review litigants' petitions, hear viva voce 
examinations of witnesses, and, when appropriate, consider 
the recommendations of a jury in rendering their decisions. 
Often in deciding cases or pronouncing sentences, common law 
judges employ codified maxims and statute law. Since the 
in the committee's report must be taken with a grain of 
salt. Also, the utilization of common law authorities in 
the early codes must also be viewed in terms of the 
historical evidence. Even if Moreau Lislet's claim was 
true, he was a prominent member of the legal community and a 
frequent litigator before the supreme bench. Accordingly, 
Moreau Lislet, through years of practice, had become quite 
familiar with Anglo-American legal conventions. Why would 
he not use them when redacting the codes? 
6see Chapter Three and Chapter Five. 
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common law is only partially codified, judges are often 
forced to look elsewhere for solutions to the cases before 
their benches. Often a case will be settled on the basis of 
a single decision rendered in a previous trial. When a case 
is decided as such, it is considered settled by the 
principle of stare decisis, one of the cornerstones of 
English and American judicial theory. Accordingly, in 
common law jurisdictions, the reputation of a court rests on 
the judge's ability to master mountains of jurisprudence. 
To achieve such mastery, judges are expected to hone their 
legal research skills and scholarship during lengthy 
apprenticeships as practicing attorneys. Theoretically, 
only the best lawyers are offered opportunities to ascend to 
the revered position of judge.? 
In civilian jurisdictions, however, judges operate 
chiefly as judicial administrators. For the most part, 
judges are presented with written petitions from each 
litigant--the plaintiff makes his complaint and the 
defendant answers it. The judges will then search the 
various codes which comprise the jurisdiction's laws in 
force and apply appropriate citations in order to render 
their decisions. In rare instances when the codes fail to 
present clear solutions, judges will then turn to previous 
judicial decisions to inform their judgments. Unlike common 
?Jean Baudouin, "The Impact of the Common Law on the 
Civilian Systems of Louisiana and Quebec," in Joseph Dainow, 
The Role of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Civil Law and 
in Mixed Jurisdictions, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1974), 15-22. 
------------
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law judges, civilian magistrates must uncover a long strain 
of consistent decisions in order to use them as the basis of 
a judgment. This procedure, known as jurisprudence 
constante, represents a lengthy and exhaustive process, and 
is rarely used in civilian courts. Moreover, jurisprudence 
constante, by requiring an immense string of consistent 
decisions deemphasizes the importance individual decisions. 
And since no single decision of any civilian judge may be 
used to decide a case, the role of the individual judge is 
far less powerful and creative in civil law jurisdictions 
than in common law jurisdictions. Because the method of 
rendering judgment in civilian systems requires such strict 
documentation and skills largely unnecessary to the 
advocate's practice of constructing and refuting complaints, 
prospective judges train for their positions in law school 
and assume the bench shortly after graduation. Thus judges 
in civilian jurisdictions assume the role of trained 
technicians in a tightly restricted legal environment.S 
The contrast between stare decisis (regarded widely as 
"judge made law") in common law jurisdictions and the rarely 
used civilian doctrine of jurisprudence constante marks the 
salient difference between the role of the judge in civilian 
and common law jurisdictions. Common law judges are viewed 
as a trusted lav1givers, seasoned by years of hard study and 
practical experience, and invested with power to interpret 
and to create crucial portions of their society's legal 
srbid., 15-22. 
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discourse. Civilian judges, as specialized technocrats, 
lack the creative power of common law magistrates and play 
less spectacular roles in their legal systems. 
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Laussat's suspension of the Cabildo, which cast doubt 
on the Louisiana's laws in force; the lack of a 
comprehensive code; and the Practice Act of 1805's 
provisions for jury trials, common law writs, and viva voce 
examinations forced Louisiana's judges to embrace the common 
law style of judicature. Moreover, the fact that from the 
territorial period to the Federal Occupation of Louisiana in 
1862 the overwhelming majority of Louisiana's most powerful 
magistrates--its appellate judges--were Americans9 (most 
sporting American legal educations) ensured the perpetuation 
of the judicial style of common law juridictions. 
9warren M. Billings, ed., The Historic Rules of the 
supreme Court of Louisiana, 1813-1879, (Lafayette: Center 
For Louisiana studies, University of Southern Louisiana 
History Series, No. 15, 1985), Appendix I 43-50. 
----------
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Appendix II 
Alexander campbell to Robert Carter of Nomini Hall 
Plan to Revise County Courts ca. 1790 
15 September 17901 
The present County Court establishment seems to be highly 
inconvenient to the people. The constant succession of the 
quarterly & monthly courts takes the people from their 
labour and their plantations at all seasons of the year, and 
at those particularly, when their presence at heme is most 
necessary. Experience too evinces that the system tho this 
inconvenient is by nc means calculated to produce expidition 
and order in the administration of Justice. The concurrent 
jurisdicition of the quarterly and monthly sessions, with 
respect to a variety of subjects; such as Injunctions in 
Chancery, petitions for small debts, & motions of different 
kinds, produces confusion in the first Place--employs a 
greater part of the time which ought to be employ 1 d in the 
trial of Regular causes--and by the frequent attendance of 
witnesses, and other charges attending a delay of justice, 
burden to the suitors with excessive debts. These 
considerations have induced me to project a plan on whc I 
mean to consult the intelligent gentm. of the district I 
know beg leave to submit it to Mr. Carter for his perusal & 
1carter Family Papers, 1651-1861, Mss. 12468al45-98l, 
(sect. 22), Virginia Historical Society. 
-----------------------
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opinion. The plan is: 
The Council are to Elect 9 gentlemen in each of the 
counties Each county is to be divided into 3 Districts. 3 
of those Nine gentlemen are to be Judges of the court of 
Pleas. This court is to sit twice a year. 12 days at each 
session. The sessions to begin on the first of March & the 
15 Novr. They may extend their session to 15 days if that 
time be necessary in order to go thro their Docket. 
Their Jurisdiction is to be all cases where the title or 
bounds of Land came into Question. In all actions of 
Detinue Traver, and in all actions of Debt &c where the Debt 
exceeds LlO. And there are confined entirely to pleas of 
this nature. 
Three other of the above mention'd 9 are to be Justices of 
a Court to be call'd an Orphan's Court, for Examg into 
Orphan's business &c. & to receive appeals on Caviats 
entered before a District Magistrate respecting the preobate 
of Wills &c. This Court to sit twice a year The days each 
term in the month of [ ] & [ ] & to try 
petitions for Debts of the value of L 10, & not exceedg L5. 
The remaining 3 are to be District Magistrates one to 
reside in each of the three Districts. Their business will 
be to try warrants of the value of L5 downwards -- to 
receive the probat of Deeds & Wills (wch will be very 
convent. to the people) unless an objection be made [to] 
such probat; and in that case he is to Certify it to the 
Orphan's court (in the Case of Wills, there to be 
-·- ---- --~ 
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Determined) and transmit together with his Certificate the 
will to be produced to him for probat. 
This plan will require Correction. THese are it's [sic] 
general outlines. I divides and distributes the different 
duties of the Court and from this distribution it seems to 
me that order and expedition will ensue. 
The plan in its present rough state is Submitted to Mr. 
295 
Carter with this one additional observation--that tho' the 
court of pleas will sit but twice a year, when it will be 
most convt. for the people to attend, it will in one Case 
sit as many days at the Quarterly Courts now sit--business, 
will [g]o thro' it's [sic] Docket twice a year; Whch now it 
does not do, once in four years. Add to this the 
respectability wch the system will give to those who will be 
chosen Judges of this Court. 
sept. 15 1790 
Robert Cart Esq. N. Hall [signed] Alex Campbell 
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APPENDIX III 
EDITORIAL NOTE 
The following writs demonstrate the similarities between 
writs of habeas corpus in Louisiana and Virginia. Writ #1 
is the earliest surviving example of a writ of habeas corpus 
in Louisiana. Writ #2 is a copy of the form of a writ of 
habeas corpus as prescribed in Lewis Kerr's An Exposition of 
the Criminal Laws of the Territory of Orleans: The Practice 
of the Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, the Duties of their 
Officers. with a Collection of Forms for the Use of 
Magistrates and Others, (New Orleans: Bradford & Anderson, 
1806; rept. Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, 1986), XLVII. Finally, 
writ #3 is a copy of the form of a writ of habeas corpus as 
prescribed in William Waller Hening's The Virginia Justice, 
Comprising the Office and Authority of a Justice of the 
Peace in the Commonwealth of Virginia together with a 
Variety of Useful Precedents, Adapted to the Laws now in 
Force to which is Added An Appendix. Containing all the most 
Approved Forms in Conveyancing: Deeds of Bargain and Sale, 
of Lease and Release, of Trust, Mortgages, Bills of Sale, 
etc. Also the Duties of A Justice of the Peace; Arising 
under the Laws of the United States, 4th ed., Revised, 
corrected, greatly enlarged, and adapted to the Revised Code 
of 1819 and the laws subsequently passed, (Richmond: 
Shepherd & Pollard, 1825), 325-326. 
296 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
297 
WRIT #1 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR ] WAKEFIELD, 19 APRIL 1806 
* * * * 
The Honorable John B. Prevost, Judge of the Superior Court 
in and for the Territory of Orleans. 
To George T. Ross Esquire, Sheriff of the County of Orleans 
in the said Territory. 
Greeting, 
We command you that you have the body of [ ) Wakefield 
now in prison, under your custody confined, as is said, 
under safe and secure conduct, together with the day and 
cause of his commitment and detention, by whatsoever name he 
is known in the same before us at ten Oclock in the forenoon 
of this nineteenth day of April at the Hotel de ville in the 
city of New Orleans to receive and submit to all and 
singular those things, which we may then and there in this 
behalf, consider and determine, and have yo1, then and there 
this writ. 
[seal] 
[over) 
Habeas Corpus 
Witness John B. Prevost Judge 
of the Superior Court of the 
Territory of Orleans this 
nineteenth day of April in the 
Year 1806. 
[signed) J. w. Smith Clk. 
---------- ··-
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I allow this writ of Habeas Corpus to issue 
Dated 
19 April 1806 
(signed] J. B. Prevostl 
EDITORIAL NOTE 
The writ is hand written and folded on docket sized 
paper. 
WRIT #2 
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No. 15. Fonn of a Writ of Habeas Corpus. issuing out of and 
returnable instanter to the Superior Court in Session.2 
* * * * 
"The Territory of Orleans, to the Sheriff of the County of 
Orleans, or other person in charge of the Public Prison of 
the said county, 
Greeting: 
"You are hereby commanded that you forthwith have the body 
of A B, now in your prison detained, and in your custody, as 
is said, together with the day and cause of his caption and 
detention, by whatever name he may be known, before the 
honorable the superior court in and over this territory, to 
do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the said court Ehall 
consider in that behalf. And have you then and there this 
writ. 
lsuperior Court for the Territory of Orleans, NOPL, 
City Archives, Box #1171-1303. 
2use of underline in the following transcriptions 
signifies the use of italics in the original. 
----------- ---
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"Witness the honorable J B P,3 senior judge 
of the said Superior Court, at the City 
of 
(L. S.) New-Orleans, this sixth day of, &c. in 
the year one thousnad, &c. 
J w T,4 Clerk of the Court." 
When this writ is issued by a judge, the court not being in 
session,m neither the seal of the court, nor the signature 
of the clerk is necessary. It is sufficient that the writ 
be tested in the name of the judge who allows it, and that 
his allowance of it be certified by endorsement on it with 
his own hand.5 
WRIT #3 
(A) Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. 
* * * * 
The commonwealth of Virginia, to (the person having the 
prisoner in custody.) 
We command you, that the body of H. D. detained in your 
custody, as it is said, together with the day and cause of 
his being taken and detained, by whatsoever name he may be 
called in the same, you hav~ under safe and secure conduct 
3John B. Prevost. 
4This is a typographical error. Kerr meant to write J 
W S in reference to J. W. Smith the clerk of the Superior 
Court, this is evidenced by the use of the correct initials 
in the French draft, Kerr, Exposition, XLVIII. 
5Kerr's use of the initials of Prevost and Smith in his 
samples suggest that he was following forms already 
established in the Superior Court. 
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before the judge of our (describe the court) immediately 
after the receipt of this writ, or before any judge of a 
superior court of chancery, or of the general court, to do, 
submit to and receive, all and singular those things, which 
shall then and there be considered of him, in this behalf. 
Witness c. T. judge of our (describe the court) at this 
day of in the year of our Lord and in the 
year of the commonwealth. 
T. (seal.) 
c. 
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Appendix IV 
EDITORIAL NOTE 
All definitions of legal terms contained in this appendix 
are quoted from Henry Campbell Black, Law Dictionary, fifth 
ed., (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1979). 
Rules of Court for the Court of Pleas, 1804.1 
* * * * 
At a court of Pleas held at the Hotel de Ville on tuesday 
evening the lOth of January 1804. Present 
Anthony Argotte 
Beverley Chew 
Benjamin Morgan 
William Kenner 
Paul Lanusse 
Francis M. Guerin 
Gaspard Debuys 
William Garland 
Eugene Dorsiere 
The Court, after mature deliberation, have adopted, and do 
order that the following Regulations be observed for the 
Government of the Court and its officers to wit: 
Art. 1 
All suits shall commence in this court by writs of 
summons,2 capias,3 or attachment.4 
1Minute Book, Court of Pleas for the Territory of 
Orleans, NOPL, City Archives. 
2A writ by which, under the English judicature acts, 
all actions are commenced, Black, Law Dictionary, 1445. 
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Art. 2 
A writ of Summons shall be issued, as a matter of course, 
by the clerk, at the request of any plaintiff, commanding 
the sheriff to require the attendance of a defendant at a 
time therein mentioned [page] not more than ten nor less 
than [blank] days after the date thereof, unless the court 
shall for special reasons direct otherwise. 
Art. 3 
302 
A writ of capias shall be issued in like manner by the 
clerk, at the request of any plaintiff, when a defendant is 
about to depart of the jurisdiction of the court, or 
[conceal] himself, commanding the sheriff to arrest such 
defendant, and have him before the court at anytime therein 
mentioned not more than ten nor less than [blank] days after 
the date thereof, unless the court shall for special reasons 
direct otherwise. But no writ of capias shall be issued 
unless the Plaintiff or some other creditable person, will 
make oath that the Defendant is, as the deponent believes, 
likely to depart out of the Jurisdiction of the Court, or 
conceal himself, before the final judgment shall be rendered 
3The general term for several species of writs, the 
common characteristic of which is that they require the 
officer to take the body of the defendant into custody, 
Black, Law Dictionary, 188. 
4A writ employed to enforce obedience to an order or 
judgment of the court. It may take the form of commanding 
the sheriff to attach the disobedient party and to have him 
before the court to answer his contempt. In its generic 
sense, any mesne civil process in the nature of a writ on 
which property may be attached, including trustee process, 
Black, Law Dictionary, 1443. 
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in the suit. 
Art. 4 
After the appearence of the parties, the court will proceed 
to trial immediately, or at some particular time thereafter, 
to be agreed upon by the parties, or appointed by the Court. 
Art. 5 
A writ of attachment shall in like manner be issued, at a 
plaintiff's request, when a defendant shall be beyond the 
jurisdiction of the court, or so concealed that he cannot be 
found; but before such writ issues, it shall be necessary 
that the plaintiff, or some other creditable person, shall 
make affidavit that such defendant is really indebted to the 
plaintiff in a specific sum, naming the same; and the said 
writ shall command the sheriff to sequester so much property 
of the said defendant as will be sufficient to satisfy the 
debt and costs likely to be recovered. 
(page] 
Art. 6 
Any defendant arrested on a writ of capias may be set at 
large on giving a bond in double the amount of the debt, 
with good and sufficient security to the sheriff conditioned 
for his appearance in court at the time appointed, and that 
he will either perform and fufill such judgment as may be 
rendered against him, [torn] deliver himself up to the 
sheriff, which bond shall, in case of forfeiture be put in 
suit by the sheriff, to the use of the said Plaintiff and 
the satisfaction of costs. 
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Art. 7 
On the return of the attachment, the court will give time 
to the defendant to appear, at their discretion, no less 
than four nor more than twelve months, and the same shall be 
nine times advertised in a public paper. And if within the 
time given, the defendant shall appear and deliver himself 
up to the sheriff, or give bail as is required of persons 
arrested on a capias, then the property which may have been 
seized shall be released, and the suit shall proceed as if 
commenced by capias. But if the defendant shall no appear 
within the time given, the Plaintiff shall on proof of his 
demand be entitled to a judgment and execution of the 
property of the defendant. 
Art. 8 
All parties shall be entitled to have from the Clerk, on 
application, as many subpenas as they may require to command 
the appearance and testimony of witness, on their behalf 
respectively. 
Art. 9 
The party, against whom judgment shall go, shall also be 
adjudged to pay the costs, unless the Court shall otherwise 
specifically direct. 
(page] 
Art. 10 
All writs or process shall be advanced to the Clerk by 
parties applying for the same. 
Art. 11 
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After judgment shall have been obtained, a writ of 
execution5 shall issue, commanding the sheriff to take or 
305 
retain (as the case may be)in his custody the party against 
Whom judgment shall have gone, and also to seize and sell 
such property of said party as he can find, and after 
satisfaction of all costs and charges occuring thereon, pay 
the next proceeds of such sales to the party who shall have 
recovered; but if the proceeds of the sales shall be 
r~turned insufficient to satisfy the judgment, costs and 
charges, the party against whom such execution shall have 
gone, shall be committed to prison without bail, till such 
judgment be satisfied. 
Art. 12 
The Court shall be attended by one crier to be appointed by 
the sd Court, as soon as the Municipality shall make some 
provisions for his maintenance. 
Art. 13 
The Court will likewise appoint for each ward or division 
of the City and its environs, one or more Constables, as 
soon as the Municipality shall make provision for their 
maintenance; and it shall be the duty of sd. constables to 
attend the Court while sitting and any magistrate thereof 
who shall require their attendance, and execute the orders 
of the Magistrate, and in all things to assist them and the 
sheriff and other civil officers, where called on, in the 
5A writ to put in force the judgment or decree of a 
court, Black, Law Dictionary, 1444. 
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due execution of the law. 
Art. 14 
All process shall issue in the name of the Governor, and be 
attested by the Clerk of Court. 
(page] 
Art. 15 
The Clerk of court shall administer all oaths required on 
behalf of the court. 
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